Miscalculations in The War with Hamas by Israel and Others

Reflecting on the events of and since October 7, 2023, it is evident that Israel made several miscalculations as did the Palestinian camp and Western countries.

1. The surprise element:
   Israel’s most significant miscalculation was their surprise at the October 7 attack. The Hamas ground assault on neighboring Israeli communities, known as the Gaza envelope, followed a massive rocket barrage, caught both the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli government off guard. While these communities had fortified themselves with shelters against persistent rocket fire, they were unprepared for a large-scale ground invasion.

The shelters and safe rooms could not be locked from the inside, allowing Hamas militants to enter and commit murder as families sought refuge in them. Furthermore, the doors were not Kalashnikov-rifle proof, which enabled militants to kill inhabitants even if the doors were held closed. Before the IDF could organize a counter-offensive, only localized civil guards—primarily civilians—were present, insufficient to successfully deter the organized Hamas forces. Most communities were quickly overwhelmed, leading to the tragic slaughter of 800 men, women, and children. Moreover, over 400 attendees were murdered at the nearby Nova music festival, which lacked adequate cover and security. In its recent review, the IDF acknowledged that while various Hamas scenarios had been considered, a contingency plan for a large-scale infantry attack on the Gaza envelope had not been one of them.

Reasons for Israel’s inadequate preparedness are numerous. A significant factor was Hamas’s successful deception of Israeli intelligence regarding their extensive tunnel infrastructure and military buildup. The IDF knew of tunnels under Gaza but did not realize their sophistication or that they extended approximately 600 kilometers with 5,700 shafts. This represented one of history’s most heavily invested military networks, funded over decades by redirecting contributions from Qatar (around $1.8 billion), Iran, and various sham charities, as well as siphoning concrete and materials meant for civilian housing and development. (Imagine how different the Gaza outlook could have been different had the resources been used as intended, to promote Palestinian well being.)

Additionally, frequent military exercises by Hamas led Israel to view their activities leading up to October 7 as routine, successfully lulling Israel into complacency. Another contributing factor was Israeli overconfidence. This combination of Hamas duplicity and Israel’s underestimation of Hamas strength resulted in tragic consequences.

Furthermore, the Israeli government inaccurately prioritized security concerns in the West Bank over those in Gaza. In fact, some military units stationed near Gaza were transferred to the West Bank just a day before the Hamas assault. While security concerns existed in the West Bank, the situation along the Gaza border—though seemingly quieter—was, in reality, far more precarious.

2. The Misinterpretation of Hamas intentions:
   Another significant misunderstanding was the misinterpretation of Hamas’ intentions by both the Israeli Left and Right and the government. In simplistic terms the Israeli public was divided into two roughly equal camps: the Left believed that Palestinians sought coexistence alongside a Jewish state, viewing the resolution of the conflict as a matter of negotiating a mutually acceptable compromise. Consequently, many left-leaning individuals, including members of kibbutzim bordering Gaza, made considerable efforts to support and accommodate the Gaza population, emphasizing neighborly goodwill.

Tragically, after October 7, it became evident that some of those same Gazans who had received assistance, shared their knowledge of the Gaza envelope’s layout with Hamas. This enabled Hamas to obtain specific information such as which houses contained firearms, increasing the destructiveness of their assault on the kibbutzim. The Hamas fighters showed no hesitation in killing those who had previously helped them.

In one striking instance, the IDF searched a Hamas fighter’s home and found a discharge summary from a pediatric oncology department in Israel regarding his son. The Israeli specialized cancer treatment had saved the boy’s life, yet the father participated in a murderous rampage against the very people who facilitated that care.

The Israeli Left has been devastated both by Hamas’s betrayal and by the support for Hamas actions from the pro-Palestinian camp. This breach of trust with their neighbors and what they had presumed Palestinian partners has, in many ways, been as devastating as the terrible actions of Hamas. It shattered their long-held belief in cooperative coexistence. Consequently, today, the vast majority of Israelis oppose pursuing a two-state solution, in part driven by the clear rationale of not wanting to support another political entity that may ultimately aim for Israel’s destruction.

To provide a broader context, none of the Palestinian leadership has explicitly endorsed a two-state solution as an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When pressed, many who claim to support it view it only as a temporary strategy leading to Israel’s dismantling. Historically, there has not been a significant number of moderate Palestinians publicly supporting a negotiated resolution.

By rejecting peace and orchestrating the October 7 assault, former Hamas leader Yehya Sinwar eliminated any middle ground that previously existed between the two sides.

3. Underestimation of Hamas brutality:
   The third flaw was underestimating the Hamas capacity for brutal violence. While the right-wing segment of the Israeli public maintained a general distrust of Palestinian intentions, even most of them failed to grasp the extent of Hamas’s extremist ideology, which made the massacre on October 7 a shock for them too. They did not expect Hamas to be so deliberately barbaric and subsequently boastful about their actions. In contrast, even the Nazis concealed their heinous acts.

Evidence discovered by the IDF revealed that Hamas’s assault was focused on causing mass casualties in the most violent and wanton ways possible. Atrocities included shooting individuals in front of their families, raping women, and burning babies. Some pro-Palestinian figures have attempted to downplay the horrific nature of the Hamas actions at the Nova festival. However, Hamas has been unapologetic and even gleeful about its actions, releasing much of the footage from October 7 to showcase their pride in what they did.

