My Concern over Israel-Taiwan Military Cooperation

Israel’s growing recognition that China is not a reliable partner represents a wise strategic shift. However, this does not mean Taiwan should automatically become a trusted alternative for deep military cooperation. I must be candid: Taiwan’s military faces severe security vulnerabilities and procurement scandals. If Israel pursues unvetted manufacturing cooperation with Taiwan’s military establishment, the risk of classified information leakage is extremely high—ultimately endangering Israel’s own national security.

A Constant Stream of Chinese Espionage Cases

Chinese infiltration and bribery of Taiwan’s military personnel is relentless. Recent cases are particularly alarming:

Retired Air Force Officer Leaked Hsiung Feng III Missile Secrets

In December 2025, the Taichung High Court convicted retired Air Force Major Shih Chun-cheng of espionage. After retirement, Shih was recruited by Chinese intelligence agents and then recruited his active-duty protégé, Hsu Chan-cheng, to leak classified information about Taiwan’s response protocols to Chinese military aircraft incursions and the tactical deployment of the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile system. Shih received over NT$1.5 million (approximately US$46,000) in payments and was sentenced to two years and two months in prison.

Presidential Security Guards Were Compromised

Even more shocking: personnel responsible for presidential security were bought off. On December 5, 2025, Taiwan’s Supreme Court finalized convictions for four individuals—Presidential Office security sergeants Lai Chung-yu, Li Yu-erh, Lin Yu-kai, and former Military Police Command telecommunications soldier Chen Wen-hao—for accepting bribes and leaking classified information to China. They received sentences ranging from five years and ten months to seven years.

The four operated through a “senior recruiting junior” model, accepting between NT$260,000 and NT$664,000 (about US$8,000 and US$21,000) to pass classified documents from Unit 211 and the Telecommunications Command to Chinese intelligence. When even presidential security can be penetrated, the security of other military units is deeply questionable.

60 Matsu Garrison Soldiers Rented Accounts to Criminal Syndicates

On December 8, 2025, the Lienchiang District Prosecutor’s Office uncovered approximately 60 soldiers and NCOs from the Army’s Matsu Defense Command who rented personal bank accounts to scam operators as money-laundering vehicles. Sergeant Tseng allegedly collected e-commerce seller accounts and linked bank accounts from military colleagues to rent to criminal syndicates for profit.

This case directly involves fraud rather than military leaks, but it reveals a deeper problem: the lax discipline and low ethical standards among Taiwan’s military personnel. When soldiers will rent accounts to criminal gangs for a few hundred bucks, who can guarantee they won’t sell military secrets for higher prices?

Military Procurement Scandals Beyond Belief

Taiwan’s military procurement procedures are equally riddled with corruption, lacking even basic professional review and oversight mechanisms.

Interior Decoration Company Wins NT$590 Million Explosives Contract

In December 2025, Kuomintang legislator Wang Hung-wei revealed that the Ministry of National Defense’s NT$590 million contract for “RDX cyclone explosives for sea mine disposal” was awarded to “Fu-Mai Company”—an interior decoration firm with only NT$19 million in capital. The company’s registered address is a three-star hotel in Tainan, it lacks any explosives-related permits, and its capitalization is less than one-tenth of the contract value.

This isn’t an isolated case. The Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology’s NT$120 million HMX explosives procurement was also awarded to the same Fu-Mai Company. An interior decoration company winning highly sensitive military explosives contracts twice within six months reveals that review mechanisms are completely non-functional.

Tea Trading Company Wins Defense Ministry Server Maintenance Contract

Legislator Wang further exposed that in 2022, the Navy Command’s server and maintenance contract was awarded to “Hung-Chang Tea Company,” which had only NT$100,000 in capital. The company only added computer and cybersecurity services to its business registration in late 2022, then immediately won a Ministry of National Defense contract the following year.

Even more outrageous: the company’s representative, Huang Hung-chun, had repeatedly forged contractor qualifications for bidding, was caught by Legislative Yuan Speaker Han Kuo-yu, and was prosecuted by the Ministry of Justice for fraud with a final conviction. Such a disreputable contractor was allowed to maintain military servers and war-gaming systems—national defense has become a joke.

The enemy’s enemy is not necessary your friend.  These examples are not isolated incidents but the tip of an iceberg revealing systemic problems. Taiwan’s military faces three major structural deficiencies:

1. Severe Infiltration: Chinese penetration of Taiwan’s military is pervasive—from rank-and-file soldiers to retired officers, from logistics personnel to presidential security guards, all have documented cases of being compromised. Any deep technical cooperation with Taiwan’s military could become prey for Chinese intelligence services.
2. Procurement Corruption: When tea trading companies can win server maintenance contracts and interior decoration firms can win explosives procurement deals, Taiwan’s military procurement system has clearly collapsed. In such an environment, who can guarantee that Israeli technology won’t flow to China through intermediary companies?
3. Lax Discipline: Taiwanese men were once required to serve two years of compulsory military service. Over time, the service period was shortened to just four months — a duration so brief that many jokingly referred to it as a “summer camp.” Some individuals even tried to evade the obligation by faking medical conditions. However, under growing security concerns and pressure from the United States, the Taiwanese government announced that starting in 2024, the length of compulsory service would be extended back to one year. This prolonged period of reduced training standards has led to a decline in military discipline and integrity.

The Boundaries of Cooperation

I welcome Israel’s recognition of China’s threatening nature—this is a significant development in international affairs. However, “China is untrustworthy” does not equal “Taiwan is trustworthy.” For Israel, military cooperation with Taiwan should strictly observe the following principles:

• Arms Sales OK, Technology Transfer Never: Israel can sell finished weapon systems to Taiwan, but should never engage in technology transfer or joint development.
• Manufacturing Must Stay in Israel: Any sensitive weapon systems must be manufactured on Israeli soil; production lines should not be established in Taiwan.
• Strict Information Compartmentalization: Even in sales relationships, multi-layered information isolation mechanisms should be established to prevent leakage of technical details.

Taiwan needs international support to counter Chinese threats—this is a fact. But support does not equal blind trust. If Israel wants to establish reliable strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region, it must recognize the systemic problems in Taiwan’s military and adopt a cautious cooperation strategy.