Israel Must Look Beyond Modi and Netanyahu

The close relationship between Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu has accelerated cooperation between India and Israel. But the partnership’s future will depend on whether Israel’s next government can turn more than three decades of diplomatic progress into lasting strategic, economic and technological gains.

Israel’s political future is being watched well beyond its borders. As Israelis went to the polls on October 27, one question carried particular significance for New Delhi: could a change of government in Jerusalem alter one of India’s most consequential bilateral relationships?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has developed an unusually close relationship with India’s Narendra Modi. Their personal rapport has helped elevate bilateral ties, giving the partnership political visibility and momentum. But if Israel’s next government judges the relationship chiefly through the friendship between the two leaders, it risks overlooking the foundations that have made cooperation increasingly important to both countries.

Modi’s historic visit to Israel in 2017 and Netanyahu’s visit to India the following year gave the relationship unprecedented prominence. Their public displays of warmth conveyed a clear message: India and Israel were prepared to move beyond the diplomatic caution that had long constrained their engagement.

Yet the partnership did not begin with either leader, and it need not end with Netanyahu.

Since India established full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992, successive governments have steadily expanded cooperation. The central challenge for Israel’s next administration is therefore not to recreate the relationship, but to build on more than three decades of diplomatic, strategic and commercial progress.

From diplomatic caution to strategic partnership

For much of its post-independence history, India’s approach to Israel was shaped by competing priorities. Support for the Palestinian cause, domestic political considerations, relations with Arab countries and India’s position in the international system all influenced the pace and character of bilateral engagement.

The establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1992 marked a turning point, but it did not immediately produce the strategic partnership that exists today.

That transformation took place gradually. Governments in both countries expanded cooperation in defense, agriculture, science and technology, creating practical interests that extended beyond the diplomatic preferences of individual prime ministers.

Modi and Netanyahu accelerated this process, but they did not create it.

For India, closer relations with Israel offer access to technological expertise, defense capabilities and opportunities to advance national development. For Israel, India’s growing economic weight, international influence and technological ambitions make it an increasingly valuable partner.

The relationship also demonstrates India’s capacity to deepen ties with Israel while maintaining important relationships throughout West Asia, including with Arab governments and Iran.

This balancing act is central to understanding the partnership’s resilience. India does not view its relationship with Israel in isolation from its wider regional interests, just as Israel must recognize that its own strategic priorities extend beyond the bilateral relationship.

Neither country needs to agree on every international question for cooperation to remain worthwhile. What matters is whether both governments continue to see tangible benefits in working together.

Defense cooperation must evolve

Defense remains one of the most important pillars of India-Israel relations. But the partnership’s future will depend less on the volume of weapons sold than on the ability of both countries to develop more sophisticated forms of industrial and technological cooperation.

India is determined to expand domestic defense production, reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers and develop greater technological self-reliance. These ambitions create opportunities for Israeli companies, but they also require them to reconsider their traditional role.

Israel cannot assume that India will remain primarily a customer for Israeli military equipment. As India’s domestic defense industry grows, the commercial and strategic case for cooperation will increasingly rest on joint development, technology partnerships and industrial collaboration.

For Israeli defense companies, this means finding ways to contribute to India’s capabilities while accommodating New Delhi’s desire to manufacture more equipment at home.

For India, cooperation with Israel can help accelerate technological development and strengthen domestic production without sacrificing access to specialized expertise.

Such an arrangement requires sustained engagement between defense establishments, engineers, companies and policymakers. Political leaders can establish priorities and remove obstacles, but it is the work of institutions and professionals that turns diplomatic intentions into lasting capabilities.

This is a relationship that must become more deeply embedded in the industrial systems of both countries.

The human connections behind the alliance

Agriculture offers another illustration of how bilateral relations can acquire a life beyond high-level diplomacy.

The Indo-Israel Agricultural Project has brought Israeli expertise in irrigation, water management and cultivation techniques into contact with Indian agricultural institutions and farmers. During Modi’s February 2026 visit to Israel, the two governments announced plans to expand their network of agricultural Centers of Excellence to 100.

The significance of such cooperation extends beyond the agreements signed by ministers.

When Indian farmers adopt improved cultivation techniques, researchers collaborate across borders or entrepreneurs develop joint ventures, the relationship acquires practical value for people who may never attend a diplomatic summit.

These connections are less vulnerable to changes in political leadership because they are rooted in professional interests, commercial opportunities and shared objectives.

Historical links, cultural exchanges, tourism and growing professional networks reinforce this foundation. They cannot eliminate political disagreements, but they create familiarity and make continued engagement easier.

