Post-jihadist Sunni Revivalism and the Return of History
For a long time, the strength of Islamists was measured by how much violence they caused: attacks, land grabs, and the deaths of leaders. That measure doesn’t show the most dangerous things that are happening right now. Islamist groups are now in a new phase where they want legitimacy instead of spectacle and continuity instead of disruption. This change is why Western leaders seem uneasy even when things seem calm. The threat no longer shows itself through chaos. It moves forward by making historical claims, taking control of institutions, and restoring symbols. Today, the most dangerous movements are the ones that seem organized, grounded, and unavoidable. To understand the current tensions in the Middle East, you need to know what this phase shift means. It is also the key to figuring out why Washington is starting to freak out. That basic reframing comes from Dr. David Wurmser’s analysis in the JNS TV episode (see link below).
Dr. David Wurmser made this framework very clear. He is a former senior US government official and expert on the Middle East, has long said that the best way to understand Islamist movements is through their civilizational stories. His work doesn’t look at tactics, but at how these movements see history, decline, and fate. Wurmser has pointed out that Islamists don’t think of modernity as a permanent state. They think of it as an interruption. In Wurmser’s telling, they say that the decline started when Muslims stopped following the rules of early Islam. For Wurmser, restoration is not revolutionary but imitative. This understanding is the basis for the analysis that follows.
Using Wurmser’s diagnosis as a starting point, and following his description of the ‘Sunni problem’ as the emerging threat, we can say that the current time is a revival of Sunni Islam after jihadism. There is no return to an ISIS-style insurgency or a rejection of Islamist goals. It is a step forward from endless jihad to the unification of civilizations. Violence is still an option, but it’s not the main one anymore. Legitimacy, authority, and historical continuity are more important. These movements want to control, teach, judge, and make their worldview normal. They judge success by how long it lasts, not how shocking it is. Western counterterrorism frameworks are not very useful at this point. The threat has grown stronger, but the response hasn’t.
Dr. Wurmser has said many times that Damascus plays a big symbolic role in this revivalist worldview. It is remembered as the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate and the place where Islam first spread. Taking over Damascus means much more than just winning a civil war. As Wurmser puts it, for Sunni revivalists, it is a historical correction that marks the end of a long period of deviation. In Wurmser’s framing, the fall of Assad and the return of Sunni power are seen as proof that decline can be reversed. This psychological win is more important than borders or ministries. It backs up the revivalist thesis. So, Syria is more than just a failed state; it is a proof of concept for civilization.
As Wurmser notes, the first people to understand what this change meant were not Western diplomats, but minorities in the region. Christians, Alawites, Druze, and Kurds understand that revivalist movements can succeed without large-scale killings. Marginalization, legal exclusion, and cultural erasure are frequently adequate. Post-jihadist revivalism does not provide a lasting space for diversity, but rather, conditional tolerance. This is why Wurmser says that minorities are more and more looking to Israel as a strategic anchor. The alignment isn’t based on ideology or feelings. It is based on structure and survival. Israel is not a part of either Sunni or Shiite revivalist projects, which makes it a natural counterweight.
This difference in how they see threats is what is causing the tension between Washington and Jerusalem to grow. Wurmser argues that this is the heart of the recent US–Israel divergence. For a long time, the US has put stability first by supporting large, cooperative blocs and regimes that are easy to manage. A unified Sunni revivalist order upsets that model by bringing in an ideological consistency that can’t be changed. It puts pressure on Arab countries that are friends with the US and spreads that pressure to Europe through the diaspora and institutions. On the other hand, Israel doesn’t care about stabilizing revivalist legitimacy. Its strategy is to stop any Islamist story from bringing civilization to an end. This difference causes problems not because Israel is careless, but because it is looking at a different map. Washington is worried because it knows that once something is legitimate, it’s much harder to take it away than to let things go wrong.
This helps explain why people like Donald Trump were obviously uncomfortable with Israel’s plans. It wasn’t about personality or politics; it was about diagnosis. That reading follows Wurmser’s account of the summit as a strategic working session focused on the ‘Sunni problem. Trump knew that a movement was coming together that couldn’t be stopped, scared off, or bargained into moderation. Panic among the elite often comes before a public crisis, because legitimacy builds up without anyone noticing. The ideological groundwork has already been laid by the time violence comes back. Trump’s response was a sign of this realization, not the reason for it. The worry came from facing a threat that regular tools couldn’t handle. In this case, stability started to look like failure.
If this analysis is accurate, building on Wurmser’s warning, numerous developments ought to ensue. First, movements that are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood will increasingly present themselves as protectors of “historical Islam,” putting more emphasis on education, law, and constitutional authority than on protest politics. Second, Israel will take indirect but strong steps to stop Sunni consolidation, especially around important sites and minority corridors. Third, the next big crisis in the West will probably come from a so-called moderate Sunni ally whose revivalist legitimacy is stronger than the regime’s control. These are not predictions, but tests to see what is wrong. The framework fails if they don’t happen. If they do, the consequences are serious. The strategy will need to change from managing the regime to fighting over ideas.
Iran is still dangerous, but it is limited, punishable, and limited by geography. As Wurmser has said, Sunni revivalism is not any of those things. It works across generations, borders, and institutions. This is not a temporary aftershock from the time of ISIS. It is a planned effort to start history over again on Islamic terms. In Wurmser’s account, Damascus is not the end state; it is a sign that restoration is possible. Washington knew there was a problem before he fully explained it. Israel gets it, even if other people aren’t ready. Negotiations alone won’t decide the next fight; it will depend on which vision of history gets legitimacy first.
Reference
JNS TV. (2025, December 31). Why Trump just hit the panic button with Netanyahu [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jc_YHBlHX1k

