Israel After the Elections: Are We Witnessing the Beginning of a New Political Era?

An inside look at Israel’s elections, the struggle over the country’s identity, and the possibility of forming a new government

I want to try to explain something to the many friends I have around the world — Jews and non-Jews alike, businesspeople, journalists, and anyone who cares about Israel, follows its developments, or is concerned about its future.

Over the past few days, I have received numerous questions about the Israeli elections. Who won? Has Netanyahu lost? Why is he still prime minister? Who is Gadi Eisenkot? Does he have a majority? What role do the Arab parties play? Have the ultra-Orthodox parties lost their political power? And what is likely to happen in the coming weeks?

I fully understand the confusion. For people coming from countries where citizens elect a president, or where the largest political party automatically takes power, Israel’s political system can seem like a complicated puzzle.

But behind all the numbers, agreements, and political negotiations lies a much bigger story: a society struggling over its identity, its values, its future, and its place in the world.

I am writing as an Israeli citizen, someone who believes in Zionism, Israel’s security, democracy, and the Jewish people’s right to an independent and secure homeland. I am also among those who believe that Israel now needs profound political change — a replacement of Benjamin Netanyahu and the extremist forces surrounding him, and the establishment of new leadership capable of beginning to repair the damage that has accumulated over recent years.

I do not believe Israel has lost its way. Quite the opposite. I believe Israeli society still possesses extraordinary reserves of responsibility, leadership, solidarity, courage, and resilience. The question is whether Israeli politics will succeed in reflecting those strengths.

To understand what is happening now, we need to start with the basics.

1. How Does Israeli Democracy Work? Why Isn’t the Largest Party Automatically in Power?

Israel is a parliamentary democracy. Unlike the United States, where citizens elect a president who heads the executive branch, Israelis elect the Knesset, the parliament from which the government is formed.

The Knesset has 120 members and serves as Israel’s legislative body. The government is the executive branch, and it requires the confidence of the Knesset to remain in office.

Israel does not hold direct elections for prime minister. Voters cast ballots for political parties or electoral lists, and each list receives seats in the Knesset in proportion to its share of the vote, provided it passes the electoral threshold.

That threshold currently stands at 3.25 percent. A party that fails to cross it receives no parliamentary seats, even if it has secured tens or hundreds of thousands of votes.

For example, a party receiving 25 percent of the valid votes would receive approximately 30 seats out of 120. A party receiving 10 percent would receive approximately 12 seats.

But here is the crucial point: 30 seats are not enough to form a government.

To establish a government with a parliamentary majority, a coalition generally needs the support of at least 61 of the 120 members of the Knesset.

This means that even the party that wins the most seats cannot necessarily govern. It must find other parties willing to join it, sign coalition agreements, and commit to supporting the government and its policies.

This is known as a coalition government.

What is a coalition?

A coalition is essentially a political agreement between several parties that decide to work together and form a government.

Each party brings its parliamentary representatives, political demands, and the interests of the voters it represents. During negotiations, the parties divide government ministries, parliamentary committee positions, and agree on policy priorities.

In simple terms, an Israeli prime minister cannot govern as though he owns the country. He must maintain the support of his coalition partners.

The problem begins when small parties realize they can become kingmakers. They may demand budgets, ministries, legislation, and far-reaching commitments in exchange for their support.

In such circumstances, the prime minister may find himself dependent on partners who represent a relatively small segment of the public but wield considerable political influence.

This has become one of the central problems of Israeli politics in recent years.

The parliamentary system itself is not the problem. It is a legitimate democratic model used in many countries across Europe. The problem arises when political survival takes precedence over the national interest.

2. The October 27 Elections: What Actually Happened?

To understand the results, we need to look at three political blocs rather than simply two parties.

The new Knesset has 120 members, and the results published following the vote count indicate the following distribution:

In terms of political blocs, the results are:

• Netanyahu’s bloc and its coalition partners: 53 seats.
• The change-oriented parties: 48 seats.
• The Arab parties: 19 seats.

