Stop the War. Bring Them Home. We Can and Should.

The most fundamental justification for Israel’s return to war is this: “Israel cannot stop the war before Hamas is completely destroyed- that would guarantee another October 7th, it would be national suicide.” I believe this claim to be based on one false assumption and one fantastical one, but before making that argument, it’s important to take the time to put our current situation in context.

We need to get our facts straight and to do that, we need first to ask whether or not Israel in practice agreed to end the war in exchange for the return of all the hostages, and only afterwards to ask whether or not it should have agreed to that. The first is a question about the ‘is’ (or the ‘was’), and the second about the ‘ought’. The false narrative that has taken hold astonishingly quickly regarding the first question seeks to change the thinking about the second question. We need to disentangle them.

On January 18th, the Israeli government approved the hostage-ceasefire agreement with Hamas, an agreement designed to bring about the release of all Israeli hostages in exchange for a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal. This was an agreement that enjoyed- in its entirety- the support of the majority of the Israeli public, and all of the security establishment. The fact that the agreement was meant to include both stages is clear to anyone who checks the news items at the time, and is conclusively proven by the fact that Otzma Yehudit quit the government as a result, promising to return only if the government did not continue to stage 2. When the agreement was signed, the mediators committed to “serve as guarantors to ensure that the parties remain at the table until an agreement on the second phase is reached, allowing the ceasefire to extend,” and the security establishment explained that Hamas’ incentive to return all of the hostages in stage 1 was in order to continue to the end of the war in stage 2.

Alongside these commitments came consistent statements from Bezalel Smotrich and the Religious Zionist party that they had received private guarantees from the Prime Minister that Israel would not continue to stage 2, but would renew the war after stage 1. These statements came with a promise/threat that if Israel does not return to fighting after stage 1, the Religious Zionist party would act to topple the government. If true, these statements show that Israel never had any intention to continue to stage 2 and the release of all the hostages. They signed the deal in order to get as many hostages back as possible in stage 1, and the plan from the beginning was to find a way to either extend this stage, or return to war—mediator’s commitments notwithstanding. Presumably, they banked on Hamas violating its side first. But, just as Israel’s security establishment had predicted, Hamas was interested in continuing to stage 2, and therefore, aside from smaller violations to which Israel consistently responded, it held up its central commitment- to return 33 hostages.

As of day 16, when Israel had committed to begin negotiations on stage 2, Israel’s actions made it clear that Smotrich wasn’t lying. After Hamas completed its return of the hostages it had agreed to in the first stage, Israel abandoned any pretense of continuing the agreement, and declared, without any cogent justification, that it would not be withdrawing from the Philadelphi route starting on day 42, as it had committed to do. The agreement does not condition this withdrawal on an agreement of the terms of stage 2. This feature was presumably meant to guarantee that before that time, Israel would have an incentive to reach an agreement on stage 2, before beginning to lose its strategic assets and bargaining chips. Instead, with the support of the American establishment, Israel changed the rules of the deal midway, declaring that it would negotiate based on the Witkoff proposal to extend stage 1, rather than to continue to stage 2. As awkward as it is to defend Hamas’ position, we must admit that, within the context of a signed agreement, it is absurd to allow one side to change the terms, and then to blame the other side for its recalcitrance in accepting those changes.

In fact, this is only a more brazen version of a trick Israel “successfully” pulled when this same deal was being discussed in May. At that time, Netanyahu also falsely represented it as a “partial deal” in his interview on Channel 14, reflecting that Israel would break it off midway. But then, Israel did not even reach the stage of signing an agreement. Netanyahu had suggested the terms, Hamas had agreed, but then Israel decide to fundamentally change the terms of the deal by insisting on remaining in the Philadelphi route, which had not been mentioned in the original deal, and then blame Hamas for its insistence on sticking to the terms of the original deal, and its refusal to negotiate based on Israel’s change. Then, too, the American establishment stood by Israel. If the proper measure of success for this exercise is ensuring the continuation of the war, this trick was successful. But if the measure of success is saving hostages, by the time Israel was essentially forced by the Trump administration to accept this very same deal in January (including, as mentioned, a promise of a complete withdrawal from the Philadelphi route), it was already too late for hostages like Carmel Gat, Eden Yerushalmi, Hersh Goldberg Polin and others, who could have returned to rebuild their lives, but who were killed in the interim.

Thus, it is not Hamas’ decision not to release hostages after stage 1 that caused us to return to war, but just the opposite. The Israeli government’s premeditated refusal to end the war and continue to stage 2 is the reason that, after completing stage 1, Hamas stopped releasing hostages. It seems likely that this refusal was planned from the start, though it contradicts Israel’s signed agreement, and although the United States’ support of this decision contradicts its commitment as a mediator to see the sides through to the agreement’s completion. But even once we have established all that, we still need to respond to the ‘ought’- to the claim that Israel needed to do this, it had no choice but to continue the war, because otherwise, they are guaranteed a repeat of 7.10.

