Ramaphosa Article Begs US Ship with Israeli Arms

There are dark clouds forming on the maritime horizon of US-South Africa relations.

Since the October 7 Attacks, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) has demonstrated a willingness to investigate foreign governments who interfere with port access for U.S. and foreign-flagged vessels engaged in the shipment of U.S. military supplies to Israel.

As evidence, the FMC opened an investigation into the restrictive port practices of the Government of Spain in December 2024.

Of course, the Government of Spain is not the only independent state that has taken action against commercial vessels engaged in the shipment of military supplies to Israel.

Only a few weeks ago, Gustavo Petro (Colombia), Anwar Ibrahim (Malaysia), and President Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa) declared that their own governments would prevent commercial vessels engaged in the shipment of military supplies to Israel from using their ports. 

At the time, the three world leaders went even further than committing to take the same actions as Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (Spain). They declared that they would “prevent all arms transfers that risk enabling further violations of humanitarian law.” 

Moral arguments aside, that clause carries significant national security and foreign policy implications for Israel and the United States.

Left open to interpretation, it could mean that President Ramaphosa and the other world leaders are willing to command their armed forces to interdict vessels engaged in the shipment of conventional and non-conventional weapons to Israel. That includes commercial vessels that are operating beyond their territorial waters. 

Note, the byline will be of particular concern to Israel and its military suppliers too.

From a geostrategic perspective, Colombia, Malaysia, and South Africa are not some random set of independent states scattered around the world.

Two are located in close vicinity to global maritime chokepoints (i.e., Panama Canal; Strait of Malacca). The other is a critical secondary route around another maritime checkpoint (i.e., Suez Canal) that is being impacted by attacks on international shipping by a U.S. designated terrorist organization (i.e., Houthis).

For those reasons, the FMC will likely examine the statements and actions of all three independent states in the course of its ongoing investigation into global maritime chokepoints. 

One of the downsides for South Africans is that presents yet another political risk for their economy.

The FMC could not only impose fines on South African vessels and restrictions on cargo carried between South Africa and the United States. In partnership with other federal agencies, it could take even more severe actions.

At a time when the economy is already weak, those offsets could have a devastating impact on select South African exporters and importers.

In the meantime, the Netanyahu and Trump Administrations will likely make their own strategic choices on how to respond to President Ramaphosa and his co-authors.

In the eyes of the Netanyahu and Trump Administrations, there will be concerns that this declaration demands an immediate response. Neither will be willing to accommodate an external environment that is permissive to world leaders taking such coercive actions in close proximity to global maritime choke points and their bypasses.

It therefore seems reasonable to expect one or both administrations to directly challenge the leaders of Colombia, Malaysia, and South Africa in the near future. 

In the case of South Africa, that could be affected by having a US-flagged vessel known to be engaged in the shipment of arms to Israel attempt to enter a South African port. 

Such an action would almost certainly force the hand of the Ramaphosa Administration.

If the Government of South Africa were to deny the port call, then there would be strong grounds for the FMC to take action against the Government of South Africa.

In turn, that would risk driving an even deeper wedge between the African National Congress (ANC) and South African businesses. It would also run the risk of facilitating the collapse of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

If the Government of South Africa were to permit the port call, then the Ramaphosa Administration would risk fueling intra-party conflict with pro-Palestine, anti-American, and/or anti-Israel interest groups within the ANC.

In addition, it would give the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and other opposition political parties a stable platform to attack the incoherence and inconsistency of South African foreign policy.

Under either scenario, the risk of regime change in South Africa would likely increase, and that poses a serious problem for the ANC and its GNU partners.