Israel’s Syrian Blitz

The IDF’s  Syrian blitz dubbed operation “Arrow of Bashan” is the clearest manifestation yet of an Israeli preemptive doctrine. The offensive eliminated the vast majority of Syria’s strategic  capabilities, as well as  took over the buffer zone on the mutual border—including the Syrian side of the strategic Mount Hermon. 

 The adoption of the new strategy is the direct result of the bankruptcy of the previous Israeli approach to securing its defenses, namely through deterrence-based containment. The latter’s demise was precipitated by Hamas’s October 7 surprise attack.

As well it demonstrates a measurable decline in the reliance on early warning as a key element in Israel’s force disposition and deployment. The October surprise has shaken the confidence that Israeli intelligence will “bring the goods”—i.e. will be able to forewarn in time of an imminent attack. As the Syrian blitz indicates conclusively in the face of a highly dynamic environment and uncertainty as to the political outcome across the border, Israel would rather rely on buffer zones and on controlling key topography so that territorial depth provides enough time to mobilize and reinforce the lines in case of another intelligence failure.

Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s declaration on December 10 all but made the new doctrine official. “We want relations with the new regime in Syria. But if this regime allows Iran to return to establishing itself in Syria or allows the transfer of Iranian weapons or any other weapons to Hezbollah…we will respond strongly. And we will exact a heavy price. What happened to the previous regime [in Syria] will also happen to this regime.” 

The last time Israel was on a such war-footing was in 1967 when the Israeli Air 

Force (IAF) intercepted the majority of the Egyptian Air Force while still in its airbases, followed by a lightning ground offensive in the Sinai Peninsula aimed to destroy the Egyptian military buildup there. 

Since then, two IDF campaigns, one in Syria and the other in the West Bank, could be seen as precursors to the new preemptive doctrine. In Syria, the “war between the wars” was designed to block arms transfers to Hezbollah and prevent Iranian proxies’ dispatched to the country from deploying on the Israeli border. Similarly, ongoing operations in the West Bank are aimed to eliminate emerging terrorist cells.

A harbinger of the new approach was also on display on August 25, 2024, when the IDF took out hundreds of Hezbollah’s rockets and drones about to be launched into Israel.

However in the case of Syria there was hardly a sign that (deposed) President Bashar al-Assad’s leftover strategic arms were about to be aimed against Israel. Yet the mere existence of such armaments, plus the concern that they might fall into the “wrong hands,” was enough to put the new policy into gear. (From this perspective the action in Syria might be defined as preventive rather than preemptive as the latter term is typically reserved to thwarting militarily a “ticking bomb“ threat. However preventive measures often involve non-military responses, reflecting usually lesser urgency, which in the Syrian case were unavailable for obvious reasons.)

 There should be no doubt that, in adopting the preemptive doctrine, Israel was buoyed by the extraordinary accomplishments of its military in the war against Iran’s “axis of resistance.” From a strategic point of view, the IDF’s recent victories have infused much credibility into the new Israeli policy.

 In addition, the protracted and costly campaigns waged by the IDF helped dispel any notion that Israelis lacked the will to confront their increasingly aggressive enemies for fear of suffering heavy military casualties. On the contrary, it is now clear that soldiers of the IDF, believing they are engaged in an existential fight, are highly motivated and determined to vanquish their enemies. In this vein, the main attraction of a preemptive doctrine is its promise to shorten the duration of any conflict and thus to minimize its costs in terms of lives and treasure.

 Also, there is no denial the recent military triumphs have restored Israelis’ self-confidence and the public’s trust in the IDF’s ability to effectively confront the country’s enemies.

In fact the central role of the IAF in successfully executing the new concept will certainly reinvigorate the debate on the role air power will play on the future battlefield and as a power projection apparatus.

 When taken together these considerations indicate that the preemptive Israeli doctrine must be viewed as a fully operational construct as it is firmly anchored in credibility of intentions and backed by spectacular capabilities. The latter were evidenced by the IDF’s stellar performances on multiple fronts simultaneously.

In activating the new defense concept vis-a-vis Syria, Israel was not only seeking to address a potential strategic threat there but to send a warning to its other enemies. One of the main targets was undoubtedly Hezbollah. Israel is signaling that any effort by the Lebanese terrorist organization to rearm and/or move closer to its northern border will not be tolerated and will be subject to the full force of the IDF.

The second and most important intended recipient of the Israeli preemptive action in Syria was Iran. Tehran must now consider that any attempt to reconstruct its “ring of fire” around Israel will not only fail, but also expose it directly to severe Israeli retribution.

In addition, the Israeli defense establishment surely realizes that Tehran’s incentives to go nuclear have peaked now that its “strategic depth” has essentially collapsed, especially after the takeover of Syria by jihadi Sunnis.

(Some Iranian commentators even described the Syrian debacle as the “fall of Iran’s  Middle Eastern Berlin Wall”.)

The mullahs may also feel that by acquiring nukes they will rehabilitate Iran’s  battered position among the remaining pieces of the “axis of resistance,” and that  exportation of the Islamic revolution could then resume in earnest.

After all, Iran’s Supreme leader the Ayatollah Ali Khameini already pledged on December 11 that the setbacks in Syria would only strengthen the resistance: “The more you [Israel and the U.S.] add pressure, the more steadfast it [the resistance] is, the more crimes you commit, the more it is motivated. The more you fight against it, the more it expands,”  he declared.

 But the Iranians must also know that breaking out to the bomb will be the most dangerous under the current circumstances. First, the deterrent provided by Hezbollah against an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities has been effectively eliminated now that its “second strike” capability had been destroyed by Israel. Second, after the Israeli attack on Iran last October, the country is essentially devoid of an air defense system to stop the IAF. Moreover, with the latest Israeli preemptive action in Syria and the obliteration of what was described as the “densest air defense network in the world,” the IAF will be essentially unopposed on its way to Iran. (Incredibly, the IAF now exercises air superiority, if not air dominance, over a significant portion of the Middle East to include Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.) Also,  the mullahs must remember that twice this year—in April and again in October—the IAF was able to reach and destroy key Iranian strategic targets irrespective of Iranian (and Syrian) air defenses. Lastly, the action in Syria is a clear cut affirmation that Israel is determined to thwart any potential threat to the country’s security.

Besides one of the IAF’s targets in Syria was its weapons of mass destruction— both chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities. This should especially catch the eye of any Iranian contemplating the crossing  of the nuclear threshold.

Israel’s enemies now understand that the costs of the October 7 attack, included not just the destruction of Hamas and the devastating losses suffered by Hezbollah which, in turn, contributed to the fall of the Assad regime. The tally must include the doctrinal shift in the thinking in Jerusalem. The reliance on deterrence and containment which stressed assessment of the enemy’s intentions —an approach responsible for the October 2023 catastrophe—was abandoned in favor of an offensive mindset bent on preempting emerging threats based, as evidenced in Syria, on the enemy’s capabilities.

Indeed in view of the IDF’s Syrian blitz these enemies might even conclude that, as a result of the October 7 debacle, Israel has gone berserk or is at least led by a trigger-happy leadership.

Whatever are these opponents assessments they must appreciate that the new offensive concept will govern the future plans and operations of a military which has just decisively demonstrated its supremacy over all of Israel’s enemies in the Middle East.