Is Jordan Next?

As Bashar al-Assad settles into his new Russian-hosted dacha, with Damascus smouldering and ISIS-like factions rounding up Alawite elites to bolster their new regime, the world is finally catching up to the shifting dynamics in the Middle East. Israel, recognizing these changes early, took pre-emptive measures by bolstering its military presence in the demilitarized zones of Syria, preparing for potential threats from the Turkish-backed Syrian forces. Meanwhile, Lebanon lies in ruins, Iraq is increasingly dominated by Iranian interests, and Yemen remains in chaos. We are witnessing the dissolution of the post WWI Sykes-Picot order, and it is imperative for Israeli policymakers to reassess and strategize for this new reality. Jordan may well be the next domino to fall, and in such a scenario, Israel could seize an opportunity to re-imagine the two-state solution, potentially east of the Jordan River.

Israel Katz, the newly appointed Defense Minister, has wasted no time in addressing these challenges. One of his first acts was to order the construction of a fortified border wall along the Jordanian frontier to stem the flow of Iranian arms and militants. Understanding the growing threats on its eastern border, Katz also approved the creation of a new military brigade to permanently secure this now threatening border.

The prospect of Jordan’s destabilization cannot be ignored, coupled with a Middle East reverting to tribal affiliations over artificial statehood, demands a fresh approach. The longstanding Israeli strategy of sacrificing the Palestinian-Jordan formula for the benefit of a stable eastern neighbor no longer holds. After the events of October 7, resolving the Palestinian conflict has become a paramount national security priority for Israel, arguably surpassing the importance of maintaining ties with a fragile Jordanian monarchy that struggles to control its borders.

Jordan’s population comprises a significant Palestinian majority governed by the Hashemite elite, whose origins trace back to Saudi Arabia. Advocating for the principle of governance by consent, it is evident that Jordan is, in essence, already a Palestinian state ruled by an unrepresentative autocracy. Historical context underscores this reality: Yasser Arafat’s first bid for power was the failed PLO coup in Amman in 1964. The territory of Jordan, over one and a half times the size of Israel, offers more than enough land to fulfill the Palestinian aspirations for self-determination.

If the Hashemite monarchy were to collapse, following a trajectory similar to Assad’s banishment into foreign exile, Israeli intelligence should proactively cultivate and support Palestinian grassroots movements inside Jordan. Providing recognition to a de facto state of Jordan as a Palestinian State, would at minimum, require that the Jordanian legislative body be free and representative of a majority of its Palestinian population, which would fulfill the Palestinian aspirations of statehood. This could pave the way for a new Palestinian state under local leadership, capable of providing a confederated citizenship model to Palestinians in Gaza, Judea and Shomron. In such a framework, Israel could ensure the protection of individual and residential rights for Palestinians residing west of the Jordan River.

Should Palestinians choose to persist in their conflict with Israel from Jordan, they would no longer do so as a stateless people. Decades of asymmetric warfare and attrition could be replaced with a clearer geopolitical alternative: advocating for a “Jordan is Palestine” solution. This strategy would allow Israel to transform an unwinnable paradigm into one with definitive boundaries and a potential resolution to Palestinian irredentism.

Critics may argue that the maximalist goals inherent in Palestinian “resistance” would only perpetuate the conflict, potentially escalating into a conventional war with a newly established state actor. Nevertheless, the potential long-term benefits outweigh the risks. A sovereign Palestinian state east of the Jordan River, with the river serving as a clear natural boundary, offers a sustainable and pragmatic solution. Hostile Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank could be permanently transferred to this state as Jordanian nationals, providing Israel with an opportunity to secure its borders and reduce internal threats through a viable political framework.

The current instability along the Jordanian border—evidenced by the establishment of new military regiments and border fortifications—signals that the region is already in flux. For Israel, the disintegration of the Sykes-Picot framework presents both challenges and opportunities. Ignoring this reality would be a grave mistake. Instead, Israel must adapt to the evolving security landscape. Especially if the next dominoes to fall create opportunities east of the Jordan that could offer political solutions to the unremitting Palestinian irredentism west of the Jordan River.

Failing to prepare for Jordan’s potential upheaval—where 70-80% of its population could gain representation while at the same time addressing Palestinian statehood aspirations—would be a tragic missed opportunity for Israel to tackle one of its greatest national security challenges.