Netanyahu Misleads Everyone—Iran Isn’t Iraq and Mossad’s Most Important Mission

The sharp shift in Israel from hysteria to complacency is a reaction to a narrative portraying Israel as on the verge of defeating Iran thanks to air superiority. But the reality is far more complex.
There is a worrying trend of politicians and journalists—led, of course, by Prime Minister Netanyahu—presenting a misleading picture. The narrative suggests Israel is close to defeating Iran within days. History tells a different story. Israel is not close to defeating Iran, and even if the United States joins the campaign, it will not be simple.
The price Israel has paid so far is, ostensibly, bearable. Even the additional price we are likely to pay in the coming days and weeks seems manageable. But the million-dollar question is: for what? What can Israel actually achieve in such a war? Eliminate the nuclear program? Overthrow the regime? Both goals are likely unattainable. In part, this is because, in times of war, the public tends to rally around the government. As we see in our own country, the opposition and protest leaders are mobilizing for the “just war” against the great Satan from Iran.
It can now be said that, in recent months, President Trump has been playing a double game. Although Trump is now “on board,” Netanyahu continues his efforts to persuade the president’s isolationist supporters to join the war, promoting the story that the Iranians tried twice to assassinate President Trump. These claims have been met with ridicule, even at the fringes of the American right, such as Tucker Carlson and his colleagues.
Netanyahu’s repeated claims that Iran is “weeks to months away from a nuclear weapon” have also drawn criticism and mockery, since he has recycled these claims for at least 15 years. It is hard to believe that someone with personal interests and under investigation for ties between his associates and an enemy state could push such a move without opposition from the security establishment—misleading both the Israeli and American public and causing suffering to millions. Yet here we are.
As for the data: Israel’s defense systems succeed in intercepting about 85%–90% of Iranian missiles. The rest manage to penetrate and hit Israeli territory, with high precision and in sensitive areas. Every missile that lands causes significant damage—to lives, infrastructure, and national security. Nevertheless, the damage is small compared to the nightmare scenarios considered before the war. It is important to stress—so far. So far, because we are far from the end of the event.
Security officials estimate that Iran had about 2,000–3,000 ballistic missiles at the start of the campaign, of which about 450–500 have been launched at Israel so far. The decision to launch fewer missiles in recent days is partly due to Israeli strikes on missile depots and launchers, but more likely reflects a strategic decision to avoid rapid depletion of the arsenal, to wear down Israeli civilians and the expensive, dwindling interception system, and of course to keep cards in reserve for further escalation. Iran has officials currently engaged in launch strategy—determining the appropriate scale, timing, assessing Israel’s interception systems, the locations of interceptors, target selection, and more. If the Mossad has field identification capabilities, these people should be at the top of its target list.
The damage to Israel is not just physical from missile strikes. War expenses run into tens of billions, perhaps hundreds; compensation for physical damages in the billions; medical expenses for treating thousands of physical and psychological casualties, and more. Beyond that, in the short and medium term, who will want to come to Israel and do business? To maintain a tech development center, vacation here, or shoot a film? How many productive people will choose to leave the moment the skies open? These are enormous damages, and we are only seeing the tip of the iceberg.
As for defeating Iran—this too is a pipe dream. Iran’s territory is two to three times larger than Iraq’s or Afghanistan’s, making any attempt to conquer or dismantle the country a particularly complex and costly operation. Iran’s population is 85 million—twice or more that of Iraq or Afghanistan. Iran’s GDP is estimated at about $1.8 trillion (PPP), compared to much weaker economies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a country with a much broader economic, social, and military infrastructure. It will not be a “walk in the park” like the coalition’s two-month campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan. Even the years-long quagmire in Iraq would be far more costly and difficult for the Americans in Iran.
Regarding damage to the Iranian nuclear program: just as scientists assassinated by Israel in the past have been replaced, and as Hamas leaders killed have been succeeded by even more extreme and violent leaders, it is likely the same will happen here. Moreover, Iran has the resources to acquire nuclear weapons through purchase (from Pakistan, North Korea, for example), even if not by indigenous development. So it is doubtful what political or security achievements, if any, can be gained here. We are paying a steep price for something we are very unlikely to achieve in the end.
As for “Netanyahu’s exit point”—since when does Netanyahu have exit points? His usual exit point is his belief and skill in lying his way out of almost any situation. So far, it has worked for him.
The tremendous achievements of recent years at Iran’s expense—the result of brilliant Mossad operations, the elimination of Hezbollah, and, consequently, the fall of the Assad regime—are achievements we are now squandering.
Therefore, it is important to emphasize even now that Israel’s most effective strategic weapon against Iran is not fighter jets or assassinations, but peace agreements. First and foremost with Lebanon, and if possible, with Syria as well. Such agreements would prevent the formation and activity of militias like Hezbollah on Israel’s border. They would create a more stable regional reality—far more than any prolonged and costly war could achieve.