From my perspective as a retrospective armchair general, the events should not have come as a total surprise. The Hamas covenant of 1988 explicitly states its intention to destroy the State of Israel and murder as many Jews as possible through unrestrained violence. Events of October 7 were just a fulfillment of their stated intentions.

4. Exploitation by Hamas of its lack of concern for the lives of Israelis and Gazans:
   Another significant miscalculation was the under-appreciation of the low value Hamas places on both Jewish lives and its own people. Their disregard for Israeli lives was evident on October 7. Regarding Gaza civilians, hints of this lack of concern were apparent before the attack, as Hamas prioritized military infrastructure over the well-being of its population and deliberately intertwined military and civilian structures. They constructed tunnels through children’s bedrooms and placed access shafts in mosques and clinics, fully aware that Israel’s military responses would lead to significant civilian casualties. Furthermore, when Israel did retaliate, Gaza civilians were left to fend for themselves above ground while Hamas fighters remained more securely underground.

If Israelis were to adopt Hamas’s perspective—favoring destruction over lives—they might view the ongoing conflict as a success. After all, most Hamas leaders, including Sinwar, are dead, and over 17,000 fighters have been killed, reducing their military strength from an army to a guerrilla force. Hezbollah, once a significant military threat to Israel, is now diminished, while Assad’s Syria is in disarray, and Iran’s perceived invulnerability has been challenged. Israel’s military success is of historical proportion. However, most Israelis remain focused on concern for the hostages rather than boasting about the IDF’s military achievements.

The differing philosophies—Israel prioritizing preservation of life and Hamas emphasizing destruction—means that Hamas is far more willing to tolerate ongoing devastation on both sides. This gives them leverage in any efforts toward a ceasefire, (not peace agreement, as they reject any peace agreement outright.)

5. The lack of distinction between the views of Hamas, the Gaza population, and the broader pro-Palestinian camp:
   Time has shown that the assumption of a distinction between Hamas and the Gaza population has been proven false. Until October 7, it was suggested that Hamas had imposed itself on a fearful populace. However, many Gazans actively participated in the massacre, proudly reporting their actions. Another example: When Israeli hostages were paraded on October 7 and during later handovers to the Red Cross, large crowds of Gazans cheered and humiliated them.

Unfortunately, these observations reflect Hamas’s success in instilling a deep ideological hatred toward Jews and Israel from a young age, supported by school textbooks—even in (UN)  UNRWA-run schools—that idealize Jihad and the killing of Jews. Sermons in mosques further reinforce this indoctrination by calling for Israel’s destruction.

Although the pro-Palestinian camp is not homogeneous, there has been a near-total lack of condemnation or call for accountability toward the Hamas actions on October 7. This supportive sentiment extends across both the Middle Eastern and international pro-Palestinian communities, indicating that Hamas’s extremist, terror-supporting ideology has permeated much of the camp.

6. Failure to anticipate an international response critical of Israel:
   On the international front, Israel was unprepared for the near-unanimous lack of criticism of Hamas from Western governments, the public, and international institutions. The UN, UNRWA, and International Court of Justice (IJC) purported paragons of virtue, contrarily displayed clear bias toward Hamas, often criticizing Israel’s response while failing to acknowledge that Hamas initiated the attack and committed brutal atrocities and underplaying the taking and holding of Israeli hostages. Despite ample documentation, allegations of rape were initially dismissed, the use of UNRWA facilities by Hamas was overlooked, and the involvement of UNRWA workers with Hamas went unmentioned. In addition, Western leaders, aside from the US have little to be proud of. Even if shocked at the horrors done to Israel, they were nevertheless often ambivalent in their support of Israel.

In retrospect, Israel should have promptly directed resources to improve its international standing, treating the global arena as another front in the conflict. In contrast, the pro-Palestinian camp aggressively successfully promoted their cause, despite their platform being contrary to reality. One consequence of effective pro-Palestinian propaganda and an inadequate Israeli response was that many Westerners inaccurately perceived the Palestinians as victims and Israel as the aggressor.

7. Underestimating the seriousness Hamas took to exploit the hostages:
   Israel also underestimated the extreme measures that Hamas would take to protect itself from efforts to free the hostages. One salient event should have clarified any doubts regarding importance Hamas placed on keeping hostages. On February 12, 2024, the IDF launched Operation Golden Hand successfully freeing two hostages. To execute this operation, the IDF faced multiple layers of resistance, involving hundreds of Gazans, both militants and civilians, involved in trying to prevent Israel from procuring the release of the hostages.

The IDF and Israeli government should have concluded then that it was likely impossible to militarily free all the remaining hostages through military action alone.

8. Not just Israel miscalculated:
   Western leaders should also do a reckoning if they don’t want the Islamic extremist ideology exported to their shores. The pro-Palestinian camp should also engage in self-reflection. If they genuinely want to improve the plight of Palestinians, continuing to support Hamas may be counterproductive, as Hamas’s priority is to dismantle Israel rather than enhance the lives of Palestinians.

Summary:
Israel was unprepared for the October 7 atrocities and underestimated Hamas’s cunning, its extreme exploitation of hostages, and the lack of definitive global support for Israel despite its clear moral righteousness. Additionally, many around the world fail to recognize the dangers posed by Islamic fundamentalist ideology.