The most important figure is that the bloc that formed the outgoing government, which previously enjoyed the support of 68 Knesset members, has now fallen to just 53.

That is a loss of 15 seats.

It represents a significant political blow to Netanyahu, his coalition partners, and the way they have governed the country.

However, it is important to be precise: Netanyahu still leads the largest individual party, and his bloc remains larger than the change-oriented bloc. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to say that Eisenkot won the election by securing a parliamentary majority.

But it is fair to say that the outgoing coalition has lost the majority it previously enjoyed and no longer has the 61 members required to form a government in the same political configuration.

The elections have therefore reopened the struggle over who will govern Israel.

3. Not All Israeli Right-Wingers Are the Same

One of the most common misconceptions among people outside Israel is to treat all right-wing political parties in Israel as though they represent a single political ideology.

That is simply incorrect.

Israel has a national right, a liberal right, a security-oriented right, an economic right, a religious right, and an extremist messianic right. These are not necessarily the same people or the same political philosophies.

The Likud, for example, was historically a large national-conservative party encompassing different political currents and leaders with varying views. Many believed in parliamentary democracy, a free-market economy, and Israel’s security.

The Israeli right is not synonymous with Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. In fact, many Israelis who identify as right-wing strongly oppose their political worldview.

The central problem in recent years has been the growing influence of extremist parties that have become key coalition partners, shaping government policy and public discourse.

Itamar Ben-Gvir and Otzma Yehudit

Ben-Gvir represents a radical nationalist movement. Significant elements within this movement hold a confrontational attitude toward Israel’s Arab population, the judicial system, and the country’s democratic institutions.

Over the years, Ben-Gvir and his associates have promoted political rhetoric that places Arab citizens under collective suspicion and, at times, portrays them as an internal security threat rather than citizens entitled to equal rights.

The issue is not whether Israel should fight terrorism or protect its national security. Every Israeli government has that responsibility.

The issue is the distinction between fighting terrorism and turning an entire population into an enemy.

Arab citizens of Israel are citizens of the state. They include doctors, lawyers, businesspeople, academics, public servants, security personnel, and people from every sector of society.

They are entitled to the same civil rights as every other Israeli citizen. We can disagree with their political parties, criticize their positions, and demand national responsibility from their representatives. But there is no justification for treating an entire population as a fifth column.

A democratic state cannot demand loyalty to the law from one group while simultaneously denying another group’s legitimacy to participate in political life.

Bezalel Smotrich and Religious Zionism

Smotrich represents a religious-nationalist movement with a rigid ideological worldview, placing central importance on the vision of Greater Israel, expanding settlements, and religious conceptions of the state’s identity.

In many cases, his positions are far removed from the broader Israeli consensus, particularly on religion and state, civil rights, the judicial system, and relations with the Palestinians.

My criticism is not directed at religious people or those who believe in the biblical Land of Israel. These are legitimate political positions.

My criticism is directed at attempts to turn a sectoral worldview into a set of rules binding on all citizens, while weakening democratic institutions and undermining civil equality.

When such parties receive political influence disproportionate to their size, they can shape security policy, international relations, and Israel’s future.

This is precisely what significant segments of the Israeli public are seeking to change.

4. Gadi Eisenkot and the Camp Seeking to Put Israel on a Different Course

On the other side of the political spectrum, a group of parties and leaders from very different backgrounds has emerged. They sometimes hold opposing views, but they agree on one central point: Israel needs new leadership.

At the center of this effort is Gadi Eisenkot, a former IDF Chief of Staff, an experienced military commander with significant security and strategic expertise, who has become one of the leading figures in the effort to replace Netanyahu.

Alongside him are:

Naftali Bennett – A former prime minister and national conservative, with a right-wing security and economic outlook, who seeks to restore responsible national leadership and rebuild the country’s ability to govern effectively.

