Sudan-Chad Clash: The Tine Incursion and North Africa/Sahel Security

The violent convergence of the Sudanese civil war and Chadian sovereign security reached a critical threshold last week, within the strategically vital Tine corridor. This lethal engagement, characterized by the Chadian government as a deliberate incursion by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), resulted in the death of seven Chadian soldiers and the destruction of military assets. The clash occurred when RSF elements pursuing Sudanese Joint Force units—a coalition allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—crossed into Chadian territory near the Birak military garrison. When Chadian troops ordered the paramilitary fighters to disarm and leave, a violent confrontation ensued, leaving several others wounded. This event represents the most significant escalation in cross-border hostilities since the conflict began in April 2023, following a pattern of increasing aggression that included a December 26 drone strike at the Al-Tina base that killed two Chadian soldiers. In response, Chadian government spokesman Gassim Cherif issued a “final warning” to the Sudanese belligerents, stating that N’Djamena will no longer tolerate violations of its territorial integrity or the dragging of its defense and security forces into a foreign conflict.

This incursion is a manifestation of a broader “system of conflict” that has fundamentally connected the crises of Darfur, eastern Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), and southern Libya. The regionalization of the war has activated new supply nodes, such as the refurbished Ma’aten al-Sarah airbase in southern Libya, which functions as a corridor for weapons and mercenaries to reach RSF-held territories. These “collateral circuits” utilize porous borders to move materiel and fighters, with units aligned with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) allegedly managing access to desert corridors. For the RSF, controlling the Tine-Karnoi-Ambara triangle is a strategic imperative to secure supply routes from southern Libya and eliminate the last holdouts of non-Arab resistance in Darfur. Meanwhile, Egypt has defined the collapse of Sudanese state institutions as a “red line,” signaling a willingness to take necessary measures to preserve Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, which further raises the stakes of a regional conflagration.

Internally, the Tine incursion has ignited a political firestorm for President Mahamat Idriss Déby, who belongs to the Zaghawa ethnic group—the same community currently targeted by the RSF in Darfur. Elite discontent within the Chadian military, which is heavily composed of Zaghawa elements, has reached a critical point due to allegations that the government facilitated UAE-sourced weaponry to the RSF via the Amdjarass airport. This “proxy entanglement” risks internal mutiny or a nationalist coup, as military leaders feel betrayed by policies that support a paramilitary force killing their kinsmen across the border. Simultaneously, Chad is grappling with a massive humanitarian crisis, hosting over one million Sudanese refugees, which has overwhelmed resources in eastern provinces like Ouaddaï and Wadi Fira. The influx has fueled inter-communal distrust and led to the formation of Zaghawa-led self-defense groups, such as “Defense, Intelligence and Support,” while the RSF is accused of recruiting among displaced populations.

The current trajectory points toward several volatile outcomes for North African and Sahelian security. If RSF incursions continue, Chad may abandon its neutral posture and launch military operations to establish a security buffer inside Darfur, potentially drawing in Egypt and turning the border into a direct front of an interstate war. Alternatively, the conflict could settle into a “durable partition” of Sudan into a SAF-controlled east and an RSF-dominated west, creating a permanent militarized frontier that destabilizes neighboring states for generations. Such a failed-state scenario risks merging the war in Sudan with broader Sahelian insurgencies, threatening to topple Chad as the “last domino” of regional stability against jihadist expansion in the Lake Chad Basin. The Tine incursion has thus stripped away the veneer of regional neutrality, leaving the Sahel and North Africa at the threshold of a transnational struggle for land, resources, and survival.