Is It Time to Negotiate with Terrorists?
Secretary of State Marco Rubio is right. Governments negotiate with governments, not terrorist organizations. Governments possess the authority to negotiate peace.
But authority alone does not always determine whether peace can be sustained.
Lebanon, a sovereign government, has the recognized authority to negotiate with Israel, a sovereign government. Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed terrorist organization, does not. Yet if Hezbollah chooses to violate a ceasefire, launch rockets, or reject an agreement, it can determine whether peace can be sustained.
Governments can negotiate peace. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization, can destroy it.
That reality was reinforced again this week when Hezbollah rejected a US-brokered Israel-Lebanon security proposal, dismissing it as a “surrender” to Israel. The message was clear: governments may negotiate agreements, but organizations outside the negotiating room can still determine whether those agreements endure.
This is not simply a conflict between Israel and Lebanon. It is part of a broader regional struggle involving Israel, Iran, and the United States. Hezbollah is not merely a Lebanese actor. It is Iran’s most powerful proxy on Israel’s northern border, and its actions can affect not only the stability of Lebanon but the broader diplomatic effort to reduce tensions with Tehran.
That broader context matters because these negotiations are not an end in themselves. They are one piece of a larger effort to reduce regional tensions, stabilize Lebanon, and lower the risk of a wider conflict involving Iran. Yet that objective depends on more than the intentions of the governments at the table. If an Iranian-backed proxy retains the ability to escalate the conflict independently, then the success of diplomacy depends not only on what governments agree to, but on whether those with the power to preserve or destroy those agreements decide to do either. That is the paradox confronting modern diplomacy.
That is where the question of intent becomes critical.
Lebanon may intend to reduce conflict. Israel may intend to secure its border. The United States may seek to lower regional tensions. Even Iran may engage in diplomacy when it serves its interests. But if Hezbollah retains both the means and the incentive to undermine an agreement, where does that leave the peace process?
Peace is negotiated at the table. War is often decided outside the room.
The pattern has become predictable. Governments negotiate a ceasefire. Hezbollah attacks or refuses to stand down. Israel responds. International attention shifts from the violation itself to Israel’s military response. The ceasefire weakens, pressure mounts, and diplomats return to the table.
The heart of the problem is not legitimacy. It is power.
No serious democracy should grant diplomatic legitimacy to a terrorist organization. But serious diplomacy also cannot pretend that formal authority and practical power are always held by the same actors. In Lebanon, they are not.
Diplomacy succeeds when authority, power, and intent are aligned. It becomes fragile when they are not.
If Lebanon has the authority to negotiate, but Hezbollah has the power to decide whether rockets are fired, then any agreement that excludes Hezbollah from the equation is incomplete. If Israel and Lebanon reach terms, but Iran’s proxy can undermine them, then the conflict itself remains unresolved. And if Washington is pursuing a broader effort to reduce tensions with Iran while Iran’s most powerful proxy can derail that effort, diplomacy is operating with a dangerous blind spot.
This does not mean endorsing Hezbollah. It does not mean accepting terrorism as legitimate. It means recognizing reality.
Diplomacy has to account not only for who possesses the authority to negotiate, but for who possesses the power to determine the outcome.
What happens when diplomacy recognizes one set of actors, but reality is controlled by another?
That is the uncomfortable question at the center of the Israel-Lebanon negotiations. It is also the question behind the title of this essay.
Is it time to negotiate with terrorists?
Perhaps the answer is still no. But if those capable of destroying peace remain outside the process, diplomacy must confront a harder truth: ignoring them does not make them irrelevant—it makes durable peace more fragile.