Yair Lapid – A former prime minister and foreign minister representing Israel’s liberal center, emphasizing democracy, an independent judicial system, international relations, and Israel’s connection to the Western world.

Avigdor Lieberman – Leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, a national right-wing politician with firm positions on security issues, but also a fierce critic of Israel’s dependence on the ultra-Orthodox parties and the exemptions from military service granted to certain sectors.

Yair Golan – Leader of The Democrats, a retired major general and experienced military commander representing Israel’s social-democratic and liberal camp. He emphasizes civil rights, equality, the rule of law, and national responsibility.

It is important to understand that this is not a single party, nor are these leaders people who agree on every issue.

Bennett and Lieberman are right-wing politicians. Lapid and Golan come from the center and Zionist left. Eisenkot brings military experience and a statesmanlike approach that seeks to unite different parts of Israeli society.

But they recognize that continuing under the current political arrangement does not serve Israel’s national interests.

What unites them is a desire to restore responsible governance, strengthen state institutions, rebuild Israel’s international standing, promote equality in military service, and end the country’s dependence on extremist political parties.

I see this as a historic opportunity.

Not because every one of these leaders has the answer to all of Israel’s problems, but because, for the first time in a long while, there is a possibility of creating a broad partnership between the right, center, and left around a shared commitment to national responsibility.

They do not have to agree on everything. They have to agree on what matters enough to prevent further political and social paralysis.

5. The Ultra-Orthodox Parties: Political Power, a Changing Community, and the Crisis of Equal Responsibility

One of the most significant stories of these elections is the decline in the political strength of the ultra-Orthodox parties.

To understand this, it is important to know how Israel’s ultra-Orthodox political system works.

The two main parties are Shas and United Torah Judaism.

Shas primarily represents the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox community, while United Torah Judaism represents mainly the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community and its various factions.

Both parties have a long political history, rabbinical leadership, educational institutions, and large communities. They are not Zionist parties in the traditional sense of the Zionist movement. United Torah Judaism, in particular, has historically held views that do not regard the state and Zionism as a conventional secular national project.

However, it is important not to confuse these parties with the entire ultra-Orthodox population. This is a diverse and changing society that includes working people, entrepreneurs, professionals, volunteers, and individuals seeking greater integration into Israeli society.

The central criticism is directed at the political system and the sector-based arrangements it continues to preserve.

For years, the ultra-Orthodox parties have enjoyed considerable influence in governments in which they participated. In exchange for their coalition support, they demanded funding for educational institutions, financial support for their communities, arrangements regarding military conscription, and influence over religious and state matters.

The biggest crisis concerns military service.

In Israel, where military service is a central part of civic life, particularly following October 7 and the prolonged war that followed, a deep sense of injustice has emerged.

Hundreds of thousands of Israelis have been called up for extended reserve duty. Families have had to cope with the absence of spouses and parents, businesses have suffered, careers have been interrupted, and people have paid enormous economic, family, and psychological costs.

At the same time, a substantial proportion of ultra-Orthodox men have continued to benefit from military-service exemptions or deferments.

This issue has become one of the most important social and political crises in Israel.

It is not a question of religion or faith. It is a question of equal civic responsibility.

A country cannot demand that some of its citizens sacrifice years of their lives, risk their lives, and serve hundreds of days in the reserves, while others receive broad exemptions that are not based on individual or security-related needs.

The same principle applies to participation in the workforce.

There are significant gaps in employment rates and income between parts of the ultra-Orthodox population and the non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish population, particularly among ultra-Orthodox men. These gaps also affect income tax revenues and participation in financing public services.

But precision matters: it would be wrong to claim that all ultra-Orthodox people do not work or pay taxes. Many ultra-Orthodox women work, many ultra-Orthodox men work, and the community also pays indirect taxes such as VAT. The issue concerns structural disparities and different levels of participation, not a claim that every ultra-Orthodox individual avoids contributing to the economy.

