Israel’s Best Chance for a Positive Future

Israel and World Jewry are at a dangerous crossroads.

The present situation is deeply troubling. Israel’s international standing has deteriorated dramatically, antisemitism has become increasingly widespread, and many Jews in the Diaspora are increasingly reluctant to identify publicly with Israel or even with their Jewishness. Israel is also experiencing an unusually serious migration problem, with emigration remaining at exceptionally high levels for three consecutive years.

These developments should be a profound warning. Israel’s security cannot be measured only by military strength or the ability to defeat immediate threats. A secure Israel also requires international legitimacy, strong alliances, a healthy relationship with world Jewry, economic vitality, demographic stability and hope for the future.

There is a growing danger that Israel’s present policies could make this situation worse.

Israel understandably has compelling security reasons for acting forcefully in Gaza following the horrors of October 7. Hamas’s massacre of Israeli civilians and taking of hostages demonstrated the dangers Israel faces. No responsible Israeli government can ignore those dangers, and Israel has both the right and obligation to protect its citizens.

But security measures can have consequences beyond their immediate objectives. The continuing devastation in Gaza, together with increasing settlement activity and settler violence in Judea and Samaria, risks transforming Israel’s legitimate struggle against terrorism into a broader international perception that Israel is denying Palestinians basic rights and any realistic hope of statehood. Recent violence in Judea and Samaria has already prompted strong international condemnation.

This distinction is crucial. Israel can win individual battles against terrorism while losing the larger political struggle for international acceptance and legitimacy.

The consequences could extend far beyond relations with the Palestinians.

The prospect of normalization with additional Arab and Muslim countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, has receded. Saudi Arabia has made clear that normalization with Israel requires a credible path toward an independent Palestinian state. If Israeli policies make such a prospect increasingly remote, Israel could forfeit an extraordinary strategic opportunity.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries would be more than a diplomatic achievement. It could transform Israel’s position in the Middle East, strengthen regional cooperation against common threats, expand economic opportunities and deepen Israel’s integration into the region. Policies intended to strengthen Israel could therefore paradoxically deprive it of one of its greatest potential strategic achievements: broad acceptance and integration in the Middle East.

There is also a vital connection between Israel’s policies and the situation of Jews throughout the world.

Antisemitism has many causes, and it would be unfair and historically inaccurate to attribute it primarily to Israeli policies. Antisemites are responsible for their own hatred. Nevertheless, when Israel is widely perceived as permanently denying Palestinians political rights and statehood, Israel’s enemies gain propaganda that can be used to portray Jews as responsible for actions they neither support nor control.

Jews should never have to apologize for being Jewish or feel that identifying openly as Jewish exposes them to hostility. Yet if Israel becomes increasingly isolated, some Jews may understandably feel less comfortable publicly identifying with Israel.

Israel therefore faces a fundamental choice.

One possibility is to continue along the present path: prolonged conflict, increasing settlement expansion, growing international isolation and the gradual disappearance of the possibility of Palestinian statehood. That path may appear to offer greater territorial security. But it could ultimately produce the opposite: a permanently embattled Israel, increasing hostility toward Jews worldwide, continued terrorism and an increasingly difficult demographic and political future.

The alternative is far more painful but potentially more hopeful: a negotiated two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Such an agreement would require painful Israeli concessions, including territorial compromises and difficult decisions concerning settlements.

Palestinians, for their part, would have to make fundamental commitments: unequivocal recognition of Israel, an end to terrorism and incitement, acceptance of permanent borders that would leave most Jews in Judea and Samaria living in Israel, and effective guarantees that a Palestinian state would not become a base for attacks against Israel.

A successful agreement would also require formidable security guarantees, international involvement, Palestinian political reform and arrangements ensuring that Gaza could not again become a launching pad for terrorism. Palestinian leaders would need to demonstrate, not merely declare, that they accept peaceful coexistence with Israel.

The borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security arrangements would present difficult negotiating challenges. Neither side would receive everything it wants. Genuine compromise means that both Israelis and Palestinians would have to surrender deeply held aspirations.

But the relevant question is not whether a two-state agreement is easy or risk-free. It is whether Israel has a better realistic alternative.

The two-state solution may be imperfect and difficult to achieve. Yet the alternatives—permanent occupation, indefinite conflict, continuing terrorism and the eventual disappearance of any realistic possibility of separation between two peoples—also carry enormous risks.

A negotiated two-state settlement could improve Israel’s international legitimacy, weaken some of the propaganda used by antisemites, create the possibility of normalization with Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, strengthen Israel’s security through regional cooperation, and give both Israelis and Palestinians a realistic prospect of a better future.

The demographic issue is especially important. Between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River live two peoples with powerful national identities. If Israel permanently controls the entire territory without granting Palestinians meaningful political rights, it faces an increasingly difficult dilemma: granting equal political rights could threaten Israel’s Jewish majority, while denying them could undermine Israel’s democratic character and generate growing international and moral condemnation. Territorial separation offers a way to preserve both Israel’s Jewish character and its democratic system.

It is therefore significant that Commanders for Israel’s Security, an organization composed of more than 550 retired senior leaders of the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, Israeli police and diplomatic corps, strongly supports a two-state resolution. These are not people indifferent to Israel’s security. Their professional lives were devoted to defending the country. Their position should therefore be taken seriously as evidence that territorial compromise and national security need not be opposing goals.

The choice facing Israel is extraordinarily difficult. But refusing to make difficult choices is itself a choice—and one that could carry an enormous price.

For the sake of Israel and World Jewry, it is time for a serious, sustained effort to negotiate a two-state resolution. Israel should seek the strongest possible security guarantees, demand reciprocal Palestinian commitments and involve trusted international and regional partners. It should negotiate from strength—but it should negotiate.

Israel’s goal should not merely be to survive the next war. It should be to create conditions in which wars do not occur.

After decades of conflict, the most important question is not whether compromise is painful. It undoubtedly is. The question is whether the pain of compromise today may be far less than the price of endless conflict tomorrow.

For Israel and World Jewry, a negotiated two-state agreement may not guarantee a positive future. But given the alternatives, it offers the best realistic chance of achieving one.