Is there a US Iranian Deal Imminently in the offing?

In the short run, a deal between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to halt hostilities might look like a welcome relief. But unless such an agreement includes the minimum non‑negotiable conditions with Iran including voluntarily ending its decades‑long policies of ballistic missile production, terminating support and arming of fundamentalist proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, completely abandoning its nuclear weapons development, and cease calling for Israel’s destruction, then any deal would amount to nothing more than a harbinger of continued instability and danger for the Middle East and far beyond. The continued expansion of Iran’s ballistic missile program would not only threaten Israel and the Gulf states, but inevitably Europe and even the United States, while giving Tehran the leverage to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz and coerce global oil recipients. Its proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, would remain empowered to continue draining their host societies, sowing regional terror, and provoking Israeli military responses, leading to further inevitable destruction and civilian casualties. And finally, allowing a regime that openly calls for Israel’s destruction and resists international oversight to prevent them from advancing toward a nuclear arsenal, would be nothing short of reckless and not just for Israel, but also Palestinians, as radiation knows no borders, nor is selective in whom it targets.

While today’s news, including President Trump’s statement that the sides are close to signing a ceasefire is encouraging, recent historical patterns and the rigid and impractical nature of Islamic fundamentalism suggest that a genuine ceasefire leading to an ideological shift in Iran remains unlikely. To support this view, even when Hamas and Hezbollah, both driven by the same Islamic fundamentalist ideology as the Islamic Republic of Iran were routed, their military forces decimated, much of their leadership eliminated, and their territories subjected to mass war related destruction, neither entity altered its ideological commitment to destruction. Their ruthless core doctrine remained unchanged, both in their internal repression and in their externally aggressive aims. Turning to Iran, every American president from Reagan onward completely failed to reach a negotiated change through persistent diplomacy and including economic sanctions. The same stymied pattern of resolute inflexibility initially occurred towards the Trump administration, as Iran simultaneously stalled and obstructed negotiations while pouring billions into further developing their underground facilities designed to conceal both the true extent of its ballistic missile development along with its military nuclear program, from international observers.

After all, Islamic fundamentalist ideology reflects a strict, literalist interpretation of Islam that seeks to pursue their aims through uncompromising or militant means including jihad, the aggressive, perpetual struggle to eliminate un-Islamic influences, and from the Iranian interpretation of this ideology, to export the Islamic revolution.

Consequently, if Iran nevertheless agrees to a ceasefire, it can arise from one of two contradictory motives. The first possibility is that the Islamic Republic, under American and Israeli pressure, has finally undergone a genuine ideological shift and abandoned its core tenets of Islamic fundamentalism. While this scenario cannot be entirely dismissed, it remains improbable; for outside observers, advancing its revolutionary ideology appears non‑negotiable and fundamentally central. That is the raison d’être of the regime’s identity, to implement their ideology regardless of the negative consequences they may face. In addition, the concept of Muslim pride weighs heavily against such a trajectory. As an analogy, no Arab state or political leader has ever endorsed an Israeli‑Palestinian arrangement that openly accepts Israel as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian state because agreeing to a ceasefire under duress could be perceived as a humiliating concession, even if it resulted in a Palestinian state. This leads to the conclusion that Iran making an ideological reversal is even less likely.

One should note that until now, none of Iran’s proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis have disarmed nor abandoned their extremist Islamic fundamentalist ideology. Iranian willingness to deviate from their rigid ideological position would therefore represent a dramatic inflection point in bringing about a change in their fundamentalist ideology and behavior.

The second possibility is that Iran would operate by way of a hudnah, that is a temporary truce or armistice with non‑Muslim adversaries. A hudnah is not a permanent peace agreement or a renunciation of long‑term goals, but rather a tactical pause designed to buy time to recover, rearm, or regroup when facing a stronger opponent.

If the Iranian government were to genuinely change its ways, it would be, using the Yiddish term, a mechaye: a breath of life, a profound relief, and a source of deep satisfaction. But history offers little reason for optimism. Regrettably, authoritarian regimes almost never abandon their ideological foundations; real change typically comes, not when they voluntarily reform, but only when such regimes collapse. However, the only consistent predictability in the Middle East is its unpredictability. Time will tell.