The problem is that the existing political arrangements encourage dependence on sector-specific funding and fail to provide an adequate response to the changes that are needed.

What happened in the elections?

Shas won just six seats, while United Torah Judaism received seven. Together, they now hold 13 seats, compared with 18 in the outgoing Knesset.

That is a significant decline. For Shas, in particular, it represents a notably weak result in the context of its electoral history.

The message from voters is clear: both within parts of ultra-Orthodox society and certainly beyond it, there is a growing demand for change.

One reason is that the Israeli public increasingly finds it difficult to accept a situation in which political leaders can maintain a government through constant dependence on sectoral demands, while the security and economic burdens are not shared equally.

In the eyes of his critics, Netanyahu has become dependent on these parties to remain in power. They have become coalition partners capable of dictating his political agenda.

Critics argue that his overriding priority has become preserving his government, even at the cost of far-reaching concessions to his partners.

The fact that Netanyahu continues to stand trial on criminal charges, while fighting politically to maintain his position, has further deepened the distrust felt by significant parts of the public. It is important to emphasize that he has not been convicted and that his trial is proceeding through the legal system.

But in the eyes of his critics, an unhealthy situation has emerged in which the political interests of the prime minister and the national interests of the state are no longer perceived as one and the same.

6. The Arab Parties: 19 Seats That Cannot Be Ignored

Another striking result of these elections is the increased strength of the Arab parties.

The Joint List received 11 seats, while Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, won eight. Together, they hold 19 seats in the Knesset.

This is a significant achievement in terms of political representation for Israel’s Arab citizens.

To understand its significance, we need to distinguish between the two political frameworks.

The Joint List is an Arab political alliance encompassing different ideological currents, including Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad. It represents a range of positions, and some elements within it maintain strong criticism of Zionism and Israeli policy.

Ra’am is a party with Islamic roots. Under Mansour Abbas’s leadership, it has pursued a more pragmatic strategy in recent years, seeking integration into coalition politics while focusing on improving conditions for Arab citizens.

Ra’am even participated in the Bennett-Lapid government in 2021–2022. Its participation was a historic moment in Israeli politics.

This brings us to one of the biggest dilemmas facing the current political system.

On the one hand, Arab citizens are an integral part of the State of Israel. They vote in elections, send representatives to the Knesset, participate in the economy and public institutions, and are entitled to political representation.

On the other hand, there are deep divisions, mistrust, ideological disagreements, and security-related disputes between some Arab parties and Zionist parties.

Some leaders in the change-oriented camp made it clear before the elections that they would not establish a government dependent on the Arab parties. Bennett, Eisenkot, and Lieberman have all placed clear limitations on such a partnership, although their positions differ regarding possible parliamentary cooperation.

I believe this debate requires maturity.

It is possible to hold Zionist beliefs, be a security-minded politician, support the IDF, oppose terrorism, and disagree with certain Arab political parties while simultaneously recognizing that Arab citizens of Israel are entitled to equal civil rights.

Political partnership does not require complete ideological agreement.

It requires clear red lines: respect for the law, opposition to terrorism, respect for state institutions, and recognition of the civil rights of all citizens.

These elections make it clear that the Arab parties are no longer a marginal political force. They are a significant parliamentary bloc and may influence the identity of Israel’s next government.

7. Why Has Netanyahu Lost His Majority, and Why Could Eisenkot Still Form a Government?

This is perhaps the most important question.

First, we need to distinguish between two concepts: political defeat and parliamentary defeat.

Netanyahu has not lost his position as leader of the largest individual party. Likud received 27 seats, more than any other party.

But he has lost the majority he previously held in the Knesset.

His bloc, consisting of Likud, Otzma Yehudit, the Religious Zionist Party, Shas, and United Torah Judaism, has 53 seats.

That means he is eight seats short of the 61 required for a parliamentary majority.

