Ports, Power, and Recognition: The New Struggle for the Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa is no longer a peripheral arena. It has become the southern hinge of Red Sea security—a region where Gulf competition, Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, Somalia’s sovereignty, and Somaliland’s campaign for recognition increasingly collide.
Saudi Arabia’s expanding defence relationship with Somalia captures this shift. Reports say Riyadh is financing the training of 5,000 Somali recruits following a defence-cooperation agreement signed in February 2026. The programme may strengthen Somalia’s campaign against al-Shabaab, but it also adds another layer to a regional contest over ports, influence, and political authority.
Security Cooperation Is About More Than Terrorism
For Mogadishu, outside military support helps rebuild national institutions and reinforce its claim to Somalia’s internationally recognized territory. A stronger federal force could improve security, protect transport corridors, and give the government greater leverage in disputes involving Somaliland and other regional authorities.
For Riyadh, Somalia offers a low-risk form of power projection. Saudi leaders can expand their influence across the Red Sea without exposing infrastructure at home to the dangers of direct confrontation. The Horn is therefore not a distant theatre. It is the African flank of the Bab al-Mandab, the chokepoint connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
Why Berbera Matters
Much of the competition centres on Berbera. The port, developed by the UAE-based DP World, links Somaliland to regional trade and offers landlocked Ethiopia a potential alternative to its heavy dependence on Djibouti. For Abu Dhabi, Berbera is a long-term commercial asset on a critical maritime route. For Somaliland, it provides revenue, infrastructure, and international visibility.
Saudi support for Somalia may therefore serve two purposes: backing a recognized central government and balancing Emirati influence. Riyadh has little incentive to endorse a secessionist precedent, while Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims provide a diplomatic basis for challenging agreements made without federal approval.
The Ethiopia–Somaliland Shock
The January 2024 memorandum between Ethiopia and Somaliland transformed the dispute. Although the full text was not released, the arrangement was widely presented as offering Ethiopia coastal access while opening a path toward recognition for Somaliland. Ethiopia saw an opportunity to diversify its trade routes and potentially restore a naval presence. Somalia viewed the deal as a direct violation of its sovereignty.
The dispute also attracted Egypt, whose rivalry with Ethiopia already centres on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Nile security. Maritime access for Addis Ababa would broaden that competition from water and land into the Red Sea. Cairo’s closer defence relationship with Mogadishu consequently supports both Somali territorial integrity and Egypt’s effort to contain Ethiopian influence.
Somaliland’s Strategy: Become Too Valuable to Isolate
Somaliland cannot match the resources of the governments gathering around Mogadishu. Instead, it is building what might be called asymmetric deterrence: making itself too useful—and too connected—to pressure cheaply.
Berbera anchors Emirati investment and Ethiopian trade interests. Somaliland’s external relationships broaden its technical, commercial, and security options. Its relative stability, long coastline, port, and airfield also give it practical value to governments concerned with counterterrorism and maritime security.
This network is Somaliland’s strongest protection. Serious instability would threaten more than Hargeisa. It could disrupt commercial investments, regional supply routes, and international security interests. Strategic usefulness does not guarantee recognition, but it raises the cost of coercion.
Diplomacy Has Lowered the Temperature, Not Settled the Dispute
Türkiye’s Ankara Declaration of December 2024 reduced immediate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Both governments reaffirmed sovereignty and territorial integrity while agreeing to pursue Ethiopian access to the sea through arrangements under Somalia’s sovereign authority. The declaration created room for negotiation, but it did not resolve Somaliland’s status or eliminate Ethiopia’s long-term maritime ambitions.
The result is an uneasy chessboard. Mogadishu is strengthening external partnerships. Somaliland is increasing the commercial and security value of its territory. Ethiopia still wants dependable access to the sea. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye are protecting their own corridors and influence.
The Real Contest
This is not simply a struggle between Somalia and Somaliland. It is a contest over who may authorize ports, naval access, and security partnerships at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia’s Somalia policy fits that larger logic: support a centralized partner, limit rival influence, and protect maritime approaches important to its economic future. Somaliland, meanwhile, is betting that strategic value can compensate for the absence of formal recognition.
That gamble may preserve room for manoeuvre, but it also raises the stakes. In a region crowded with overlapping alliances and red lines, a local confrontation could quickly draw in powers whose interests extend far beyond the Horn.
The central question is no longer whether the Horn belongs in Middle Eastern security calculations. It is whether its growing strategic value will produce negotiated interdependence—or turn ports and partnerships into triggers for the next regional crisis.