Israel at the Brink: A Systemic Crisis of Democracy

Israel is not facing merely a political dispute—it is undergoing a systematic breakdown of democratic restraint. This is not a crisis born of one decision or one party, but of a pattern: a deliberate dismantling of legal oversight, institutional independence, and public accountability.

The roots of this fragility lie in Israel’s legal architecture. Without a formal constitution, Israeli democracy rests on Basic Laws and the authority of the Supreme Court to interpret and enforce them. That system worked—until it no longer did. In January 2024, the Supreme Court struck down a Basic Law amendment aimed at eliminating judicial review under the reasonableness doctrine. It was a historic defense of the state’s democratic identity. But instead of respecting the ruling, senior officials responded with hostility, seeking to curtail the Court’s authority and legitimacy.

Justice Minister Yariv Levin led efforts to discredit the judiciary, portraying it as an unelected elite. He has openly disregarded the authority of President Justice Yitzhak Amit, breaching norms of institutional respect and separation of powers. These are not rhetorical disputes—they are structural attacks on judicial independence.

Compounding this institutional crisis is Prime Minister Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial. He faces charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust—charges that allegedly form the backdrop of certain legal and political decisions his government now makes. The Supreme Court has already ruled that Netanyahu must avoid involvement in matters that directly intersect with his personal conflict of interests. He signed a formal conflict of interest agreement on July 20, 2020. Yet, through both direct decisions and legislative agendas pushed by his coalition, Netanyahu has seemingly crossed that line—blurring the boundaries between public governance and personal legal interest, in defiance of his obligation to avoid such conflicts.

This message is reinforced by executive behavior. When the Attorney General instructed Netanyahu not to proceed with the appointment of a new Shin Bet head until guidelines could be formulated—following a Supreme Court ruling invalidating the dismissal of Ronen Bar due to procedural flaws and a conflict of interest—Netanyahu defied that instruction. He unilaterally appointed Major General David Zini on May 23, 2025—circumventing not only the Attorney General’s directive, but also the standard consultative process with the IDF Chief of Staff, who is Major General Zini’s direct superior. This was not a procedural oversight. It was a direct rejection of judicial authority, undertaken in the shadow of an ongoing criminal trial that continues to cast doubt on the Prime Minister’s ability to govern impartially.

This dynamic is reinforced by political dependency and coalition interests that sustain unequal civic obligations and shield key partners from accountability. As war strains the Israeli Defense Forces, entire sectors of the population—particularly ultra-Orthodox communities—remain exempt from military service. The same faction benefiting from this exemption is critical to the coalition’s stability and is instrumental in supporting its anti-judicial agenda. What should be a shared civic burden has become a tool of political preservation, enabling the government to maintain power by shielding its allies from equal civic responsibilities.

Yet this erosion is not only institutional—it is popular. Despite overwhelming public support for accountability, the government continues to obstruct it. Surveys conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in July 2024 and January 2025 found that 70–75% of Israelis, including nearly 60% of right-wing voters, support the establishment of a State Commission of Inquiry into the October 7 massacre.[1] The demand is clear. The government’s response: obstruction.

On May 5, 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s cabinet formally decided not to establish such a commission. More than 1,200 civilians were murdered in one of the greatest national security failures in Israeli history. The legal mechanism to investigate such systemic breakdowns—the State Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Law (1968)—was bypassed. Instead, the government proposed a “special commission” whose members would be appointed not by the President of the Supreme Court, but by the Knesset or the government—effectively removing the inquiry’s independence and placing it under direct political control.

This model is not theoretical. It has precedent. In Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, democratically elected leaders retained the form of elections while eroding all substance of liberal democracy. Courts were subordinated, legal oversight hollowed out, and public trust undermined. I am concerned that Israel is adopting the same blueprint.[2]

This is not a crisis of politics alone. It is a constitutional breakdown. A democracy that does not enforce limits on power ceases to be democratic. Elections are essential—but they are not enough. What must be reclaimed is the core principle that no one—not even the most powerful elected official—is above the law.

Israel can still choose a different path. But time is running short.

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[1] Israel Democracy Institute, “Public Opinion Survey: Accountability after October 7,” July 2024 and January 2025. Available at: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/55785 and https://en.idi.org.il/articles/59339
[2]https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/insights-into-the-political-aspirations-of-netanyahu-and-orban/Levy, H.V. (2024).