Meanwhile, the four parties seeking to replace him hold a combined 48 seats:

• Yashar – 21.
• Beyachad – 12.
• The Democrats – 8.
• Yisrael Beiteinu – 7.

On paper, this provides the foundation for a new government. But 48 is not a majority.

If these four parties manage to reach an agreement with the Arab parties, they could theoretically reach 67 seats.

That would constitute a substantial majority.

However, the challenge is political, not merely mathematical.

Three of the four parties in the change-oriented bloc expressed reservations before the elections about forming a government in partnership with the Arab parties. Lieberman, in particular, has declared that he wants a Zionist coalition.

A second possibility is to establish a minority government that relies on external support from some of the Arab parties, without formally including them in the coalition.

This would be politically complicated, but it would not be unprecedented in Israeli history. The Bennett-Lapid government also relied on Ra’am, which was formally part of the coalition.

A third possibility is to try to bring the ultra-Orthodox parties into the change-oriented camp.

Shas and United Torah Judaism together hold 13 seats. If they joined the four change-oriented parties, the result would be exactly 61 seats.

But there is a serious obstacle: the change-oriented parties have pledged to advance changes to the ultra-Orthodox military-service arrangements, while the ultra-Orthodox parties oppose ending the existing exemptions.

A fourth possibility is a broad unity government that includes some right-wing parties alongside the center, but without Netanyahu as prime minister.

A fifth possibility is continued political deadlock, eventually leading to another election.

What about Eisenkot himself?

This is where an especially important political declaration comes into play.

On October 21, Eisenkot stated unequivocally that he would not serve under Netanyahu, even under a rotation agreement in which the two leaders would take turns serving as prime minister.

He also said that if required to join such a government, he would resign.

Bennett, Lieberman, and Golan have also expressed opposition to Netanyahu remaining in office.

This is a significant political commitment because it narrows the possibilities for compromise within the political camp.

But it also creates a challenge: how can Netanyahu be replaced without reaching agreements with parties outside the central Zionist bloc?

In my view, this will be Eisenkot’s real test.

He will have to demonstrate that he is not merely a leader who has received public support, but someone capable of conducting complex negotiations, compromising on nonessential issues, and building a partnership that can survive.

The figures and scenarios are also discussed in analyses by Reuters and The Times of Israel.

8. What Happens in the Coming Weeks? The Battle for the Knesset Begins Before a New Government Is Formed

One of the most important things to explain to an international audience is that Israel does not have to wait for a new government to be formed before parliamentary and political changes can begin.

The Knesset is an independent institution, and elections determine its composition.

The newly elected Knesset is expected to convene and swear in its members on November 10, 2026.

Until then, the outgoing government continues to serve as a caretaker government, subject to the restrictions and restraint expected of such a government.

At the same time, a political struggle is already underway over control of the Knesset’s institutions and the advancement of legislative changes.

A. Replacing the Speaker of the Knesset

One of the first moves planned by the change-oriented camp is to replace Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana of Likud.

Why does this matter?

The Speaker of the Knesset plays a central role in managing parliamentary proceedings. The Speaker presides over plenary sessions, oversees parliamentary procedures within the rules of the Knesset, influences the legislative agenda, and plays an important role in managing the country’s central democratic institution.

Control of this position becomes particularly significant when the composition of the Knesset changes.

The change-oriented camp therefore wants to elect a new Speaker at the first Knesset session.

One possibility that has been discussed is appointing Yair Lapid to the position.

But here, too, a parliamentary majority is required. The 48 members of the change-oriented bloc are not enough on their own, meaning that support from the Arab parties or abstentions by other members of the Knesset could prove decisive.

This move is important because it could change the balance of power in parliament even before a new government is established.

B. Establishing Knesset Committees and Distributing Parliamentary Power

The next stage involves establishing the Knesset committees and selecting their chairpersons.

These are not ceremonial positions.

Knesset committees deal with legislation, the national budget, security, foreign affairs, education, the economy, domestic affairs, and many other areas.

