It’s not a ‘Third Lebanon War’; it’s a quest for peace in the Galilee

Following the significant and painful blows Hezbollah has sustained over the past week, the organization was compelled to respond. This response came in the form of expanded rocket fire, targeting areas such as the Haifa area and the Jezreel Valley. Hezbollah declared this a “preliminary response” to the Israeli attacks on communication devices, including pagers and radios. It seems Hezbollah is trying to maintain a delicate balance: targeting military and security objectives (such as Ramat David Airbase and a defense factory near Haifa), while minimizing the risk of uncontrollable escalation, which it appears to be avoiding at this stage. 

Whether the “Beirut = Tel Aviv” equation remains in play will be revealed in the coming days, with much depending on Israel’s strategy and actions, as today Israel has escalated to extensive strikes against the rocket and missile array threatening its residents.

This escalation compels the Israeli government to adopt a broader outlook, extending beyond Lebanon, and considering several fundamental understandings regarding the theater of war and its additional theaters of operations:

1. A comprehensive deal seems off the table for now: The possibility of an agreement that would return the hostages from Gaza and ensure Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani River appears unlikely at this time. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader, was not interested in such a deal prior to the current escalation and is certainly not inclined toward concessions now. He is expecting the realization of a multi-front war, a dream he failed to achieve on October 7. Nevertheless, Israeli defense assessments suggest it is possible to demonstrate to Sinwar that a regional conflagration is improbable. It’s crucial to emphasize that Israel bears a moral imperative to make every diplomatic and military effort to bring its hostages back from Gaza. A significant achievement in Lebanon must contribute to this crucial objective, which has been ostensibly set as one of the primary goals of Israel’s war cabinet.
2. There is a wide middle ground between a war of attrition and full-scale conflict: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is not Sinwar. He fears the devastating consequences of a full-scale war on Lebanon as a whole, and in particular on the Shia population in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Nasrallah also understands that this is the war for which the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has been preparing in recent years. Consequently, he has made clear signals that he prefers to avoid an all-out confrontation at this point.
3. A full-scale war is undesirable for Iran as well: Iran is wary of its limited ability to strike Israel, as demonstrated in the attack on the night of April 13. Additionally, the US military presence in the region and Washington’s stance alongside Israel, even if somewhat hesitant, heighten Iranian fears of being dragged into a conflict that could damage both Iran and its key asset, Hezbollah, which it painstakingly built over decades as a deterrent against Israel.
4. Israel’s military actions proceed without US approval: Israel has not informed the United States about its military plans and continues to act in Lebanon, despite Washington’s concerns that a war in the Middle East could jeopardize Vice President Kamala Harris’s prospects in the November elections. However, the Americans understand that Israel, as a sovereign nation, has a duty to defend against Hezbollah, which has been attacking Israel since October 8, without any provocation. This serves as a critical lesson for those who argue that Israel cannot act in Gaza or reoccupy strategic areas (such as the Rafah crossing or the Philadelphi Route) due to heavy American or international diplomatic pressure.
5. Hezbollah’s attacks on military targets justify Israeli response: By striking military targets while also hitting civilians, Hezbollah is granting Israel the legitimacy to strike the group’s military infrastructure, systematically embedded within civilian areas, such as its missile production and storage facilities.
6. Hezbollah’s operational coordination has been severely damaged: Nasrallah’s command structure has suffered significant losses, leaving him relatively isolated from senior commanders, many of whom have been eliminated. Despite this, Hezbollah retains the ability to launch missiles, rockets, and drones against Israel, even if its capacity to effectively counter swift and intense Israeli actions has been reduced. In fact, Israel has already executed numerous preemptive strikes for war, and it must ensure they will deliver the desired strategic outcome, either as stand-alone measures or as an overture for a broader conflict.

Strategic Campaign Objectives in the North

In the past week, the Israeli government has changed its war goal regarding Lebanon. The objective is no longer to maintain the north as a secondary front, but to enable the residents of northern Israel to safely return to their homes with sustained security following a ceasefire.

This new goal should be broken down into three key objectives:

1. Decoupling Lebanon from Gaza: Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel must cease, regardless of IDF actions in Gaza. This is a critical achievement for the coming years, as Israel is likely to conduct future operations in Gaza, and cannot afford a reality where every such campaign results in rocket fire on northern Israel.
2. Targeting Hezbollah’s most strategic assets: Israel must deepen its offensive against Hezbollah, focusing on the organization’s most prized capabilities. So far, Israel has mainly targeted the Radwan Force, medium-range rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles. In the coming days, it must also strike Hezbollah’s precision missile project, which threatens Israel’s strategic assets. Additionally, Israel should consider whether it is time to eliminate Nasrallah himself, delivering a significant blow to the organization and exploiting the current conflict to exact a heavy price from Hezbollah and Iran.
3. Achieving a new security reality post-October 6: Some argue that a full-scale war with Hezbollah would result in a return to passive Israeli policies. Regardless of the military achievements in Lebanon, Israel must shift its post-war policy to ensure a lasting change in the balance of power. This may involve securing a buffer zone in Lebanon free of Hezbollah forces or establishing understandings that grant the IDF the legitimacy to respond swiftly to any violations, without sliding into wide-scale escalation. Ideally, this would mirror Israel’s ongoing operations in Syria, based on resetting deterrence dynamics.

Israel must also pursue another critical goal: leveraging its successes in the north to secure a hostage deal. Quick victories in Lebanon could help close the southern front, convincing Sinwar that his dream of a multi-front war to destroy Israel will never materialize.

Unlike in the south, where the goal is to dismantle Hamas’s military and governing structure while securing the return of the hostages, Israel’s objective in the north is more modest: restoring security to northern residents and altering the rules of engagement. To achieve these aims, Israel must capitalize on the current window of opportunity and intensify its operations against Hezbollah’s core capabilities, signaling its readiness to escalate should Nasrallah continue to shackle himself to Gaza. Gradual execution is important to allow Nasrallah to decide to stop and avoid a wide-scale war, which he also does not seek.

We seek peace for the Galilee, not a third Lebanon war – but we must be prepared for such a conflict if Hezbollah and Iran insist on preventing peace in the Galilee, and, ultimately, in Lebanon itself.