Israel and the Kurds: Growing Points of Commonality

There are many commonalities and similarities between the Kurds and the Jews. Historically, for example, both peoples are considered among the oldest in the region, with origins dating back thousands of years. Politically, both have endured long histories of suffering due to the absence of an independent state, marked by decades of struggle and aspirations for independence and statehood. Fortunately, the Jews ultimately achieved this goal in 1948 with the establishment of Israel; unfortunately, the Kurds have not yet realized theirs. In terms of persecution, both groups have experienced genocide, ethnic cleansing, and displacement from their ancestral lands. The key difference between the two lies in the fact that the Jews succeeded in founding Israel—a strong, advanced state that protects its people with all its strength, determination, and will. In contrast, the Kurds still lack such protection to this day.

However, my focus is not on these historical parallels, but rather on a point that is currently unfolding and tied to the present political dynamics in the region. This point can be summed up in one sentence: Today, those who are hostile to Israel are also hostile to the Kurds. Conversely, those who are not hostile to Israel—or who are its allies—are also friends of the Kurds.

Let us explore this point in more detail. The Kurds are divided among four countries—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria—which collectively control the region historically known as Kurdistan. The persecution the Kurds have endured over the past century—and continue to face today, particularly in Iran and Turkey—has been carried out by the successive governments of these four states. These regimes have consistently denied the Kurds their political, cultural, and national rights, most notably the right to establish an independent state.

Historically, Iraq and Syria have opposed Israel since its establishment. Iran, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, transformed into one of Israel’s most vocal and aggressive adversaries, and today poses one of its most serious threats. Turkey, by contrast, was initially an exception. It was the first country in the region to recognize Israel and for decades maintained relatively strong diplomatic and economic ties with it. However, with the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the increasing influence of his government, especially in recent years, Turkey’s stance has shifted. It has become increasingly hostile toward Israel—particularly in its political rhetoric—and is now considered by many to be a growing threat.

As a result, a striking convergence has emerged: the same four countries that oppress the Kurds are also hostile to Israel. This alignment underscores a deeper geopolitical connection and reinforces the growing commonalities between the Kurdish and Israeli experiences in the region.

There are additional, more nuanced details that further illustrate this alignment. For instance, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, prior to 2003, was one of the most hostile regimes toward both Israel and the Kurds. During his rule, more than 200,000 Kurds were killed through the use of chemical weapons, the Anfal genocide, and other brutal policies such as forced displacement and Arabization. Today, post-Saddam Iraq, largely influenced by Iran-aligned militias, especially the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), continues to display hostility toward both Israel and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (located in Southern Kurdistan). The PMF have repeatedly accused the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of maintaining ties with Israel and allegedly allowing Mossad operations on its territory. On several occasions, Iran has used these claims to justify bombing locations within the Kurdistan Region, citing the supposed presence of Israeli intelligence.

A similar dynamic is evident in Syria. Under the Assad regime, which was firmly anti-Israel, the state systematically oppressed the Kurdish population—denying them political, civil, and cultural rights, and even stripping large numbers of Kurds of Syrian citizenship. In the present day, Syria remains a potential threat to Israel, while also continuing to oppose the autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria (Rojava).

On the other hand, the commonalities between Israel and the Kurds are not limited to shared enemies—they also include shared allies and partners. For instance, Israel’s closest and most important ally is the United States, which is also the primary partner of the Kurds. With US support, the Kurds have secured significant gains, particularly the establishment of two autonomous regions: the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Rojava. Both of these regions continue to receive political and, to some extent, military support and protection from the United States.

These commonalities may be coincidental to some extent, but they also reflect a deeper convergence of vision, ambition, fear, and strategic outlook between Israel and the Kurds regarding the political future of the region. They point to a shared perception of regional threats, as well as a common understanding of the challenges ahead, grounded in mutual political values and long-term objectives.

It is not merely a coincidence that any political or territorial gains made by the Kurds in the four countries that divide Kurdistan—such as securing autonomy—also align with Israel’s strategic interests. Simply put, such gains weaken Israel’s adversaries and strengthen a potential ally. Furthermore, Israel’s recent achievements in its conflict with the Iranian axis have created meaningful opportunities for the Kurds. By diminishing Iran’s influence in the region, these developments have—at the very least—reduced Iranian pressure on both the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Rojava in northern Syria.

However, it is essential that these shared interests and commonalities not remain uncoordinated, undeveloped, or informal. They should be translated into a reciprocal relationship guided by a clear strategy aimed at strengthening and institutionalizing ties between both sides. The Kurds are unlikely to find another state in the region whose interests and aspirations align with theirs as closely as Israel’s. Likewise, Israel is unlikely to find a potential ally like the Kurds—one that, at both the governmental and popular levels, holds a positive view of Israel and the Jewish people.

Accordingly, the establishment of formal and reciprocal relations—politically, economically, and socially—between the Kurdistan Region and Rojava, on one side, and Israel, on the other, constitutes a critical historical and political opportunity for both. As the stronger and more capable party, Israel may need to take the first step, and this potential should be seriously considered by Israeli decision-makers. In turn, leaders in the Kurdistan Region and Rojava should welcome such an initiative enthusiastically, recognizing it as a historic turning point for the Kurdish cause. The United States—as a close ally of both parties—may be the most effective and appropriate mediator to facilitate this potential strategic and enduring partnership.