The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, for example, is one of Israel’s most important parliamentary committees. It oversees aspects of the defense establishment, discusses strategic issues, and holds hearings with military and government officials.

The Finance Committee influences the national budget and the allocation of public resources.

The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee deals with constitutional legislation, the judicial system, and civil rights.

Those who control these committees wield significant political influence, even when they are not part of the government.

The change-oriented camp therefore wants to alter the distribution of power within the committees and restore parliamentary oversight to the center of political activity.

C. Repealing Laws and Changing Legislation

Another issue on the agenda is a review of laws passed by the previous Knesset.

Among the subjects under consideration are:

• Repealing or amending elements of the judicial overhaul advanced by the previous government.
• Introducing legislation to limit the tenure of a prime minister.
• Advancing a proposal that would prevent a person facing criminal charges from serving as prime minister, subject to the final wording of the legislation.
• Strengthening oversight and accountability mechanisms over the government.
• Changing arrangements concerning senior appointments and the relationship between the branches of government.
• Legislative changes intended to strengthen the independence of law enforcement institutions.

It is important to understand that not every such proposal can become law overnight.

Every bill must go through the proper legislative process. Some are ordinary laws, while others involve amendments to Basic Laws, which have a special legal status in Israel.

Therefore, even if the change-oriented camp succeeds in securing a parliamentary majority on specific issues, it will need to handle these moves carefully.

I believe this is particularly important. Israel does not need to replace one form of extremism with another. It needs to rebuild the balance between the branches of government and establish a stable and clear constitutional framework.

D. A State Commission of Inquiry into the October 7 Attack

This is one of the most important issues facing Israel as a nation.

October 7, 2023, was the most severe security and intelligence failure in Israel’s history.

Hundreds of civilians were murdered, women and children were kidnapped, entire communities were destroyed, families were displaced, and the country as a whole was plunged into national trauma.

Since that day, there has been a broad public demand for a State Commission of Inquiry to investigate all the factors that led to the failure.

Not just the military.

The political leadership, intelligence agencies, security establishment, decision-making processes, national security doctrine, and the responsibility of senior officials over the years must all be examined.

What is a State Commission of Inquiry?

It is an independent investigative mechanism established under Israel’s Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968.

The government decides to establish such a commission and defines the subject and scope of its investigation. The President of the Supreme Court then appoints the commission’s chairperson and members.

The commission has significant powers, including the ability to summon witnesses, take testimony, demand documents, and investigate events.

Its greatest advantage is that its members are not directly appointed by the government being investigated.

It is a mechanism designed to ensure independence, professionalism, and public credibility.

It is important to clarify that a State Commission of Inquiry is not a criminal court. It does not convict individuals of criminal offenses, but it can determine personal and public responsibility and recommend significant measures.

The leaders of the opposition parties have announced their intention to advance the establishment of such a commission among the first measures of the new Knesset.

Yair Golan has stated that this will be among the first steps he seeks to promote.

This demand should not be a partisan issue.

Whether someone supports Netanyahu or opposes him, they should understand that a country cannot move forward without establishing how the greatest disaster in its history occurred.

The bereaved families, the families of the hostages, the wounded, the residents of the Gaza border communities, and all Israeli citizens deserve answers.

Not for revenge, not to conduct a political trial, but to ensure that something like this never happens again.

E. Can All These Things Happen Before a New Government Is Formed?

Yes, in some cases.

The Knesset is the legislative branch of government. It can elect a Speaker, establish committees, and advance bills without waiting for coalition negotiations to be completed.

But there is a difference between initiating a process and completing it.

Every decision requires the appropriate majority under the relevant law and parliamentary rules.

For example, a State Commission of Inquiry can be established through a government decision or through a specific parliamentary route involving the State Control Committee.

In other words, even if the change-oriented camp succeeds in gaining a degree of control over the Knesset, that does not mean it already controls the executive branch.

