ISIS Has Not Forgotten Israel
A terrorist plot that fails rarely holds the world’s attention. There are no prolonged broadcasts, no funerals and no photographs of devastated families. Security services announce arrests, the headlines disappear, and public attention moves elsewhere.
That creates a dangerous blind spot. Successful prevention can make a persistent threat appear insignificant.
While Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran dominate discussion of Israel’s security, ISIS continues to seek opportunities to recruit supporters and encourage attacks. The absence of a sustained campaign of successful attacks should not be mistaken for the absence of intent.
What the arrest figures actually show
Research published by Aaron Zelin at the Washington Institute in October 2026 identified 46 publicly reported ISIS-related arrest operations by Israeli authorities since October 7, 2023. Twenty-eight involved alleged attack plots. The comparison period, beginning in 2014 and ending before October 7, recorded 50 operations, including 18 involving plots. These are findings from a public-source research database, not a comprehensive government count.
Those distinctions matter. Arrest operations are not completed attacks, and allegations are not convictions. But the findings warrant serious attention.
They raise two questions: How effectively are security services disrupting individual plots? And how effectively are they weakening the recruitment networks that produce the next suspects?
The first question concerns immediate protection. The second concerns whether the threat will persist.
Israel cannot afford to answer only the first.
The recruitment problem
Several reported cases illustrate how young people can become involved.
In January 2026, authorities disclosed the arrest of a 15-year-old from northern Israel accused of pledging allegiance to ISIS, communicating with affiliates overseas and preparing an attack. In a separate 2025 case, three Arara residents, including a minor, were accused of plotting violence after receiving guidance from Syria. Reporting described contact through TikTok and tests involving explosives.
These cases undermine the comforting assumption that a terrorist recruit must first travel to a distant battlefield.
A young person can encounter propaganda at home, establish contact abroad and begin preparing violence locally. The physical distance between recruiter and recruit offers little protection when their communication is immediate.
This makes prevention more demanding. Authorities must distinguish between exposure to extremist content, active support and concrete preparation for violence. Schools and families need credible ways to report concerns. Digital platforms must respond when their services facilitate recruitment and threats.
Waiting until a suspect begins assembling a weapon leaves far too much to the final intervention.
Antisemitism must be confronted directly
The ideological target also needs to be named clearly.
ISIS’s propaganda has encouraged violence against Jews and Jewish institutions. Its hostility toward Hamas does not dilute that threat. The organizations have distinct ambitions and structures, and ISIS has condemned Hamas while encouraging its own followers to attack Jews.
Their rivalry is no protection for their intended victims.
Nor should attacks on Jewish communities be explained away as an inevitable reaction to Israeli policy. A synagogue is a place of worship. A Jewish school is a school. Neither becomes a legitimate target because someone claims political or religious outrage.
Religious leaders have a particular responsibility when extremists invoke faith to justify murder. Condemnation after an atrocity is necessary, but insufficient. The teachings and propaganda used to make violence appear righteous must be challenged before they produce another attacker.
Antisemitism does not become acceptable when its advocates dress it in the language of grievance.
The danger extends beyond Israel
The overseas cases show why this cannot be treated solely as an Israeli domestic security problem.
In January 2026, Azerbaijan announced the arrest of three suspects allegedly connected to ISIS-K who were preparing to attack a foreign embassy in Baku. The official statement left the embassy unnamed; subsequent reporting identified the Israeli embassy as the target.
In October, Serbia reported an attack on an officer guarding Israel’s embassy in Belgrade. Authorities described the attacker as a minor who supported ISIS and displayed its symbols online. That establishes the authorities’ account of his sympathies, not proof that ISIS leadership ordered the attack.
The distinction between centrally directed attacks and violence inspired by propaganda is essential for investigators. Both, however, require protection for those being targeted.
Governments hosting Israeli diplomatic missions and Jewish institutions cannot leave that responsibility to Israel. Threat information must move quickly between countries. Protective measures must reflect credible risks. Investigations must follow overseas contacts as well as local suspects.
Precision strengthens security
A firm response also requires discipline.
Arab citizens of Israel and Muslim communities must not be treated as collectively responsible for the actions of extremists. Collective suspicion is unjust and can damage the cooperation that prevention requires.
Authorities should pursue individuals on evidence. Community leaders should confront recruitment without hesitation. Families seeking help should have somewhere credible to turn before a child’s involvement becomes a criminal case.
Equal citizenship and determined counterterrorism belong together. Protecting both strengthens the legitimacy of the response.
The task is larger than stopping the next attack. It includes making recruitment harder, disrupting overseas assistance and denying extremists the space to normalize hatred.
Every prevented attack represents lives protected. It should also prompt a harder question: who is already trying to recruit the next attacker?
