Israel Will Draw the Wrong Conclusions

Israel is set to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate its failure to prevent the October 7 Hamas attack from Gaza. This commission will examine the roles of politicians and military officials, as well as technical and intelligence failures. A similar process took place after the Yom Kippur War, when the Agranat Commission was formed to investigate the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) unpreparedness for the simultaneous Egyptian and Syrian attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 2,812 Israeli soldiers.

These investigations operate under the flawed assumption that Israel’s security depends entirely on constant military readiness, rather than recognizing that true security comes from peace, which does not require perpetual vigilance. The primary goal of the inquiry is presumably to determine what went wrong and how to prevent a similar attack in the future. However, a commission focused solely on technical failures is, in itself, a failure. Israel cannot completely eliminate or even predict surprise attacks. Even if certain individuals or procedures are found at fault, it does not mean Hamas or any other adversary will repeat the same strategy in a future attack. The idea that surprise attacks can be entirely prevented is unrealistic. Israel cannot remain on high alert 24/7, 365 days a year. Its enemies are equally strategic and can strike at a time of their choosing.

Israel must work toward creating a reality in which it has no enemies and is not under constant threat of attack. The solution is not military invincibility but peace. The Palestinians are motivated to attack because they see an opportunity for success, and Israel is unable to meet their demands or diminish their motivations through military means alone. A commission of inquiry may provide Israelis with a false sense of security, leading them to believe that once the investigation is complete, the military will have learned its lesson and future attacks will be prevented.

This is a waste of time. By nature, surprise attacks are unpredictable and ever-changing. Too much time will pass before the inquiry is completed, and its conclusions will likely be muddled by political agendas, making it difficult to determine clear lessons.

Meanwhile, Hamas will also analyze the events of October 7 and likely reach the conclusion that a surprise attack against Israel is possible. It may determine that achieving its goal—the destruction of Israel—requires an even larger and more violent attack in the future.

Israel will draw the wrong conclusion from its inquiry, operating under the mistaken belief that future attacks can be prevented through military means. Hamas, on the other hand, will reach the correct conclusion that Israel cannot fully prevent a surprise attack. Both Israel and Hamas pose a danger—the former for believing it can prevent attacks through military superiority and the latter for believing it can achieve victory through surprise assaults. Ultimately, both sides fail to embrace a vision of peace as the only true solution to avoiding future violence.