Silent Genocide: Who are the Alevis and Alawites? What is happening in Syria?

Alevis…

A people who have been condemned to massacres, oppression, and inequality for centuries in the heart of Anatolia…

A people who believed in God not through fear, but through love…

A people who shaped Turkish literature through their poets, performed their worship in Turkish, and preserved their language, culture, and folklore without losing their essence…

Despite their deep-rooted connection to Turkish and Anatolian culture, they have been marginalized, oppressed, and subjected to injustice under Turkish-Sunni rule…

Yet, through all this suffering, they have never bowed to tyranny, nor have they become tyrants themselves… They have never led wars or massacres but instead illuminated history with their wisdom, fought for justice with words rather than weapons, and embraced peace, love, and human dignity as their guiding principles…

In recent days, we have started to hear the names of Alevis and Alawites more frequently due to the massacres of Alawites in Syria.

Although these two sects are closely related, they are distinct, yet they have been fighting the same battle for survival for centuries. I feel a deep sense of responsibility to speak out against this oppression.

I come from a Sunni family that deeply admires Alevi culture and has stood shoulder to shoulder with Alevis in their struggle against persecution. And for me, as well as for any Turk, the concept of Alevi massacres is not something newly discovered.

The 1970s and 1980s were dark years when Alevi homes were marked, their residents were targeted, and brutal massacres took place in the streets. The 1990s became a chilling period when the horrifying images of the Sivas Madımak Massacre, where 33 people were burned alive by radical Islamists, echoed on television screens, shaking the conscience of the nation.

Today, we are witnessing a period where Alevi places of worship are still not recognized as legitimate houses of worship by Sunni authorities, forced religious education continues as a tool of assimilation, Alevi children face discrimination in schools, and sectarian hate speech is widespread. Despite the 20 million Alevi population in Turkey, there is a deafening silence over the massacres of Alawites in Syria. Worse still, protests against these massacres are often suppressed, with authorities refusing to grant permission for demonstrations.

After the passing of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, the issue of succession led to a significant political dispute. According to Shia and Alevi sources, Prophet Muhammad designated Ali as his successor, whereas Sunni tradition holds that leadership was to be decided through consultation, resulting in Abu Bakr being chosen as the first caliph. This power struggle created a deep division within the Islamic world, further intensified by the Battle of Karbala (680). The killing of Ali’s son, Husayn, and his companions by the Umayyad army became a defining moment in the development of Alevi and Alawite sects, shaping their political and theological identities.

Although they share a common historical memory, Alevism and Alawitism differ significantly in belief and practice. Alevism is closely linked to Twelver Shi’ism, emphasizing collective worship in cemevis and gender equality in religious practices. Alawitism, on the other hand, emerged in 9th-century Iraq as a mystical and esoteric sect, incorporating elements from Gnosticism and Christianity. While Alevis believe in the trinity of “Allah, Muhammad, and Ali,” Alawites view Ali as a divine manifestation on Earth. Furthermore, Alevis allow equal participation of women in religious practices, whereas Alawites tend to limit communal worship and place women in a more separate religious role.

Why Are Minority Sects Targeted in Massacres?

Syria’s ousted leader, Bashar al-Assad, originates from the Kardaha district of Latakia and belongs to the Alawite Muslim sect. Throughout the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, the provinces of Latakia and Tartus, where Alawite and Alevi populations are concentrated, remained strongholds of support for the Assad regime and were largely shielded from opposition attacks. These cities functioned as safe zones for the government and did not experience large-scale conflicts. However, as the possibility of Assad’s downfall increased and opposition forces began gaining control, the future of the minority communities in these areas became increasingly uncertain.

Upon entering Latakia, opposition forces toppled statues of Assad and staged large convoys in celebration, presenting themselves in international media as a force committed to fair and inclusive governance for all minorities. However, this narrative quickly unraveled as, starting from December 8, violent attacks against minority communities escalated. Opposition forces began referring to these events as “the cleansing of Assad’s remnants,” framing the persecution of minorities as a necessary response to provocations against the new administration.

However, ISIS-affiliated radical Islamist groups, such as the Uyghur-dominated jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party and the Uzbek-origin Imam Bukhari Jamaat, actively spread aggressive rhetoric against Alevi and Alawite communities through social media, emphasizing religious themes. These groups do not recognize Alevis and Alawites as Muslims due to their refusal to attend mosques, non-compliance with Sunni rituals, and distinct religious practices, instead labeling them as infidels.

In 1305 and 1318, Ibn Taymiyyah issued three separate fatwas, declaring Alawitism outside of Islam. In one of his most well-known rulings, he stated that “Nusayris are more infidel than idol worshippers” and called for jihad against them. This rhetoric was later revived by radical groups during the Syrian Civil War.

Zahran Alloush, commander of Jaysh al-Islam, referenced Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa, claiming that “Alevis are more infidel than Jews and Christians and are enemies of Allah.” Similarly, al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra presented itself as the “enemy of Alawites and defender of the Sunni community”, reinforcing the idea that Alawites and the Assad regime were inseparable. The group frequently used terms like “Nusayri army” and “Nusayri soldiers” to equate the regime with the Alawite community.

In a 2015 interview with Al Jazeera, Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani stated that “Our war is not a matter of revenge against the Alawites, despite the fact that in Islam, they are considered to be heretics.” Although he claimed they would not attack Alawites, his statement openly reinforced sectarian rhetoric by labeling them as heretics.