Might is Not Right

This war in Lebanon and Iran has shown that “might is right” is a fallacy for Israel. Israel has, since its founding in 1948, attempted to use as a strategy, a “might is right” policy deploying escalating kinetic retaliation against any attacks on Israel. “Strike us and we will strike back harder”. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Gaza War initiated by Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. While the numbers do not tell the full story, they nonetheless illustrate the Israeli approach: 1,156 Israelis killed on October 7, +70,000 Gazans killed in the resulting war. 

Although Israel’s overwhelming military superiority was on full display in Gaza, subsequently twice in Iran, and currently in Lebanon—integrating artificial intelligence into operations, targeting and killing leaders seemingly at will, the exploding pagers operation, and achieving aerial supremacy at low cost, the ability for fighter aircraft to roam at will over Iran and Lebanon— it also revealed deep problems.

These wars have shown that the value of Israel’s might is easy to overestimate especially in modern asymmetric warfare against an enemy armed with drones, rockets, and missiles. Israeli and American factories cannot resupply Israeli armed forces fast enough with the expensive interceptors and guided ammunition needed to sustain a long-term engagement. In contrast, Iran fought an asymmetric war with limited weapons, using limited drones and missiles to terrorize millions of Israeli civilians for more than five weeks, joined by barrages of rockets and missiles from Hezbollah in Lebanon. Too much testosterone leads to wretched judgments that confuse lethality and destruction with winning. 

Overwhelming firepower without a political strategy saps Israeli strength, leads to hubris, and results in a lack of an effective strategy to ensure long-term peace. Nowhere is this currently more evident than on the Israeli TV news channels, which parade retired IDF generals, one after another, who proclaim Israeli victory on the battlefield with an endless ream of statistics, while ignoring the lack of long-term vision and the absence of a political strategy after the fighting ends.

More and more Israelis are beginning to realize that the current wars with Iran and Lebanon are revealing both a strategic geopolitical failure and the hard limits of Israeli military power even when allied with American might. Firstly the 47-year-old Iranian regime, while militarily weakened, which will be rebuilt, is politically stronger having demonstrated its leverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the imposition of tariffs on ships passing through. Before the war there was free passage through the straits, now Iran has demonstrated its ability to control and profit from all traffic in the straits. Secondly, Iran and the current regime have absorbed multiple American and Israeli attacks on infrastructure and targeted assassinations while remaining in power. Israel’s tolerance for forever war masks the reality of Israel’s current situation in external its wars in Iran, Lebanon and Gaza, and it’s internal war in the West Bank. The endless push to keep striking these adversaries to degrade their capabilities has revealed the limitations of Israel’s own military force. After all, if you need to keep doing more and more of something, it strongly suggests that what you are doing is not working.

Furthermore, the outcome of this war with Iran is a country with the ability to demand concessions including sanctions relief. Iran can generate billions of dollars in income from oil exports, enabling the restoration and rebuilding of what was damaged during the war. This added economic activity will enable Iran to move from a sanctioned economy under strain to a more prosperous state, the opposite of what economic sanctions were intended to accomplish.

Finally, this war, with the accompanying New York Times report on how Netanyahu, among others, influenced Trump to blunder into this war, is contributing to Israel’s deteriorating status, with the accompanying continued loss of public and political support in the United States. For the first time, more than 60% of Americans, 80% of Democrats, and 40% of Republicans, express unfavorable support of Israel. This will undoubtedly translate into an erosion of political support from a Democrat President and a Democrat controlled Congress. This loss of support is shaped by Israel’s behavior and actions post October 7 and Israeli conduct in the subsequent, unending wars.

Unfortunately, Israeli reaction, policies, and behavior, shaped by incessant internal and external threats since 1948 and previously, has been an instinctive reaction of fight rather than negotiation. This has led to the creation of a nuclear-armed military machine without peer or competition in the region. Military force can be deployed actively or used as a passive threat to achieve strategic political gains. Regrettably, in the case of Israel, it appears that military force is almost exclusively deployed in the active mode rather than utilized as a passive threat. The IDF can only offer military solutions, but battlefield success is only one part of victory in modern warfare, which is why the IDF has and will ultimately fail to deliver decisive results when it comes to Israel’s continuing wars, both internally and externally. There is no decisive military solution for political or religious movements operating below the threshold of conventional war as Hamas and Hezbollah do. Only the political leadership can ultimately negotiate political settlements with such groups in the absence of conclusive military defeat. 

Contributing to the violence has been the Israeli policy of escalating retaliation – hit us and we hit back harder. This has led to untold misery, death, and destruction, not least of all to all Israelis who now bear the brunt of enemies that actively fight back with missiles, rockets, and drones which have caused widespread consternation, death, and destruction in Israel’s home front and backyards.

Historically Israel has taken the war to the enemy, outside of Israel’s borders. The strategy of fighting short, limited engagements, utilizing a large reserve army has enabled Israel to field a relatively large force to achieve quick tactical successes while limiting widespread damage to civilians. Post October 7 a new reality has emerged – despite overwhelming technical and force superiority, Israel has neither managed to avoid threats and damage to the civilian home front, nor has Israel managed to limit the duration of these wars. Rockets, drones, and missiles have wreaked untold damage to Israeli morale, the economy, and the self-image Israelis had of their military capabilities. So too has the ability of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to continue fighting, send missiles, drones, and rockets into Israel, even after absorbing massive losses including the assassination of all their leaders.

While it is too early to determine the medium to long-term outcome of these latest rounds of fighting, it is immediately apparent that the limit of Israeli might has been reached. Israel cannot achieve an enduring peace and a permanent settlement with the Iranians, Palestinians, and others by the imposition of military force alone. Hamas is not defeated, Hezbollah will not be defeated, and Iran is not defeated. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be defeated militarily, nor will they surrender. There is no purely military solution to these conflicts, and there never has been despite Netanyahu and others claiming otherwise over and over. Without negotiated political solutions, Israel is doomed to round after round of fighting, a deteriorating worldwide status, reduced American support, the flight of secular elites, and a future as Sparta of the Middle East, living by the sword forever.