Rorschach Speech

On July 8, Rahm Emanuel delivered a speech at Tel Aviv University, and since then most of the published commentary on the event has reflected the predictable reactions of those weighing in. Journalists, pundits, and analysts who have been deeply critical of the current Israeli government (both in and out of Israel) were more welcoming of Emanuel’s message, interpreting it as an important, well-meaning, and friendly warning to a country which needed to hear it. We’ll call this first group the “Blame Bibi” camp. By contrast, for those who have found much of the criticism of Israeli policy these last three years to be misguided, obnoxious, or at times bordering on antisemitism, Emanuel’s speech came across as yet another arrogant American’s attempt to lecture (or worse, to blame) Israelis for their current predicament. We’ll refer to this second group as the “Beyond the pale” camp.

Where people stood in relation to these two camps also turned out to be a decent predictor of how they interpreted the intended audience for Emanuel’s speech. From the standpoint of the Blame-Bibi crowd, Emanuel was chiefly aiming to persuade Israeli voters, especially those in the center and center-right, that the recent decline in American public support for Israel is significant but can still be halted and possibly even reversed under a new Israeli government. For the Beyond-the-pale crowd, the intended audience was not even in Israel – it was the Democratic primary voters back in America Emanuel will presumably need to convince if he is to secure a nomination for the Presidency in 2028.

Thus, as with most developments in the world these days, public reactions to the speech mostly fell along the partisan lines to which we have become accustomed. There were few attempts at an open-minded, honest evaluation of the speech in its entirety; instead, the tried-and-true tendency to cherry-pick enabled both camps to walk away satisfied by their respective judgments.

Indeed, the Bibi blamers could find much to feel good about in Emanuel’s speech. His references to a lack of strategy in Israel’s war against Hamas and its other regional adversaries (that ever elusive “day after” plan…), Israel’s increasing diplomatic isolation over the last three years, the stoppage of humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza, and complicity for Jewish extremist violence in the West Bank, all echoed criticisms expressed by opponents of the current government within Israel over the last three years. Similarly, Emanuel repeatedly singled out Netanyahu personally (by my count, Bibi is named in nine of the eleven most critical paragraphs of the speech), while invoking Yitzhak Rabin and David Ben-Gurion as models of Israeli leadership. All of this would have resonated with Bibi blamers, and if the applause pattern was any indication, they were over-represented in the university lecture hall that day.

But to feel truly vindicated, the Bibi blamers needed to cover their ears through substantial stretches of the speech acknowledging the reality with which the current government, like it or not, has had to contend. The very opening line, in which Emanuel simply stated that he understands the source of Israelis’ cynicism today, was almost shocking for its rarity: Israelis are not used to much empathy these days. He reminded his audience that “Three times since the early 1990s, you have offered the Palestinians sovereignty in exchange for your security—and three times your offer was not only rejected, but you were attacked as a direct consequence.” In his meetings with Israeli officials over the years, Emanuel reported, Iran has been at the top of the agenda “for good reason.” And notwithstanding his efforts to distinguish between the Israeli people and the Israeli government, Emanuel himself seemed to erase the distinction in recognizing that all Israelis are “reluctant to engage again” in peace-seeking initiatives for the simple reason that “[t]he terrible atrocities and unspeakable horrors of October 7th are seared in your collective consciousness, and they have convinced many Israelis that Palestinians want only to kill them.” These are realities to which the anti-Bibi crowd does not always have a sufficient or compassionate response, let alone a plan.

On the flip side, the Beyond-the-pale folks could find much to lament in the speech. Emanuel seemed to suggest an equivalence between those chanting “From the River to the Sea” and those advocating for “Greater Israel.” For his detractors, this juxtaposition has rhetorical flare but not much basis in reality: the former is prominent in the demands of actual marchers and voters across America, while the latter remains substantially more alive in the imaginations of Israel’s adversaries than in Israel. Emanuel declared that he would, if elected, sanction Israelis who attack Palestinians, without any nod to the reverse phenomenon. And he posited a debatable premise that most Arab states today stand ready to be “the adult in the room with the Palestinian leadership.” These claims could all be convincingly dismissed, especially by hardened Israeli cynics who have heard such ideas for a long time, as morally inverted, distorted, or hopelessly naïve. (For some, the naivete extends to Emanuel’s read of America: no Democratic candidate, they insist, survives today’s primaries without disavowing Israel. He appears to be betting they’re wrong.)

