Partial Independence Day
This week, Israel marked 78 years of independence. Before that, we observed Memorial Day for the fallen soldiers of Israel’s wars, the heroes who gave their lives for the rebirth of the homeland. The homeland, incidentally, was established in 1948, not in October 2023, despite the prime minister’s considerable efforts to frame the current conflict as a war of revival.
Around Independence Day, I suggest that each of us, the Israelis, especially Jews who celebrate the founding of the Jewish state, ask ourselves whether Israel is truly an independent state. From the perspective of the international system, the answer is yes: we have a government, we have recognized borders (with Egypt and Jordan, though not with Lebanon, Syria, or the Palestinians), and Israel is a member of international institutions such as the United Nations. But all of this exists only at the formal level. In reality, Israel celebrates independence while its freedom of action and its ability to defend its territory and sovereignty against external threats are not fully intact.
The following lines analyse a situation that has existed in Israel since October 2023. They may be difficult to read for anyone who loves Israel, is Zionist, and is willing to die for its continued existence. Having said that, there is no avoiding the following points:
- We have not won the war in Gaza against Hamas. It is already known that the IDF controls 57 percent of the Gaza Strip along the “yellow line”, but the plan to establish a new order in Gaza, one that would not threaten Israel and would ensure the protection of its citizens, is not progressing. This is a plan that President Trump placed on the table, and Israel was compelled to accept (I am aware of the claim that Netanyahu conceived it. If that is true, why does it include a clause that paves the way for a Palestinian state? And if that is also true, why has the plan not advanced to its second stage, which is disarmament of Hamas?).
- Moreover, Israel is unable to operate in the Gaza Strip to neutralize threats, including the rebuilding of Hamas’s capabilities, which still controls 43 percent of the territory. Under such circumstances, there is no victory, certainly not a decisive one. It would not be an exaggeration to assume that we will return to fighting in Gaza. The government will no doubt explain that this is necessary due to growing threats. Once again, we will have to coordinate military action with Washington, especially now that the U.S. military maintains a major base near Kiryat Gat and effectively dictates the scope of operations (recall that Trump rebuked Netanyahu for violating the Gaza ceasefire after Israel eliminated a Hamas brigade commander). This has been the situation for several months and does not reflect independent decision-making by a sovereign state.
- Turning to the northern front: Donald Trump forced Israel to agree to a ten-day ceasefire in Lebanon. This ceasefire is not between Israel and the Lebanese state, with which we are not at war, but between Israel and Hezbollah. The only actor capable of restraining Hezbollah is Iran, particularly after Israel was compelled to halt its campaign to push Hezbollah forces beyond the Litani River. I suggest we not be swayed by the boastful rhetoric of the defence minister and the prime minister, because the moment Trump told them to stop (enough is enough) the IDF ceased fire.
The truth is that Netanyahu is not to be envied. He has no real choice: even his staunch supporters understand that he cannot defy Trump, who is simultaneously working on his behalf for a presidential pardon from President Herzog while also ensuring Israel’s security through the provision of munitions and the deployment of American forces in the region to guarantee Israel’s continued existence. In this reality, it does not matter how many public celebrations are held on Independence Day or how much noise children make with plastic hammers. Nor do the speeches of state leaders carry much weight. What matters are actions on the ground. At this point, Israel has lost the ability to independently decide how to fight its enemies, both in Gaza and Lebanon. It is difficult not to discern the American strategy: maintaining quiet on a secondary front such as Israel and Lebanon asking to advance broader U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.
Independence Day 2026 is a day of partial independence. I remind readers that during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger urged Israel (then led by Prime Minister Golda Meir) to halt the IDF’s advance toward Cairo. Even then, Washington’s position carried significant weight, but five decades have passed, and Trump, who does not adhere to conventional diplomatic norms, is unashamed to conduct aggressive and forceful negotiations even with allies, including Israel.
A concluding thought: absolute victory will not come through the defeat of Hamas or the disarmament of Hezbollah. Nor will it be achieved by amplifying impressive military successes with triumphant rhetoric. We are not achieving total victory for a variety of reasons, including the stance of decision-makers who may not actually seek such a victory, as a constant state of emergency serves their political interests (I wrote about Netanyahu not allowing victory in Gaza as early as October 2023).
Therefore, I propose redefining absolute victory as our survival as a state in the Middle East, a Jewish state with a 21 percent minority population (which has also suffered losses in various conflicts), now celebrating 78 years since its founding. That survival is the only true victory. For that victory to be complete, Israel must rebuild itself from within, including restoring the trust of all its citizens in the government. This government will be remembered as one that during its term, Israel lost part of its national resilience. Why? Because Kiryat Shmona was abandoned, and because most residents of the north feel deceived and betrayed: Hezbollah has not been defeated, and they do not feel safe living along the northern border.
Happy holiday.