This is a struggle over state institutions, the political agenda, and the ability to begin a process of change even before a new government takes office.

9. What Happens If Nobody Manages to Form a Government?

This is a possibility that must be taken seriously.

Israeli law establishes a clear process for forming a government.

After the election results are published, the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, consults with representatives of the various parliamentary factions and assigns a member of the Knesset the task of forming a government.

The candidate is generally the political leader considered most likely to secure the confidence of the Knesset. There is no legal requirement that the mandate automatically go to the leader of the largest party.

Once the mandate is received, the candidate has 28 days to form a government. The president may grant an extension of up to 14 additional days.

If the candidate fails, the president can assign the task to another member of the Knesset.

Under the circumstances established by law, 61 members of the Knesset can also recommend an agreed candidate and ask the president to assign that person the task.

If all attempts fail, Israel could face another election.

This is not merely a theoretical possibility. In recent years, Israel has experienced prolonged periods of political instability, repeated elections, and governments that struggled to survive.

But this time there is also a difference.

The Israeli public enters this process after years of war, economic crisis, social divisions, political disputes, and a significant loss of public confidence in its leadership.

It is difficult to believe that the public wants another round of elections ending in the same political deadlock.

That is why there is considerable pressure on the political leaders to find a solution.

10. Why Does Political Change in Israel Matter to Jews Around the World?

Here I want to move beyond numbers and domestic politics.

Israel is not an ordinary country.

It is the nation-state of the Jewish people, and it plays a significant role in the identity, security, and sense of belonging of millions of Jews around the world.

When Israel is strong, stable, democratic, and successful internationally, that matters to Jewish communities in New York, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Melbourne, and many other places.

And when Israel enters a political, moral, or diplomatic crisis, the consequences do not remain within its borders.

In recent years, we have witnessed a disturbing rise in antisemitism, harassment of Jews, threats against Jewish institutions, violent demonstrations, and attempts to portray every Jew around the world as responsible for the policies of the Israeli government.

I oppose this absolutely.

A Jew in Paris is not responsible for the decisions of the Israeli government. A Jewish woman in London should not have to explain Israel’s security policy to every person she meets in the street. A Jewish community in New York should not have to live under threat simply because the State of Israel is engaged in a war.

Antisemitism is antisemitism. It does not become legitimate when disguised as political criticism.

At the same time, Israel must understand that the way it conducts itself also affects its ability to confront this phenomenon.

An Israeli government that maintains constructive relations with the United States, Europe, and moderate Arab countries; pursues responsible policies; respects international law; and advances diplomatic solutions alongside national security provides Jewish communities around the world with a stronger foundation for addressing their challenges.

This does not mean Israel should abandon its security interests in order to receive applause from the international community.

Israel must defend itself. It must fight terrorism. It must protect its borders and its citizens.

But national security does not contradict diplomatic responsibility.

On the contrary. A country that understands its surroundings, manages alliances, builds partnerships, and maintains the trust of its friends is a stronger country.

I believe a new government could begin repairing some of the damage to Israel’s international standing.

It could reopen doors, rebuild relations with governments, strengthen cooperation with moderate Arab states, restore trust with parts of the Jewish communities around the world, and conduct a more constructive and nuanced dialogue with Israel’s friends.

It will not solve antisemitism or eliminate security challenges. But it could provide Israel with better tools to confront them.

11. Israel Does Not Have to Choose Between Security and Democracy

I want to address a point that is particularly important to me.

Some people try to present the debate in Israel as though it is a choice between those who want security and those who want democracy.

That is a false distinction.

Israel must be a strong country in security terms. We do not have the luxury of being weak. We live in a complex region, facing genuine threats, terrorist organizations, hostile states, and strategic challenges.

But security cannot become an excuse for weakening the country’s institutions.

A strong security establishment needs responsible political leadership. A strong military needs professional leadership. Good intelligence requires decision-makers who are willing to listen, including to opinions they may find uncomfortable.