Israel should devote greater attention to this human dimension. Public appreciation of India in Israel, and of Israel in India, cannot be understood solely through the personalities of Modi and Netanyahu.

A durable partnership requires societies to see value in one another, not simply governments to issue declarations of friendship.

Turning promises into results

The decisions taken in February 2026 offer a useful test of how far the relationship has progressed.

On February 22, shortly before Modi’s visit, the Israeli government approved Resolution 3911, setting out a program to strengthen relations with India during 2026–29.

The initiative covered cooperation across several government departments, including economic development, science, innovation, technology, agriculture, academic engagement and people-to-people relations. It also established planned activities and financial commitments extending beyond the immediate political cycle.

Four days later, during Modi’s visit, the two governments elevated their relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation and Prosperity.

Considered together, the two developments illustrate the difference between political ambition and institutional commitment. The leaders established the strategic framework; the government resolution outlined practical measures intended to support it.

The next Israeli government should treat these commitments as a starting point rather than a ceremonial achievement.

Government programs require budgets, coordination, administrative capacity and sustained political attention. Approval does not guarantee implementation, and declarations of strategic partnership have little value if they fail to produce measurable results.

The new administration will inherit both a relationship with considerable potential and a set of commitments that demand follow-through.

The economic relationship illustrates the work still required. Despite substantial cooperation in defense and technology, bilateral merchandise trade stood at approximately $3.93 billion in India’s 2025–26 financial year.

Negotiations over a free-trade agreement have advanced, but no agreement has yet been concluded.

A successful deal could widen commercial opportunities, encourage private investment and make it easier for businesses in both countries to expand their activities. Its value, however, would depend on whether it addressed the commercial priorities of both economies rather than serving primarily as a diplomatic symbol.

Israel’s next government should make progress on this front a priority. A deeper economic relationship would broaden the partnership’s foundations and create additional constituencies with an interest in its success.

A change of government is not a reset

Netanyahu is a familiar partner for Modi, and a new Israeli prime minister would need to establish a productive working relationship with India’s leadership. Personal diplomacy remains important, particularly when governments are pursuing ambitious defense, technological and economic agendas.

But a change of leadership should not be mistaken for a return to the starting line.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett maintained contact with Modi during his time in office. An official visit to India was scheduled for April 2022 but was postponed after Bennett contracted COVID-19.

Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, brings extensive national-security experience. That background makes him familiar with the demands of strategic partnerships, although his approach to India would ultimately have to be assessed on the basis of his policies and decisions.

Different Israeli leaders may bring different diplomatic styles and priorities. The responsibility of New Delhi will be to develop strong working relations with whoever forms the next government, while the responsibility of Israel’s leadership will be to demonstrate that the partnership commands support beyond any single political faction.

There is a further consideration for Jerusalem: India’s regional interests are considerably broader than its relationship with Israel.

New Delhi maintains important ties with Gulf states and Iran. Energy security, trade, regional connectivity and the welfare of Indian citizens living and working in West Asia all shape its foreign policy.

An Israeli government that expects India to align automatically with Jerusalem on every regional issue will misunderstand the nature of the relationship. India will continue to pursue its own interests, just as Israel will defend its security priorities.

Recognizing this reality is essential to managing disagreements without allowing them to undermine cooperation elsewhere.

The most successful partnership will be one that accommodates differences while preserving the areas where the two countries have compelling reasons to work together.

The next phase of the partnership

Modi and Netanyahu deserve credit for raising India-Israel relations to a new level. Their political friendship has created momentum, strengthened public visibility and helped establish an ambitious agenda for cooperation.

But the relationship has matured beyond the point at which personal chemistry can serve as its principal measure of success.

Israel’s next government should focus on implementing existing commitments, adapting defense cooperation to India’s changing industrial priorities, expanding academic and technological exchanges, strengthening commercial ties and maintaining regular engagement with New Delhi.

It should also recognize that India’s strategic autonomy is a defining feature of its foreign policy, not an obstacle that can be overcome through closer personal relations between leaders.

For India, a change of government in Jerusalem need not represent a setback. The partnership rests on interests that extend beyond the political fortunes of either Netanyahu or Modi.

For Israel, the relationship is both an achievement and a responsibility. Its future will depend on whether the next administration can translate the diplomatic progress of recent decades into stronger institutions, deeper economic links and cooperation that delivers practical benefits to both societies.

The test will not be whether Israel’s next prime minister can replicate Netanyahu’s personal rapport with Modi. It will be whether the two countries can continue to expand their partnership when the political personalities at the top inevitably change.

That is how India-Israel relations will move from a friendship between leaders to a durable strategic alliance.