Israel and the Kurds: Potential for a Strategic Relationship in Syria

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria was a significant achievement for Israel, as it dealt a severe blow to the Iran-led axis and disrupted the Iranian supply route to Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, Syria’s future still presents challenges for Israel. After Assad’s fall, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took control of Damascus and large parts of Syria, with Abu Mohammad al-Golani declaring himself president. This development poses a new challenge for Israel for several reasons: HTS is a designated terrorist organization, originating from Jabhat al-Nusra, the former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. Its ideology is deeply hostile toward Jews and Israel. Furthermore, HTS’s rule is backed by Turkey and Qatar, both of which support Hamas and have expressed hostile rhetoric against Israel. In addition, Syria remains in a state of political, economic, and social instability, with multiple armed groups still active, making the new Syrian government just as unpredictable—and potentially as dangerous—as Assad’s regime.

Israel and the Kurds: Shared Interests

There are many armed groups in Syria, but three main and powerful factions control large areas of territory: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

HTS, as mentioned above, is designated as a terrorist organization. The Syrian National Army is a radical Islamist group affiliated with Turkey, and its stance on Israel aligns with that of HTS and other extremist factions.

Among these major groups, the SDF, which represents the Kurds, is the only one that does not harbor hostility toward Jews and Israel. Instead, it seeks to establish relations with Israel and holds a positive view of it. The SDF is also the only secular major group in Syria, as it is neither extremist nor religious. Additionally, the SDF is the primary US ally in Syria. Historically, Israeli-Kurdish relations have not been marked by hostility or tension; instead, the two sides have often shared mutual interests and a sense of sympathy.

Both Israel and the Kurds face the same two primary threats in Syria: extremist jihadist groups, which oppose both Kurdish self-rule and Israel’s security, and Turkey’s ambitions under President Erdogan, which threaten both Kurdish autonomy and Israeli regional interests. Given these shared concerns, establishing cooperation and relations between the two sides is extremely important. The Kurds could become a major and reliable ally of Israel in Syria—one that is both strong and influential. This alliance would provide Israel with a significant political advantage in Syria, countering the ambitions of both Turkey and the new Syrian government.

In return, the Kurds are in dire need of Israeli support in various areas. For instance, the Kurdish entity in Rojava primarily depends on the presence of American forces in Syria for its survival. In this regard, Israel could play a crucial role in persuading the Donald Trump administration to extend the presence of US forces. The withdrawal of American troops could serve as a green light for Turkey, HTS, and pro-Turkish militias to launch a large-scale and potentially devastating attack on Kurdish areas.

In such a scenario, the SDF may be compelled to seek support from any available party. This situation could provide Iran with an opportunity to reassert its influence in Syria by supporting the Kurds against Turkey and the Syrian militias—particularly since Iran can easily reach Kurdish areas in Rojava via Iraqi territory. This development would pose a serious threat to Israel, especially if Iran manages to reopen its supply route to Hezbollah.

In addition, developments in the Syrian arena may create an opportunity to establish a Kurdish-Druze alliance under Israeli-American sponsorship, given the many similarities between the Kurds and the Druze in the country. Both are minorities, both fear the new extremist Syrian government, and both are non-extremist groups with American-Israeli orientations. This alliance would connect the Druze region in southern Syria, near the Israeli border, with the Kurdish regions in north-eastern Syria. As a result, it would place the Syrian-Iraqi border under the control of this Israeli- and US-backed alliance, thereby preventing the return of Iranian influence to Syria and Lebanon through this border strip. Additionally, the alliance could include the Alawite minority, offering it protection from the new extremist Syrian government and distancing it from Hezbollah’s and Iran’s influence and interventions. It is also worth noting that the American military base at Al-Tanf is located in the aforementioned border strip, potentially facilitating the connection between the Druze and Kurdish areas. This, in turn, links the US base at Al-Tanf with other US military bases in north-eastern Syria.

To prevent the establishment of this strategic rapprochement, Turkey has taken numerous and sustained steps to keep Israel and the Kurds apart. It initiated peace talks with the Kurds in Turkey, which led to a statement by Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), calling for disarmament, the dissolution of the PKK, and the beginning of Kurdish cooperation with Turkey in the pursuit of peace. This, in turn, was a key factor behind the signing of the eight-point agreement between Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, and Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria, under US mediation. Mazloum Abdi’s motivation was to distance the SDF from Öcalan’s call for disarmament, which had likely been made under Turkish pressure.

Nevertheless, there remains significant potential for Israeli-Kurdish cooperation, as the so-called peace process in Turkey and the fragile agreement between Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Sharaa are both likely to collapse. To realize this potential, however, both the Israeli and Kurdish sides must take serious and urgent steps.