Somaliland’s Türkiye, Djibouti, and the Politics Behind the Allegations
Somaliland’s Western Front: Türkiye, Djibouti, and the Politics Behind the Allegations
Claims that Türkiye and Djibouti are helping destabilize western Somaliland have gained traction in Hargeisa. Yet the reality is more complex than a coordinated foreign proxy campaign. The allegations combine genuine regional rivalries, Somalia’s expanding security partnership with Türkiye, Djibouti’s concern about competition along the Gulf of Aden, and unresolved grievances in Awdal and Salal.
Why the Allegations Emerged
The dispute intensified after Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding in January 2024. The agreement offered Ethiopia possible naval and commercial access to the Gulf of Aden while raising the prospect of future recognition of Somaliland. Mogadishu rejected it as a violation of Somalia’s territorial sovereignty, while Djibouti viewed a stronger Berbera corridor as a threat to its dominant role in handling Ethiopian trade.
Meanwhile, unrest in Awdal and Salal exposed long-standing disputes over representation, land, administrative boundaries, public resources, and relations with Hargeisa. Because Issa and Gadabuursi communities span Somaliland, Djibouti, and Ethiopia’s Somali Region, local tensions can quickly acquire a cross-border dimension. Somaliland officials therefore accuse Djibouti and Somalia of exploiting these grievances to create a western front resembling the conflict in Sool.
Türkiye’s Role: Strategic Partner, or Proxy Sponsor
Türkiye is Somalia’s most important external military partner. At Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, Ankara has trained thousands of Somali National Army personnel, including Gorgor commandos and Haramcad police units. Somaliland watches this expansion closely because Mogadishu considers it part of Somalia and opposes its campaign for international recognition.
Concern deepened after Somalia and Türkiye signed a ten-year defence and economic cooperation agreement in 2024. The pact supports Somalia’s maritime security and naval development. From Hargeisa’s perspective, Turkish-backed enforcement of Somalia’s claimed territorial waters could eventually extend to Somaliland’s coastline.
Formal military cooperation, however, is different from covert militia sponsorship. Available evidence does not establish that Turkish intelligence or special forces are organizing irregular fighters in Djibouti or Ethiopia. Türkiye has also mediated between Somalia and Ethiopia through the Ankara Process. Its policies may strengthen Mogadishu and indirectly increase pressure on Somaliland, but they do not prove a Turkish-run proxy war.
Djibouti’s Interests and the Borderland Reality
Djibouti has clearer reasons to resist the Ethiopia–Somaliland corridor. Its economy depends heavily on serving as Ethiopia’s main maritime gateway. Expanded Ethiopian access through Berbera could reduce Djibouti’s port revenue and strategic leverage. Hargeisa has consequently accused Djibouti of sheltering dissidents, facilitated assembly points, and allowed small arms to move through borderlands near Lawyacado and the Sitti Zone.
Djibouti rejects these claims, arguing that Somaliland is externalizing internal disputes. Ethiopia likewise has little strategic incentive to undermine Somaliland while relying on the Berbera corridor to diversify its trade routes. Fighters or activists may cross border communities, but movement alone does not demonstrate official participation in a coordinated campaign.
The Domestic Fault Lines External Actors Can Exploit
The strongest explanation for insecurity in western Somaliland is the interaction between foreign pressure and unresolved domestic grievances. Demands for greater autonomy in Awdal, disputes over municipal authority, and competition over grazing land and trade routes predate the latest regional crisis. Outside actors may encourage or exploit these divisions, but they did not create them.
Somaliland’s traditional institutions remain essential to preventing local tensions from becoming sustained insurgencies. The Guurti, or House of Elders, uses customary law known as Xeer to negotiate ceasefires, investigate grievances, arrange compensation, restore property, and reopen roads or grazing corridors. Neutral elders can convene a shir, secure an end to hostilities, and pursue settlements that preserve communal coexistence.
This approach matters where state institutions have limited reach and arrests or military deployments can trigger collective retaliation. Yet customary mediation cannot settle every political question. Parliamentary representation, district boundaries, public investment, and national authority require credible constitutional and administrative action from Hargeisa.
A More Credible Assessment
Somaliland faces real strategic pressure. Mogadishu is using diplomacy and stronger security partnerships to contest Hargeisa’s independence project. Djibouti has economic and geopolitical reasons to oppose an Ethiopia–Somaliland maritime arrangement. Cross-border clan networks may also provide sanctuary, recruits, weapons channels, and opportunities for political mobilization.
Nevertheless, the claim that Türkiye is directing irregular militias from Djibouti and Ethiopia goes beyond the evidence presented, even if Somaliland forces have captured Turkish-made weapons and equipment. A more credible assessment is that the Western Front is being shaped by overlapping pressures: domestic clan grievances, Djibouti’s economic anxieties, Somalia’s opposition to Somaliland’s recognition, and Türkiye’s formal alliance with Mogadishu.
For Somaliland, the most effective response is not simply to expose possible foreign interference, but to reduce the vulnerabilities that make interference possible. That means inclusive policies in Awdal and Salal, serious investment in local services, transparent political representation, stronger border coordination with Ethiopia, and sustained elder-led mediation. External pressure is most dangerous when it finds internal fractures already open. National resilience begins by closing them.