Korach’s Critical Lesson for Israeli Politics Tomorrow

It was a coalition held together by a shared desire for power, honor and money. But this didn’t mean that every member of the coalition did not have their own ideology, or that their ideological beliefs did not have enough truth to them to attract a mass of followers.  If we listen carefully to the complaints and campaigns of those who rise up against Moshe in parshat Korach, we can discern at least three separate camps.

There was the anti-corruption, anti-nepotism camp led by Korach. He campaigned against the injustice that the highest priestly honor was granted by the nation’s political leader to his own brother. Then there was the equality camp, who argued that “all of the congregation is holy”, and therefore, the tribe of Levi should enjoy no special status at all. The third camp, the failed leadership camp, arose from two members of the tribe of Reuven who also happened to have a long-held personal vendetta against Moshe. But this didn’t mean their campaign, too, didn’t have much truth to it. Moshe’s most basic promise to the people had not been fulfilled, and so, they argued, he should be replaced, and a new path should be followed.

When you analyze the ideology of these three camps, the anti-corruption camp, the equality camp, and the failed leadership camp, you find fundamental contradictions between their positions. Korach didn’t have any problem with the choosing of the tribe of Levi. On the contrary, he was a beneficiary of it. And the members of the tribe of Reuven didn’t oppose choosing one tribe, they were simply bothered by the fact that it wasn’t them. Neither of these groups, many of whom were an integral part of the leadership structure, shared the drastic, radical conclusions that Datan and Aviram had come to, that the Jewish people should return to Egypt. All these groups wanted power for different reasons and different ends. But what united them was that they all wanted power, and that in order to get it, they needed to depose Moshe. This, perhaps, is what the Mishna means when it takes this case as the paradigmatic example of the dispute that is not for the sake of heaven, which is destined to come apart. Had this coalition succeeded in dethroning Moshe, they would immediately have started fighting amongst themselves, because their ideological visions for the people were so fundamentally and practically at odds with one another.

Anyone with a pro-Netanyahu bent reading these words (and particularly anyone who doesn’t know me and my history in the anti-Netanyahu protests) might have a very clear sense of where I’m going with this, and I will get there in the end, at least somewhat, but first, I must surprise them. The problem of a coalition united by the interests of power despite deep internal ideological contradictions is as relevant to the current governing coalition as it is to anyone that aspires to replace it. While the government’s rhetoric always tried to present the “fully fully right-wing government” as being the most ideologically coherent and homogeneous of all Israeli governments, that story has begun to unravel. The haredi ideological commitment to learning Torah as the key to defending Israel, and their consequent demand for an exemption from military service, is fundamentally at odds with the basic ideology both of the Likud and of the Religious Zionist parties. And conversely, the ideological commitment to conquering and resettling Gaza as the key to defending Israel maintained by the Religious Zionist and Jewish Power parties, and the consequent need for a larger army, is fundamentally odds with the basic needs and ideology of the haredi parties. The Likud was traditionally a liberal party that was right wing not only in terms of politics but also in terms of economics. Shas, on the other hand, had traditionally held dovish political positions, and until this day champions left-wing economic policies. Thus far, despite all of these deep ideological differences, each party has received enough power, honor and budgets to keep it happy, especially when faced with a probably alternative of losing all those, but it has demanded serious ideological compromises of all parties, and it doesn’t appear to have long-term viability.

But even I must admit that the story of Korach bears no less of an important cautionary tale for all political parties that share the desire to replace Netanyahu. If the critics of the “anti-Bibi” camp are right and that desire alone is what will unite these parties, regardless of ideology, then it too lacks long-term viability. The next government to be formed must seek to base itself not only on shared political needs and goals, but on deeply shared values. In today’s divided Israeli society, is there any such foundation that is shared by the majority of Israelis? Micha Goodman, in his book ‘The Eighth Day’ argues that there is- it is the shared ideological commitment to Israel as both a fundamentally Jewish and fundamentally Democratic state. A significant majority of Israelis share what he calls this “hybrid commitment’, and therefore, this can serve as the most viable foundation upon which the next government can be built.

To be sure, there are many debates about the ways to properly balance these two poles, but that dissent is not a bug, but a feature. After all, what the Mishna offers as the preferred alternative to Korach’s dispute is not ideological uniformity, but rather, a dispute which is for the sake of heaven. Jews are far too opinionated of a people to imagine that such uniformity is possible, and far too wise of a people to think that it is desirable. When taking place in a context of shared basic values held by the majority, disputes that are not motivated by power or personality, but rather by values and ideology, can be resolved with a proper democratic process that satisfies the valid demands of the most vehement of Moshe’s critics.