Netanyahu And the Likud Tell Us What They Are
I voted for Gadi Eisenkot’s party, Yashar. I want him to form the next government, and my “least of all evils” preference is for a minority government of 56 that includes Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am Party, with the Arab “Joint List” parties abstaining in the Knesset vote to approve that coalition.
I do not lightly dismiss the argument that these parties oppose the Jewish character of the State and include Knesset members sympathetic to Hamas. But given the various possibilities – the oxymoronic (or just plain moronic) idea of a “unity” government with Netanyahu, perhaps including Ben-Gvir and Smotrich as well; reaching a dubious compromise with Charedi parties regarding army service; or new elections – the essential question is this: as a practical matter, which is the least objectionable alternative.
In this regard, the Likud responds: In the not unlikely event of renewed intensive hostilities with our neighbors near and far, the Arab parties will threaten to bring down the government, and thus either rein in our ability to fight, or extract extortionate unreasonable concessions.
I do not think we can be certain how the Arab parties will react in the event of war, particularly given their antipathy toward Netanyahu and the risk of his return to power. But the argument above is significant because of what it reveals about those who advance it, and serves as a vivid reminder of why they can never again be allowed to run the country.
First, it is inconceivable to Netanyahu’s Likud that Eisenkot and his partners might refuse to capitulate to demands that conflict with Israel’s security interests, even at the cost of the collapse of their government. To paraphrase a famous American football coach, for Netanyahu the exercise of power isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.
Second, since the Arab parties hold only 19 seats in the Knesset, the only way they could bring down the government would be if the Likud voted together with them to do so. In other words, implicit in the Likud’s argument against a government with (or not opposed by) Arab parties, is that if Israel, under an Eisenkot-led coalition, reengages in war, the Likud would act to force a new election in the midst of that war – even though the Likud itself would no doubt pursue the same course were it in power.
Nor is this anything new. In June 2022, the final straw that led to the collapse of the then Bennett-Lapid government was the defeat in the Knesset of a proposal to renew the provision that applied Israeli law to Israeli citizens living in Judea and Samaria. That provision, first enacted in 1967 after the Six Day War, had, as a matter of routine, been extended ever since, and was considered essential by all major Zionist parties, foremost among them – the Likud. And yet, when it came up for renewal again in 2022, all the members of the Likud (except for David Amsalem, who was absent) joined with the Arab parties’ Knesset members to defeat it by a vote of 58-52.
So yes, I’ll take the risk of a government dependent on Arab Knesset members rather than one that will prioritize its no-holds-barred lust for power over the interests of the country.