National responsibility also requires the ability to acknowledge mistakes.

One of the greatest lessons of October 7 is not merely military. It is also a lesson in leadership.

It teaches us what happens when assumptions become entrenched, when people stop listening to warnings, when political considerations override professional judgment, and when an entire system loses its ability to examine itself.

As someone familiar with security systems, decision-making under pressure, crisis management, and complex operational environments, I believe one of the central conditions for Israel’s recovery is restoring responsibility to the heart of the decision-making process.

We need leadership capable of making difficult decisions, but also capable of admitting when it is wrong.

Leadership that understands the limits of power.

Leadership that does not treat the country as the private property of a political party, a sector, or a single individual.

12. My Reason for Optimism: Israeli Society Is Bigger Than Its Politics

I want to end on an optimistic note, not because there are no reasons for concern.

There are many.

Israel has endured extraordinarily difficult years. Society is divided, families have lost loved ones, soldiers and reservists have paid a heavy price, the economy has suffered, the country’s international standing has deteriorated, and public trust in the leadership has been damaged.

But there are also genuine reasons for optimism.

We have seen Israeli society mobilize during its darkest hours. We have seen people leave everything behind to report for reserve duty. We have seen citizens establish support networks, communities organize themselves, businesses step forward, and families support other families.

We have witnessed the uniquely Israeli ability to make decisions under pressure, take action, recover, and keep moving forward.

That strength has not disappeared.

It exists in civil society, in the military, in the healthcare system, in academia, in industry, in the technology sector, in communities, and among millions of citizens who want to live in a better country.

I believe that most Israelis, even when they disagree on political questions, ultimately want similar things: security, stability, a functioning economy, an independent judicial system, quality education, equal opportunities, responsible leadership, and a future for their children.

The recent elections have demonstrated that Israel’s political landscape is changing. They have shown that the previous government has lost its majority, that the ultra-Orthodox parties have weakened, and that new political forces and leaders have been given an opportunity to influence the country’s future.

They have also shown that the road to change will not be easy.

Gadi Eisenkot does not yet have the majority required to form a government. Netanyahu still leads the larger political bloc. The Arab parties hold significant parliamentary power, and the disagreements among the change-oriented parties remain substantial.

But I see an opportunity here.

An opportunity to build a broader, more responsible government that represents the national interest rather than the political survival of individual leaders.

An opportunity to return political discourse to a place where people can disagree, debate, and oppose one another without turning political opponents into enemies.

An opportunity to restore trust between citizens and their state.

An opportunity to rebuild Israel’s relationships with its friends around the world and demonstrate that Israel is capable of examining itself, correcting its mistakes, and growing stronger through crisis.

I am not asking any of my friends around the world to agree with every political position I hold. Nor do I believe the next government will be perfect.

I am simply asking them to understand that the debate in Israel is not between those who love the country and those who do not.

Many of the people seeking to replace Netanyahu are Zionists, right-wing voters, security professionals, former military officers, bereaved families, reservists, and people who have devoted their lives to the country.

They are not seeking to weaken Israel. They are seeking to strengthen it.

They are not seeking to abandon security. They are seeking to restore security and diplomatic responsibility to where they belong.

And they are not seeking to abandon Israel’s Jewish identity. They want to ensure that Israel remains a Jewish and democratic state, as promised in the Declaration of Independence.

I believe Israel can emerge from this crisis stronger.

I believe it is possible to establish new leadership, rebuild trust, restore Israel’s international standing, and create a better future for the next generation.

These elections have not yet delivered a new government. They have not resolved the political crisis. But they have opened a window of opportunity.

And sometimes, in a democracy, the possibility of change is already the beginning of change.

Israel does not need to abandon the Zionist dream. It needs to regain the ability to fulfill it.

Yair Marton is a strategic consultant, crisis manager, and expert in negotiation, security, and influence. He writes about Israeli society, politics, security, leadership, and Israel’s relationship with the world