Recognizing Palestine Premature, Sanctions More Advisable

Canada’s recent announcement to recognize a Palestinian state at the UN in September 2025 marks a significant shift from its longstanding policy. Traditionally, Canada believed that a two-state solution would emerge from negotiated peace talks. However, recent developments have prompted a reassessment. The government now considers this traditional approach “no longer tenable,” citing escalating civilian suffering in Gaza, increased settlement expansion, and a rise in settler violence in the West Bank.

Canada’s planned recognition depends on the Palestinian Authority (PA) having made certain commitments also supported by the Arab League. These include: condemning the October 7th terrorist attacks; calling for the liberation of hostages, disarmament of Hamas, and its exclusion from future governance; ending the prisoner payment system; reforming education to remove hate speech and antisemitic content; calling for elections within one year under international supervision; and accepting the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state.

As for Hamas, Canada merely states that it must immediately release all hostages, etc, but it does not say how Canada will ensure its implementation. Canada’s strategy is just based on hope.

Canada’s move aligns with a broader international trend, with UN Security Council permanent members like the UK and France. Yet, it sharply contrasts with the United States, Germany, and Italy who oppose Palestinian recognition. This disagreement among Western nations underscores a fundamental debate over the timing and potential consequences of diplomatic recognition.

The Challenge of Recognition
The challenge of recognition is formidable. Canada’s conditions face significant hurdles, especially regarding Hamas’s core ideology about hostages and disarmament. Approximately 50 Israeli hostages remain in Gaza. Hamas has consistently linked their release to the end of the war and Israeli withdrawal, making unconditional release unlikely without a comprehensive, mutual agreement with Israel. On disarmament, Hamas asserts it “will not disarm unless a fully sovereign Palestinian state is established with Jerusalem as its capital.” This creates an intractable deadlock: Hamas views armed resistance as essential for Palestinian sovereignty, from the River to the Sea, while Canada sees disarmament as vital for a peaceful coexistence of two states.

Canada insists Hamas should have “no role in future governance,” although a recent poll shows that Hamas leader Khalid Mashal receives important Palestinian public support and is more popular than Mahmoud Abbas, the PA president. Presently, Marwan Barghouti, who is in an Israeli prison for life, is the most popular Palestinian leader. If Western powers deny Palestinians the opportunity to elect a government of their choosing by dictating who can participate, the new government would likely be seen as illegitimate by Palestinians. This will seriously complicate the issue.

The PA’s reform record further complicates matters. Canada demands significant reforms, but realistic implementation in the near future appears unlikely. The PA has not held legislative or presidential elections since 2006, and prior efforts have failed to provide credible results, leading to questions about its legitimacy. The PA recently announced it had cancelled its “pay-for-slay” policy, but critics say the reform is minor and incomplete.

An implicit condition for recognition involves removing hate language from PA-controlled Palestinian textbooks. A March 2025 report by NGO Impact-se reveals ongoing incitement in Gaza, including antisemitic stereotypes, glorification of terrorism, and the erasure of Israel from maps—actions that undermine efforts toward peace and coexistence.

The Perils of Premature Recognition
Moving forward with recognition without fulfilling these conditions entails considerable risks. Recognizing Palestine while Hamas still holds hostages and stays armed could be perceived as rewarding terrorist intransigence. Such a move might weaken the credibility of Canada’s conditions and undermine future diplomatic efforts. Recognition might embolden Hamas by showing that international recognition results from armed resistance, especially after the October 7 attacks, which could lead to increased radicalization on both sides.
Moreover, this recognition could reinforce Israeli perceptions that the world is against them, making negotiations even more difficult. Israeli far-right figures, like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have already taken provocative steps against recognition that would split East Jerusalem from the occupied West Bank, a move his office said would “bury the idea of a Palestinian state” by lopping the West Bank in two, a move that effectively would kill the two-state solution, according to Peace Now. Following approval by the Ministry of Defense, infrastructure works could begin within months and housing construction within a year.

Under international law, a state requires, among other things, a defined territory and an effective government. Palestine presently lacks fully controlled borders, recognized sovereignty, and a unified governance structure—raising questions about whether recognition now would create a “paper state” prone to disputes and instability.

The state of Palestine is now recognized as a sovereign state by 147 countries, and more are planning to do so. These recognitions have not discouraged the current government from expanding its settlement enterprise and its war in Gaza.

Recognition indeed carries certain benefits. It might help revive international momentum for the two-state solution, send a comforting message to traumatized Palestinians that the world has not forgotten them, reduce public pressure from Western populations on their governments, and carry the message to Netanyahu that his policies in the Palestinian territories are intolerable and there is a diplomatic cost for Israel to pay.

There is some negative news about Israelis’ attitudes. Support for a two-state solution has reached a new low, with only 21% (16% of Jews) believing that a peaceful coexistence between Israel and a future Palestinian state is possible. But there is some hope. According to most polls, the opposition is likely to be elected in the next elections in fall 2026 or earlier. A recent poll shows that a plurality of Israelis think that Israeli authorities are acting too leniently towards settlers’ violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, with only a small minority thinking they are too harsh, a definite positive trend. Confronting the rest of the world has negative consequences on the mood of Israelis, as a majority of Israelis (59%) feel they cannot thrive under international isolation, against 31% that feel they can, a bad omen for the Netanyahu government.

Conclusion
While Canada’s intentions are aimed at preserving the two-state solution, its planned recognition is premature. The hopes for future action from both the PA and Hamas face profound obstacles that are unlikely to be overcome soon.

Genuine progress requires verifiable, tangible reforms and a fundamental shift in Hamas’ ideology and the PA’s governance, which may take a long time. Unilateral moves, absent substantive change on the ground, risk undermining the path to peace rather than securing it.

The status quo is untenable. Diplomatic protests as well as minor military sanctions have had no effect. Only President Trump, who is supportive of Netanyahu extending the Gaza war, has leverage on him, as in the case of bringing more humanitarian aid to Gaza.

It is now time for strong and gradual economic, diplomatic and military sanctions by Canada against Israel’s illegal actions in the Palestinian territories.

To be effective, sanctions should be applied in a coordinated way with selected Western nations. The Netanyahu government will probably find ways to avoid those sanctions, but some may be difficult to circumvent. The objective is to ensure that the sanctions make the current Israeli government and the Israeli public feel more internationally isolated. For example, personal sanctions could be directed at selected Israeli political, military and business leaders and dual Canadian-Israeli citizens who have committed war crimes or broken international law, that is, those who tend to support the current far-right government.

Government leaders should listen to the advice of prominent Israeli legal experts, including those who, last year, defended Israel at the International Court of Justice, about not widening the war in Gaza because of possible criminal prosecution.