Israel’s ‘Deep State’ is Critical Not Of, but FOR, Democracy

The “Deep State.” A term that sends shivers down the spine of anyone who views democracy as a vulnerable marvel. Lately, the Deep State has been used as a cudgel by Israel’s present right-wing government to explain why it hasn’t succeeded over the past 50 years (since 1977) in implementing most of its policies.

To a certain extent, their claim is correct. But they have things backwards. It turns out that around the world, almost across the board, it is the so-called “Deep State” that has protected democracy and the various civil rights that its citizens have come to cherish. So before getting to the Israeli case, here’s a very brief survey of some other countries where the Deep State came under attack. (If you want to dig deeper, read the NY Times’ article from mid-May: “Actually, Democracy Dies in H.R.”

From 1930s Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, to 1970s Argentina’s military junta, all the way to Victor Orban’s Hungary in the 2010s, the same pattern was repeated: those governments recruited into the bureaucracy what can best be called “Loyal Losers” i.e., people whose professional or intellectual abilities were so low that they couldn’t find gainful employment in any other organization. With their very livelihood at stake, these individuals were willing to do whatever the government demanded – torture and murder among the most egregious actions: mobile killing Einzatzgruppen in Germany, secret police NKVD in the Soviet Union, Battalion 601 in Argentina.

To be sure, some proto-autocratic regimes are far more subtle. Instead of an abrupt coup or clear authoritarian takeover, various subtle, systematic tactics are employed by manipulating legislative procedures, restricting judicial oversight, undermining independent institutions, and especially using populist rhetoric to delegitimize the democracy-upholding political opposition. What makes such methods insidious is that they often appear legal and procedural, rendering them harder to detect and resist – thereby hollowing out democracy by way of incremental changes.

Turning to Israel, its free press, strong judiciary, and vital civil society have been pillars of its democracy from the start. However, recent changes in the present government’s policies, not to mention its rhetoric, have rung alarm bells. Its attempts to weaken institutional checks and balances, limit dissent, and in general to consolidate power in the Executive Branch, prompted widespread protests in 2023 with the new government’s announcement of a wide-ranging “Judicial Reform” package.

This included proposals to change the judiciary’s appointment process by altering the composition of the judicial selection committee to favor political appointees. Perhaps even worse, the government pushed legislation to enable legislators to negate court judgments by granting the Knesset the power to override Supreme Court decisions.

In addition, the government is presently trying to restrict the scope of independent oversight bodies, undercutting their ability to check executive actions. For one, splitting the Attorney General’s position into three different offices. Another: reduce the State Comptroller’s budget and also support legal petitions against it – such as the government’s attempt to have the Supreme Court temporarily freeze the Comptroller’s broad October 7 investigations (in lieu of an Official State Commission of Inquiry that the government refuses to establish).

There are two additional bugaboos in the eyes of Israel’s Right-wing parties. First, senior government leaders have publicly criticized (even threatening) journalists who tend to report unfavorably on government actions in “overly critical” fashion. Moreover, wealthy supporters close to the government have been encouraged to purchase Israeli media outright (e.g., TV Channel 13; the government failed in this attempt). Perhaps the most publicly sensitive of all: the governing coalition is presently trying to disband Galei Zahal (Israel’s Army radio station) because of its perceived “left-wing slant.”

A second bête noire of Israel’s right-wing parties are the (mostly left-wing) NGOs. Here the government has been trying to pass legislation that would impose burdensome reporting requirements on the NGOs, as well as additional burdens on Israeli NGOs receiving foreign financial support (including overseas Jewish organizations).

On the rhetorical front, Israel’s present leaders have used populist rhetoric to delegitimize its critics” (Hamas supporters”; “traitors”; etc.). The purpose here is to polarize society and weaken civilian trust in the country’s bureaucratic institutions, thus laying the groundwork to justify consolidation of power.

Each of the above actions by itself would not amount to much. But the cumulative effect of these tactics, should they mostly/all be implemented, would constitute a profound weakening of Israeli democracy. Right now, most of these actions have been stifled by an active Knesset Opposition, as well as by many civic society activities – chief of which were the ongoing massive protests back in 2023 (before the events of Oct. 7) and its aftermath put most such activity on hold.

With the government’s days numbered, as elections must be called by the end of this October – and all significant legislation is then put on hold for the preceding three-month election campaign period – the government is now involved in a legislative frenzy to pass as much of its “anti-Deep State” laws as it can. Should the Opposition win the election, it would almost certainly cancel any such laws and policies that were passed and implemented. The upcoming elections, therefore, are truly nothing less than existentially critical for the continuation of Israel’s still-healthy democracy.