Israel Must Win the Peace

In recent developments, Israel’s strategic operations in the Gaza Strip have significantly diminished Hamas’s capacity to launch substantial attacks. Over the most recent period of fighting, Hamas has managed to fire only four rockets towards Israel—a stark contrast to the massive barrages of up to 3,000 launched on Oct. 7th. Notably, there have been no reported attempts by terrorist cells to infiltrate Israeli territory during this period, indicating a substantial weakening of Hamas’s offensive capabilities. This is not a sign of a changed ideology but rather clear evidence that Hamas’s operational capabilities have been severely weakened.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have expanded their operations to target not only military assets but also key components of Hamas’s civilian infrastructure, aiming to disrupt the organization’s governance and operational control. This approach marks a change in strategy from the previous Chief of staff

Israel’s military engagements in Gaza had followed a “conquer and leave” approach, where the IDF would strike Hamas strongholds only for the terrorist group to quickly reestablish control. However experts such as chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, John Spencer have long argued that a more effective strategy is “conquer, hold, and build.” Israel appears to be shifting towards this model, seeking to dismantle Hamas’s rule entirely rather than simply degrading its military strength.  In following with this approach, Israel must be prepared to not just win the war but win the peace. Only once Israel is able to hold the territory and reassure the inhabitants that there will be no reemergence of Hamas, only then can the building begin. The building includes a non-hostile civilian administration as well as a reeducation program focused on coexistence and a rejection of hate.

Several factors have enabled Israel to adopt this new approach:

1. The IDF’s accumulated experience in Gaza and Lebanon has provided improved operational efficiency in addition to valuable intelligence on the ground.

2. The current U.S. administration has shown increased support for Israel’s methodology and has indicated a willingness for Israel to “finish the job” as it sees fit.
3. Under the guidance of the new Chief of Staff, Zamir and Defense minister Katz, the IDF has implemented tactics consistent with the notion of “total victory” including both military and civil targets of Hamas

Additionally, with Hezbollah, Iran and the Houthi’s remaining largely out of the current conflict, Israel can concentrate its resources and attention on Gaza, enhancing the effectiveness of its operations.

An encouraging development is the growing discontent among Gazan civilians towards Hamas. For four consecutive days, large-scale protests have erupted in Gaza, demanding an end to the war and the removal of Hamas from power. Demonstrators have chanted slogans such as “Out, out, Hamas out,” expressing frustration over the ongoing conflict and dissatisfaction with Hamas’s governance. This marks one of the most widespread civilian uprisings against Hamas in years. This is not an endorsement of Israel but rather an indication that the people are both fed up with this war and that Hamas’s ability to suppress dissent through violence is eroding.

Many in Gaza are beginning to see the writing on the wall—that Hamas’s rule is nearing its end and that Israeli forces may maintain control over key areas for the foreseeable future.

There are indications that Israel’s strategy is working and that Hamas is negotiating to release more hostages. There is a danger that in the pursuit of the legitimate attempt to get hostages back Israel may cease its fire again and withdraw once again. At this stage Israel ought to cease fire only and remain in control of the strip. Given Hamas’s history, any pause in military pressure could allow the group to regroup and rearm. The ultimate goal should be to provide Hamas with only one option: withdrawal from Gaza, which will then allow for a civil administration not hostile to Israel to replace it.  Failing to do this will send the wrong message to the Gazans and will ultimately slow down the process of “conquer, hold and build”

It is clear to all that Hamas’s days in power are numbered.  Israel’s shift in strategy, coupled with the internal unrest in Gaza, presents a real opportunity to dismantle Hamas’s rule once and for all.  A future without Hamas’s grip on Gaza is finally within reach and Israel’s next challenge will be to win the peace.