Israel’s Rift with America Is a Policy Problem, Not a PR Problem

Israel’s relationship with the United States is undergoing its most serious crisis in decades. The deterioration is no longer fringe; it is visible across American public opinion, deepening partisan divisions in Congress, shifting attitudes among younger Americans and American Jews, and fueling increasingly contentious debates over the alliance’s strategic and moral costs. For generations, the U.S.-Israel special relationship rested on a durable foundation of shared liberal-democratic values and broad bipartisan support in Washington. Today, that foundation is cracking under unprecedented structural strain.

Yet much of the debate in Israel still focuses on why America is changing rather than on the extent to which Israeli policies have driven that change.

The explanations offered in Jerusalem frequently reduce the crisis to a failure of hasbara, the Hebrew term for public diplomacy and foreign media outreach. From Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s complaint that Israel is fighting an information war with “Polish cavalry” to Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s call for expanded “consciousness warfare,” official leadership insists that the rift in Washington is fundamentally a problem of communication.

Even when the debate in Jerusalem extends beyond simple hasbara, it focuses heavily on external dynamics: the deepening partisan polarization of American politics, declining support among Democrats and younger Americans, generational turnover within the American Jewish community, critical news coverage, the rise of anti-Israel activism on college campuses, and growing isolationist currents on the American right. Some also cite antisemitism and what they regard as distorted media portrayals of Israel, while an increasing number acknowledge the Gaza and Iran wars themselves as important factors.

This diagnosis contains undeniable truth. American attitudes toward Israel were already shifting well before October 7. Gallup polling from February 2026 showed that, for the first time in its history, a larger share of Americans sympathized with Palestinians than with Israelis, 41% to 36%. The shift was not sudden; the longstanding Israeli advantage in U.S. public sentiment had been steadily narrowing since 2019.

Why, then, has the shift accelerated so dramatically?

The Gaza war has made Israeli policy inseparable from the debate over the U.S.-Israel relationship. Americans have spent months watching widespread urban destruction, immense civilian suffering, mass displacement, and severe humanitarian deprivation in Gaza, alongside settlement expansion and violence in the West Bank. Whatever one’s assessment of Israel’s security imperatives or Hamas’s responsibility for the October 7 attack and the ensuing war, these visible realities directly shape how the American electorate judges Israeli policy.

Empirical polling reflects the depth of this breakdown. In March 2026, the Pew Research Center found that 60% of Americans viewed Israel unfavorably, compared with 37% who viewed it favorably. Among Americans ages 18 to 29, unfavorable views reached 75%. Gallup similarly reported in July 2025 that approval of Israel’s military action in Gaza stood at just 32%, while 60% disapproved.

These numbers cannot be dismissed simply as the product of campus activism or media coverage. They demonstrate a profound shift in American attitudes that extends well beyond the activist left, even though substantial partisan differences remain.

And now there is the shadow of wider regional confrontation with Iran.

The war with Iran has introduced a different question into American foreign-policy discourse: not simply whether Americans support Israel’s right to self-defense, but whether direct U.S. military involvement on Israel’s behalf advances American national interests. Pew polling from March 2026 found that 59% of Americans believed the United States had made the wrong decision in using military force against Iran, compared with 38% who said it had made the right decision.

The significance goes beyond the immediate polling. Americans are increasingly questioning whether protecting Israeli security and advancing American strategic interests remain synonymous. When an alliance is perceived as drawing the United States into major regional conflicts, the traditional argument for automatic strategic backing becomes harder to sustain.

Meanwhile, the growing distance between Israel and American Jews represents another warning sign. It is too convenient to attribute this alienation primarily to left-wing pressure or rising antisemitism. The vast majority of American Jews responded to the horrors of October 7 with profound solidarity with Israel. But the subsequent conduct of the war, the humanitarian consequences in Gaza, settlement expansion, and statements by far-right cabinet ministers advocating displacement or permanent annexation of the Palestinian territories have created a profound conflict for some American Jews between their attachment to Israel and their own Jewish and liberal-democratic values.

This alienation does not mean American Jews have abandoned their commitment to Israel’s survival. Rather, it means that the distinction between supporting the State of Israel and supporting the policies of its current leadership has become increasingly important in American Jewish life.

This is why a simple change in Israeli leadership, while important, cannot by itself resolve the structural crisis. A post-Netanyahu government led by opposition parties might restore diplomatic decorum and reduce divisive rhetoric. But if fundamental policies regarding Palestinian self-determination, settlements, Gaza and Israel’s regional military posture remain substantially unchanged, a new prime minister would alter the atmosphere without addressing the underlying issues.

The United States and Israel will continue to share vital security interests, intelligence cooperation and concerns about regional threats. But a lasting strategic alliance is sustained by more than shared intelligence files; it requires a continuing perception among the American public and political leadership that the partnership aligns with American values and serves American interests.

The breakdown with Washington is not fundamentally about how Israel explains itself to the world. It is about what Israel does, the strategic choices it makes, and whether the American public continues to believe that the special relationship serves the United States as well as Israel.