But much like their Bibi-blamer counterparts, the Beyond-the-pale camp also had to ignore several lengthy passages of the speech to avoid discomfort. Here is one: “[T]he 21 Arab nations that have exploited Palestinian rights as a slogan for decades now need to roll up their sleeves and stand up a governing authority capable of accepting the historic Jewish connection to this land. That new institution must put an end to the heinous practice of financially rewarding terrorists who kill Jews. And they must stop teaching young children to hate Israelis.” (Italics mine.) So, if I understand him correctly, Emanuel is proposing something here that many Democratic politicians have shied away from, namely that the Palestinians’ formal acknowledgment of the Jewish people’s historic ties to the land should be a precondition for any Palestinian state. And notwithstanding his call for Israel to be stripped of its special status vis-à-vis American military assistance (something the current Prime Minister, and others both in and out of his coalition, arguably preempted by earlier calling for Israel to wean itself off the dependence), Emanuel also promised that under his proposal, “America would continue to ensure that the IDF maintains its qualitative edge.”

One ironic result of the confirmation bias infusing our hyper-partisan moment is that the tendency to seek out the arguments and evidence in support of our preexisting views can lead us to miss important, even if only partial, openings on the part of “the opposing team” when they do occur. In today’s climate, the two predominant camps with anything constructive to say about Israel and the US-Israel relationship are increasingly unable to engage in a productive debate because each is busy ignoring the very openings which would facilitate or advance constructive policy discussions. (I set aside here a third camp of what we might call “the deniers,” those opposed to Israel’s very existence, since they are not interested in constructive discussion surrounding these issues.) The Emanuel speech may turn out to be the latest casualty of the era.

But maybe not. I am an Israeli who made aliyah from America nine years ago, and my deep and abiding love for Israel sits alongside a deep and sustained love for America. The trauma of October 7, combined with my professional engagements in the defense establishment here in Israel, has made it very difficult to stomach much of the criticism lobbed at Israel these past few years. There has been a relentless and ill-timed quality to it, and at the risk of presumption, I do not see much evidence that it has helped Israelis to heal, let alone to contemplate decisions which would risk our well-being. In this respect, at least on matters of Israel’s national security, I have generally been on the “Beyond the pale” end of the spectrum. And yet, I managed to refrain from writing off Emanuel’s speech. Whether others in my situation might feel similarly ready to buck the more predictable and prevalent response is an open question, but I suspect I am not alone.

Some of this may reflect the passage of time, as the distance from October 7 begins to allow for greater receptivity to the kind of risk-taking Emanuel is advocating. Or maybe his “23-state plan” sounds similar enough to other regional-integration frameworks floated in recent years that most Israelis would be hard-pressed to reject it out of hand. Asking us to endorse a Palestinian state on its own, after we saw what Palestinian control in Gaza brought us, is like asking us to commit suicide. Asking us to contemplate a fully demilitarized Palestinian sovereign entity against the backdrop of preconditions Emanuel seems to be suggesting – and alongside diplomatic relations with the entire region – is more palatable.

But some of my receptivity here is probably more visceral: the decision to open the speech with the words “I understand” likely had the intended psychological effect of helping me let my guard down just enough to hear some important openings in the remainder of Emanuel’s message. (Critics of Israel, take note: you will get farther in your endeavors if you start out by seeking to understand us and acknowledge our experience.) Whatever the reason, and notwithstanding a healthy amount of cynicism that should meet any political speech these days, Israelis and Americans would benefit from engaging Emanuel’s ideas – and others’ that reflect his obvious affinity for Israel – with a more open mind and a more honest assessment of the attendant risks and opportunities.