South Africa’s Tightrope: Managing Iran–US Dynamics

South Africa wants to have it both ways — moral authority in the Global South, and preferential trade with Washington. But that balancing act is becoming harder to sustain, and Iran is just the latest test.

As geopolitical strains mount between Iran, Israel, and the United States, South Africa is adopting a carefully calibrated approach. While publicly advocating for dialogue and de-escalation, Pretoria maintains operational ties with Tehran—allowing Iranian naval vessels access to its ports and supporting Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program. At the same time, its economic reliance on the United States compels a cautious tone, especially as political conditions in Washington grow increasingly volatile.

Pretoria’s muted reaction to the recent U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure—markedly less forceful than its condemnation of Israeli attacks earlier this month—has not gone unnoticed. As Nosmot Gbadamosi wrote in her Africa Brief for Foreign Policy, this posture “underscores the diplomatic challenges that [Pretoria] faces as it navigates an increasingly unpredictable administration in Washington.” She also noted that “this balancing act may only become more complicated if an Israel-Iran cease-fire fails to hold.”

That balancing act is not unique to South Africa. Both China and Russia, though formally aligned with Iran, refrained from offering Tehran military or significant diplomatic support as tensions escalated. Their caution reflects broader calculations: Beijing is negotiating a complex trade arrangement with the U.S., while Moscow is seeking leverage over potential settlement terms in Ukraine. South Africa, currently holding the G20 presidency, finds itself facing similar constraints—though with more immediate exposure to economic repercussions.

On July 9, new U.S. tariffs will come into effect, including a 30% duty on South African automobile exports. The fallout could be severe for a sector that supports over 125,000 jobs. With the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) set to expire in September, Pretoria is scrambling to secure economic continuity while managing political headwinds.

Former President Trump has already signaled a confrontational stance. Not only has he indicated he may skip the upcoming G20 summit hosted by South Africa, but he has also signed executive orders referencing Pretoria’s cooperation with Iran on nuclear and military matters as grounds for reassessing bilateral ties. A recent high-profile meeting with President Cyril Ramaphosa in Washington, more confrontational than diplomatic, underscored this adversarial approach.

Yet Pretoria is unlikely to yield on all fronts. Pretoria isn’t just managing foreign relations — it’s managing identity. For example, the genocide case filed against Israel at the International Court of Justice in 2023 remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy, resonating across Africa and the Global South. For South Africa, that legal action represents both moral leadership and geopolitical signaling. But sustaining this stance while preserving access to Western markets is increasingly difficult.

Meanwhile, Europe is stepping up. In March, the European Union pledged $5.1 billion for green energy and vaccine production initiatives in South Africa—a strategic investment aimed in part at filling the void left by recent U.S. aid cuts, especially in health. For Brussels, keeping Pretoria within reach is critical to preventing its full alignment with anti-Western blocs, which would mean losing a key African partner and the continent’s second-largest economy.

South Africa’s foreign policy is no longer a passive expression of nonalignment. This is what diplomatic hedging looks like in an era of transactional superpowers. It has become a high-stakes exercise in strategic triangulation—balancing principle, economic necessity, and a rapidly shifting global order. The Iran episode illustrates this dynamic with clarity.