Iran Wants America’s Partners to Feel Abandoned. The US Must Prove Otherwise

Iran’s latest attacks across the Gulf and against Jordan are not random acts of retaliation. They reflect a deliberate political strategy: convince America’s regional partners that their relationships with Washington make them less secure, not more.

By striking American military facilities and related infrastructure in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan, and by threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran is targeting the long-established network of relationships and assets that allows the US to operate throughout the region.

Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, a major hub for American command-and-control operations. Kuwait provides critical logistics and air-defense infrastructure. Jordan is an indispensable platform for US operations, intelligence and regional defense. Oman occupies a pivotal position along the southern side of the Strait.

Iran is not simply choosing countries it dislikes. It is attacking the infrastructure of American regional power.

At the same time, Tehran appears to be calibrating its actions carefully. It has so far avoided the most devastating potential attacks on major Saudi and Emirati population centers, ports and energy infrastructure.

That is not because Iran regards Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates as friendly. Rather, major attacks against them could produce precisely what Tehran wants to prevent: a more unified coalition willing to impose severe costs on Iran.

Iran has avoided striking Israel in this round, presumably in order to avoid the significant Israeli retaliation that could lead to another cycle of escalation.

Rather than trigger an immediate region-wide war, Iran’s objective is to climb the escalation ladder selectively, pressure vulnerable American partners, and fragment the coalition confronting it.

The US should respond by targeting the political logic of that strategy.

The answer is neither an open-ended regional war nor another cycle of American withdrawal. It is strategic reinforcement: a more resilient US posture, stronger collective defenses, credible consequences for aggression, and deeper economic and political engagement.

Make Partnership an Asset, Not a Liability

The US has treated access to bases, ports, and airspace as part of longstanding security relationships without clearly articulating its corresponding obligations when those facilities make the host country a target.

Countries hosting US forces should know that if they are attacked because of that presence, the US will help defend their territory, replenish depleted interceptors, repair damaged military infrastructure, and provide emergency support.

Major US operations should also involve meaningful consultation with host governments when those operations could expose them to retaliation.

This does not require a NATO-style treaty but a clear political understanding: hosting American forces must strengthen a country’s national security, not leave it alone to absorb the consequences.

Iran’s strategy depends on convincing partners of the opposite.

Turn Bilateral Vulnerability into Collective Defense

Iran benefits from treating each confrontation as a separate bilateral crisis. Bahrain worries about Bahrain. Jordan worries about Jordan. Qatar worries about Qatar. Smaller states may hesitate to respond forcefully because they fear being isolated.

The US should work with its partners to make an attack against any one of them a regional security problem.

Much of the most valuable cooperation can occur quietly through shared radar tracks, common early-warning protocols, interoperable command systems, and contingency plans for moving defensive assets among countries.

Iranian missiles and drones do not respect national borders. The response cannot remain trapped within them.

Harden and Disperse the American Presence

Doubling down on US commitments does not mean rebuilding every damaged base exactly as it was.  Large, concentrated, and highly visible installations offer Iran both operational targets and propaganda opportunities. Even a strike that produces limited damage can generate dramatic images that make the American presence appear vulnerable and politically costly.

The US should harden aircraft shelters, fuel depots, power systems, and communications infrastructure. It should disperse aircraft and personnel across a wider network of locations, increase the mobility of radars and air defenses, create redundant supply routes, and demonstrate an ability to restore damaged facilities quickly.

Resilience is itself a form of deterrence. If Iran concludes that attacks will not disable American operations, fracture US partnerships or generate pressure for withdrawal, the political value of those attacks declines.

The goal should therefore not necessarily be more permanent bases or a dramatically larger American footprint. It should be a harder, more flexible, and sustainable one.

Establish Collective Consequences for Aggression

Defensive resilience alone will not be sufficient. Iran must also understand that targeting a smaller or more exposed partner is not a low-cost alternative to confronting a more powerful state.

Washington should make clear that the response to an attack need not be limited to the territory where the missile or drone lands. The US and its partners should retain the option to impose costs on the Iranian systems enabling the attack.

This does not mean automatic military retaliation after every intercepted drone. It means restoring uncertainty in Tehran’s calculations.

Reduce Iran’s Economic Leverage

Iran’s ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz remains one of its greatest sources of coercive power. The US and its partners must continue to protect freedom of navigation, but they should also reduce the region’s long-term economic vulnerability.

That means expanding pipelines and export routes that bypass Hormuz and strengthening ports on the Red Sea and Arabian Sea – initiatives Saudi Arabia and the UAE are already advancing – as well as protecting subsea cables and energy infrastructure and creating more resilient transportation and logistics networks.

Such actions reduce Iran’s ability to hold the international economy hostage.

Commitment Must Extend Beyond the Military

Finally, the US cannot define commitment to the Middle East solely through bases, aircraft carriers, and air-defense systems.

American embassies should be fully staffed. Washington should expand trade, technology, infrastructure and educational partnerships, and support the region’s emerging networks of economic integration.

A broader commitment demonstrates that America is invested not only in defending the region, but also in its future.

Iran’s strategy is designed to force a choice between escalation and retreat. The US should reject that false choice. The right response is sustained, disciplined engagement: defending partners, strengthening collective resilience, imposing credible consequences for aggression, and ensuring that Iranian coercion produces deeper regional cooperation rather than American withdrawal.

Iran wants America’s partners to believe that standing with Washington leaves them exposed. US strategy must prove that partnership instead brings stronger defenses, faster recovery, greater economic resilience, and a more secure regional order.