Mansour Abbas’s Second Revolution

The political camp seeking to replace Benjamin Netanyahu — Eisenkot, Lapid, Bennett, the Democrats, and Yisrael Beytenu — has no majority without Arab Knesset members. They know it, and we know it. And that is even before we consider Yoav Segalovich’s likely move to Ra’am, which, it seems, could bring the party to seven or even eight seats. In plain English, Ra’am’s bargaining power could be unprecedented for an Arab party in Israel.

That is precisely why Mansour Abbas should demand a strategic partnership built on more than budgets, five-year plans, and improvements in the standard of living of Arab citizens.

In recent years, Abbas has brought about a revolution in Israeli politics. To break the longstanding taboo against partnership with an Arab party, he had to convince the Jewish public that Ra’am was not seeking to challenge the very legitimacy of the state, but to become a partner in governing it. He deliberately chose to focus on personal security, the fight against crime, housing, infrastructure, and budgets, while distancing himself as much as possible from the national issues — the occupation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the collective rights of Arab citizens, and their Palestinian identity.

He broke the taboo against an Arab party joining a governing coalition and succeeded in changing the rules of the game more than any other Palestinian citizen of Israel in political leadership since the establishment of the state.

It was a courageous strategy, one that came with an unprecedented personal and political price. But it worked. And now it is time for the next stage.

Most Arab citizens want to see their elected representatives influence government and deliver results. In that sense, those within Arab society who criticized Abbas did not do so because of the pragmatism he adopted, but because he almost completely avoided addressing his voters’ national identity, their collective rights, the reality in the occupied territories and Gaza, or the aspiration to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

That price could perhaps be understood as long as Ra’am still had to prove that it deserved to be allowed onto the playing field. But if Ra’am is becoming a party without which there can be no government, that entry fee has already been paid.

This is precisely the moment for Abbas to use the political power he has accumulated not only to change the composition of the government, but to change the rules of partnership itself. Ra’am should not have to choose between citizenship and national identity, between fighting crime and advancing a political solution, or between five-year plans and recognition of the collective rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel. It can — and should — pursue both.

Arab-Jewish partnership is not about erasing identities. If Yoav Segalovich joins Ra’am, he does not become any less Jewish. And Mansour Abbas does not become any less Palestinian. Genuine political partnership is based precisely on each side remaining true to its identity and values while still being able to govern together with the other.

If Jewish parties are entitled to speak about security, Jerusalem, the future of the territories, and the identity of the state, there is no reason why an Arab party should be considered a legitimate partner only as long as it confines itself to roads, budgets, and garbage collection. That demand is not an expression of pragmatism. It is an expression of inequality. The political camp seeking to replace Netanyahu will have to understand that.

If it wants Ra’am’s support, it will have to accept the party for what it really is: a party representing a public that is both Israeli citizens and part of the Palestinian people; a public that seeks personal security and economic prosperity, but also wants its leaders to fight for an end to the conflict, for full equality, and for recognition of its rights as a national minority.

Many of Ra’am’s potential voters are not asking it to embrace a politics of boycotts and slogans. Nor do they want to give up the gains that pragmatism has produced. They want a third model: a party that knows how to govern, exert influence, and deliver results, but that does not silence its identity or its national positions in order to gain legitimacy.

If Mansour Abbas has the courage to take this step, he will not only increase Ra’am’s bargaining power in coalition negotiations. He may also broaden the party’s base of support within Arab society and even beyond.

Abbas’s first revolution was to prove that an Arab party can be a partner in government. His second revolution must prove that it can be a partner in government without leaving its identity, its principles, and the national interests of its voters outside the room.