It’s Always Possible to Change

The rabbinic tradition portrays Yaakov and Esav as two sharply contrasting personality types. Even their manner of speaking is interpreted as a window into their inner character. The very choice of words each uses becomes significant. Esav’s words, when he returns famished from a long day of hunting and finds Yaakov cooking a pot of lentil stew, are particularly telling:

“Give me some (haliteini na) of that red stuff to gulp down, for I am famished.” (Genesis 25:30)

The English translation does not fully convey the nuance of Esav’s expression. The verb “haliteini” is the causative form of the root ל–ע–ט (lamed–ayin–tet), a term commonly used in reference to feeding animals and carrying connotations of crude, unrestrained gluttony. As we will see, this unusual verb plays a crucial role in the continuation of our discussion.

We now turn to a Mishnah dealing largely with agricultural law:

“A vineyard in its fourth year (whose fruit must be eaten in Jerusalem or redeemed) is marked with clods of earth; orlah (the forbidden fruit of the first three years) is marked with potter’s clay; and graves (so that kohanim will not contract impurity) are marked with lime that is dissolved and poured on. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: When does this apply? In the seventh year. The conscientious would place money down and declare: ‘Any fruit gathered from this vineyard may be exchanged for this money.’” (Maaser Sheni 5:1)

This Mishnah establishes the responsibility of a field owner to mark areas of prohibition so that passersby will not unwittingly transgress. It is unclear whether Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is explaining the first opinion or offering an alternative.

The Talmud elaborates on Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s statement, explaining that this requirement applies only during the seventh year (shnat hashmita). In the other six years of the Sabbatical cycle, anyone who takes grapes from another’s field is simply a thief, and the Mishnah’s requirement to warns such an individual does not apply. This ruling is grounded in the adage: “Feed it to the wicked man and let him die” (ha’aliteihu la-rasha v’yamut), that is, one is not obligated to protect the wicked from the consequences of their own wrongdoing. In such cases, there is no obligation to warn a thief that the grapes he is stealing are also prohibited.

The Mishnah continues: “But the pious ones would set aside coins and say: ‘Anything that is picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins.’” These righteous individuals maintained that the owner could redeem the fruit even after it had left his possession (see Bava Kama 69a).

The Talmud’s introduction of the word “ha’aliteihu,” a form related to haliteini, draws on the image of one who is a “glutton for sin.” Such a person, according to this view, does not merit special protection or warning. Rashi applies this principle to the six non-Sabbatical years, when taking another’s fruit constitutes theft. Tosafot, by contrast, argue that the marking requirement should apply at all times, thereby limiting the relevance of the principle of “ha’aliteihu”.

This principle raises profound questions about communal responsibility for the actions of others, a topic that has generated considerable debate. At issue are not only the limits of responsibility for others and the ethics of labeling individuals, but also the boundaries of moral coercion: When must a community intervene to prevent wrongdoing, and when is a person accountable for the consequences of their own choices?

The literary and legal use of the word “ha’aliteihu” thus invites a measure of self-awareness. We must examine what drives us to act in certain ways and consider the wider implications of our choices and behaviors.

In recent years, the principle of “ha’aliteihu” played a role in an intriguing debate between two of the most prominent poskim (halakhic decisors) of 20th-century Israel: Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg and Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef. The question concerned whether a meat restaurant that also sold packaged dairy ice cream should be granted rabbinic kashrut supervision. Rabbi Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 11:55), citing this principle, ruled that it would be improper to do so. Rabbi Yosef (Yabia Omer, Yoreh De’ah 4:7), however, rejected the application of “ha’aliteihu” in this case, asserting that one must provide people with kosher options even if they might choose to act otherwise. Rabbi Yosef wants to give people the opportunity to do what is right.

Ultimately, we must find an appropriate balance between personal autonomy and communal responsibility. It is not an easy task, but it is a necessary one.