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Yitzchak Blau

R. Schachter’s Divrei Soferim: A Review

Rav Hershel Schachter, Rosh Yeshiva at Yeshiva University, has, for some sixty years, successfully taught Torah to university students, older working people, and even to high school students in the NCSY summer kollel. His range of knowledge and his entertaining presentations are legendary. In recent years, devoted students have been publishing R. Schachter’s Torah in English and a volume titled Divrei Soferim; The Transmission of Torah Shebe’al Peh came out in 2024. R. Schachter’s great erudition makes the sefer a very worthwhile read.

How many people know that R. Yaakov of Karlin, author of Mishkenot Yaakov, penned another book of teshuvot called Kehillat Yaakov in which he discusses when we say that a rationale no longer applying enables the nullification of a rabbinic edict (p. 43)?  Similarly, R. Schachter brings an obscure halakhic position that we make a berakha on Shabbat candles and not on ner Yom Tov and explains that the blessing reflects an anti-Kairite polemic since the Kairites did not allow for a flame to be burning on Shabbat. No such debate existed regarding Yom Tov; therefore, we do not make the blessing on holidays (xix).

I discovered several novel approaches in this volume. For years, I have taught two explanations as to why we say ein gozerim gezerah le’gezerah, that the rabbis cannot create a safeguard to protect another safeguard. R. Shimon ben Zemah Duran (in the Zohar Harakia) says that this rule prevents prohibitions from getting out of control; otherwise overly nervous rabbis could forbid everything.  Maharal suggests that legislating another safeguard would confuse what is essential and what is secondary (Be’er Hagola chapter 1). R. Schachter offers a third explanation. According to the Netivot Hamishpat, there is no need to repent for inadvertent violations of rabbinic decrees. Unlike biblical laws, these prohibited actions are not inherently wrong and the only problem is knowingly rebelling against rabbinic authority. The inadvertent sinner is not a rebel. Accepting this position enables the following argument. Since rabbinic decrees are usually intended to prevent mistaken transgressions, there is no need for such caution when the transgression we aim to prevent, the first gezerah, is rabbinic (33).

He cites a clever idea from the former Rosh Yeshiva of Kerem Be’yavneh, R. Chaim Yaakov Goldvicht. Shimon Ha’amsuni went through the entire Torah deriving a legal addition from every appearance of the word “et“. When he came to et Hashem elokekha tira, Shimon cancelled the project because he thought it inappropriate to add anything else to fear of God. R. Akiva responded that the et comes to include reverence for Torah scholars. According to R. Goldvicht, it was the outstanding integrity of Shimon Ha’amsuni that inspired R. Akiva’s teaching. If a rabbinic scholar could give up on his life’s work due to one problematic example, then such scholars are worthy of great reverence (98).

R. Schachter adds an interesting explanation from R. Moshe Soloveitchik for why later sages do not argue with the Talmud. It may be that oral learning remained the norm even after the Mishnah was committed to writing. Only after the Talmud was completed did textual study become regular. If we assume that oral learning has certain superior qualities and reflects the ideal mode of transmission, then the shift to text based study was a reduction in quality and later generations can no longer take issue with those who studied the oral law as it was meant to be (62-64).

It can be safely said that R. Schachter represents the yeshivish elements in YU and yet his ideas show how different that world remains from Haredi approaches. R. Schachter is willing to say that Hazal were wrong about scientific matters (Appendix 1), suggests that we no longer need to perform meziza (122), thinks we should deemphasize gematriyot when teaching children (87), and asserts that, regarding certain halakhic issues, the later authorities are not bound by the precedent of earlier generations (40). Sociologists should acknowledge that YU’s “move to the right” has not erased important differences between communities.

At the same time, R. Schachter strongly inclines towards conservative positions. The Torah states that a Jewish female slave does not “go out as male servants do” (Shemot 21: 7). Hazal derive from here that she does not go free if her master knocks out her tooth in the way a gentile slave would achieve freedom. R. Schachter correctly notes that this is not the simple reading of the verse and that the peshat reading remains significant. To capture the simple reading, he cites the Tur who says that, for reasons of modesty, female slaves should not work outside as male slaves do (7). In contrast, Ibn Ezra and Rashbam both interpret the pasuk to mean that the Jewish girl does not consistently go free after six years as does her male counterpart since we hope that she will marry her master or his son and she goes free in any case upon reaching adulthood. This appears much closer to peshat since the six year limit was mentioned earlier in the chapter but the question of work location receives no mention.

“Commitment to Masorah means following one’s rebbe muvhak‘s views, whether lenient or strict” (149). I think this notion of a talmid‘s subservience overstated nor followed by R. Schachter himself. R. Schachter is a loyal student of Rav Solovetichik who has done much to disseminate the Rav’s Torah. However, he does not follow his rebbe’s views on the value of secular studies or on the importance of teaching women gemara.

R. Schachter assumes that divine assistance guides poskim in their decision making and that this factor undergirds their authority (70). His supporting proofs are quite debatable. “Any judge who judges a judgment according to absolute truth causes the Divine Presence to rest among Israel” (Sanhedrin 7a) does not clearly show that God helps the judges rule correctly. In fact, the statement implies that God comes in response to a good judgment. Another gemara says that Hashem is with David and the halakha always follows his rulings (Sanhedrin 93b). However, Hashem being with David may simply convey divine favor (see Ramban Bereishit 18:1) and not that God guides his decision making. Ramban does mention divine guidance in his Torah commentary (Devarim 17:11) but Sefer Hahinukh explains rabbinic authority without any mention of God’s involvement in rabbinic rulings. In fact, he explicitly raises the possibility of rabbinic error and explains why we suffer such errors for the good of the system (mizva 508). Even Ramban may limit God’s role in pesak to the Sanhedrin sitting in the temple.

Combining the last two paragraphs, we can say that this work may contain a somewhat exaggerated sense of rabbinic authority. That being said, it is a treasure trove of interesting Torah and we eagerly look forward to learning more from R. Schachter.

About the Author
Rabbi Yitzchak Blau is a rosh yeshiva at Yeshivat Orayta and also teaches at Midreshet Lindenbaum. He is an associate editor of the journal Tradition and the author of Fresh Fruit and Vintage Wine: The Ethics and Wisdom of the Aggada.