Before arguing against this claim, we should note that it is a legitimate position to have, so long as one is up front with its cost. Returning to war now endangers the hostages. Refusing to end the war almost certainly means that we will not succeed in returning alive all those who managed to survive over 530 days, nor to return the bodies of those killed to Israel for burial. An argument can certainly be made that these are painful but necessary costs we must pay in order to defeat Hamas, and that is a higher priority. The argument that can not be credibly made any longer (but many still stick to) is the idea that “enough military pressure will cause Hamas to give us back all the hostages on their knees.” This is a fantasy that has no factual basis. Recall that the deal signed in January is almost the exact same deal that was available six months before, despite an additional 6 months of extreme military pressure. After over a year of fighting, we see that trying to solve the hostage problem with military pressure has both killed hostages, and severely limited our military options, leading to a reality no one would have believed at the beginning of this war-  that after over 500 days, Hamas would still be holding both hostages and power. Yes, it could be that after enough military pressure, Hamas will agree to another “pulse” of hostages- but logic dictates that they have no reason to give up all the hostages if Israel is just going to keep fighting them afterwards anyways.

But even if, in theory, you would prioritize complete military victory over returning the hostages, there is good reason to disagree with the equation: “Only erasing Hamas can guarantee that there won’t be another 7.10”. The reason I disagree is because this equation rests on one false assumption and one fantastical one.

The false assumption is that as long as Hamas exists, we are guaranteed another 7.10. This assumption is based on the premise that there is nothing that Israel could possibly have done to prevent the success of the attacks of 7.10. Based on the investigations that have been done thus far, this is clearly false. There was a lot that could have been done to prevent 7.10. Anyone who blames the army and the secret service for their failures on 7.10 agrees with this- if you’re blaming them, it could have been prevented. But of course, this premise, in the weird world in which everyone except for the government is to blame for this- serves the narrative of a government who doesn’t want to take any responsibility for 7.10, and has refused to create a committee that will objectively analyze the causes of its failures. In truth, just as 7.10 was enabled not only by our enemy’s evil designs, but by our own failures, a future attack can be prevented, despite their continued evil designs, if Israel successfully lives up to its basic obligation to defend its citizens.

But won’t our enemies always try new things, and eventually succeed?

This brings us to the fantastical assumption that if we completely destroy Hamas, 7.10 will never happen again. Right wing papers are full of articles about this needing to be “the last war”. It is obviously true, by definition, that if we could, in theory, obliterate every single group that wanted to destroy Israel, then we would have peace. Of course, this isn’t just Hamas. and it certainly isn’t just Hamas in Gaza. It’s Islamic Jihad and many other groups, and it’s in the West Bank and within the green line as well. And the thing is, as this war has shown, while we are in the process of destroying terrorists, we also simultaneously create new terrorists, by increasing rage and desperation. While we fight them, we also strengthen them. This isn’t a justification of this reality, only an observation of it.

Well, one could argue, that’s exactly why we need Trump’s plan, in order to expel them all. But to realize the fantasy of absolute security, of never again needing to fear another 7.10, this would need to be applied not only to Gaza, but also to 2.8 million Arabs in the West Bank, as well as some number within the Green Line. If you read some of the more honest commentators on the right, this is precisely what they are explicitly arguing. From others, the sensitive ear can already hear this plan between the lines. Whether or not it’s said is irrelevant, though. If you want to guarantee never having another 7.10, and the only tool in your kit is “destroy, conquer, expel, settle”- that’s what you need to do. And you need to take into account that during the years it will take to do this, Israel will likely become a complete pariah to the Western world, and lose much support from American Jewry as well. But why go across the sea? There is fully half of the country that opposes this government that will not support this plan, and a third of the segment that does support it refuses to serve in the army that will need to enforce it. Given all that- does this really sound like a viable plan?

Where does all this leave us? If the return to war on the one hand endangers hostages, and on the other hand, does not prevent a realistic way to prevent another 7.10, what are we meant to do? There is a clear alternative, that includes the return of all the hostages, and a path forward that Israel can pursue in a responsible, gradual way, that will enjoy majority support. It’s been on the table since December 2023, but this government has refused to consider it. A regional deal that includes normalization with Saudi Arabia, an international coalition to administer Gaza’s rebuilding, and movement towards a Palestinian state. If you think that Saudi Arabia’s normalization with us is actually just a trick to destroy us, and they haven’t really come to terms with the existence of a Jewish state, then you should be opposed to it—and to all the Abraham Accords– regardless of what it dictates about Palestinian statehood. But if you’re excited about Saudi Arabia’s willingness to recognize Israel’s existence, in the way that other previously sworn enemies have done, then it is worthwhile to consider that the Palestinian people could undergo the same process, in the context of this regional peace. In any case, even if just to save the hostages, this seems to be our best alternative.