Syria Should Be Part of Israel’s Regional Strategy

Saudi Arabia and Syria completed a set of agreements on November 4 that were aimed at improving Syria’s economy, including through loans worth over $400 million. Additionally, a bilateral defense agreement was signed. This could be a milestone towards Syria’s official accession to the Mecca Defense Alliance (aka Mecca Pact), signed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan in August. By focusing on a concrete set of economic and defense-related issues, Syria and Saudi Arabia are working on mutual challenges without the fanfare of the Pact.

The Syrian agreement with Saudi Arabia does not target Israel, and in fact, it comes amid often conflicting reports of Syrian troops and military advisors coming to Saudi Arabia to defend the country from attacks by the Houthi rebel faction in Yemen. The Syrian-Saudi rapprochement is part of increasing the interconnections between regional states on strategic levels. This kind of regional security cooperation already has support among key opposition figures in the Israeli government.

In 2025, MKs Gilad Kariv (The Democrats), Ram Ben-Barak (Yesh Atid now Yachad/Together) and Alon Schuster (Blue and White) launched a Knesset caucus to promote a regional security agreement. A poll released at its launch found 70 percent of Israelis — including nearly two-thirds of coalition voters — supported such an arrangement. No coalition MK joined.

There is no reason why Israel should see the strengthening of Syria and its recovery from the civil war as a bad thing. In particular, the stated goal of protecting sovereign borders from proxy militias fits hand in glove with Israeli security concerns. Moreover, Syria has much to gain from a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. It helps balance Turkish influence and involvement in Syria’s project of rebuilding its national army with a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, where al-Sharaa was born.

Just days before the November 4 bilateral agreement was signed, there was speculation that Syria was going to join the Mecca Pact. A recent article in Syria’s pro-government outlet al-Ikhbariyya al-Suriyya paraphrased military analyst Brigadier General Ammar al-Wawi, who said joining the Pact would add capabilities to the alliance that go beyond the size of its forces and weaponry, extending to its geographic position, operational experience, and logistical support potential.

While Turkey could gain from Syrian-Saudi interconnectivity, it should not be forgotten that Israeli-Turkish trade reached $7 billion in 2023 before Turkey halted trade in 2024 in protest of Israel’s conduct in the Gaza War. Restoring bilateral trade with Turkey overland through Syria could potentially reduce costs to Israeli consumers as well as exporters.

Turkey has maintained a military presence in Syria for nearly a decade, and an official agreement was signed in August 2025 focused mainly on technical assistance that would enable Damascus to better handle the challenges of domestic terrorism. A closer relationship between Damascus and Riyadh could help Syria become less dependent on Ankara as a sole sponsor of its military development. This doesn’t conflict with Israel’s wider regional concerns, as there are mutually held challenges emerging from Iranian proxy forces in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq.

When the Mecca Pact was announced in early August, Syria was already considering joining unofficially. Israel’s air force struck the Abu al-Duhur air force base on August 18, 2026. This was framed by Israel at the time as an attempt to prevent a Turkish air force installation in Syria, potentially including advanced radar technology.

Syria’s foreign minister Shaibani met with the head of the Mossad in Jordan following the Abu al-Duhur strikes, but the meeting was inconclusive. Syria has few ways to retaliate against Israel now without incurring great costs. On the other hand, Israel has no leverage over Syria beyond pure military power. Despite supporting the Kurds in Syria, Israel could not prevent the January 2026 agreement that allowed al-Sharaa to take the Kurdish-held areas in exchange for the gradual integration of Kurdish officers and soldiers into the Syrian army.

Syria’s networking skills have led to renewed or improved relations with Lebanon, Iraq, and the UAE, where many Syrian ex-pats reside. Al-Sharaa managed to tamp down public outcry after Jordan attacked Syria and killed civilians in an anti-terrorism operation in October. Contacts between the governments enabled a Jordanian agreement to establish a joint committee for future coordination against terror operatives.

It is worth noting that Syria and Jordan are key to land transportation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Ankara and Riyadh signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at building a New Hejaz Railway that would connect Turkey to Saudi Arabia by rail through Syria and Jordan. Others have noted that this railway plan cuts Israel out of new regional infrastructure.

Additionally, the Iraqi PM visited Syria last month to discuss early plans for an oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria’s coast. The main idea is to find trade routes that bypass both the Hormuz Strait and the Bab al-Mandab/Suez Canal corridor. That need became more pressing on November 15, when Saudi-backed Yemeni forces withdrew from the Bab al-Mandab coast, leaving the Houthis overlooking the strait while Iran continues to disrupt Hormuz.

Though the Iraqi-Syria pipeline idea is a brand-new project, international connectivity was envisioned by the Assad regime. In recent months, what al-Sharaa, at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April, called Syria’s shift “from a conduit for conflict into a platform for sustainable investment.”  Another name for this is the “Four Seas and Nine Corridors” plan to link Syria to the Gulf, Mediterranean, Caspian, and Black Sea in closer coordination with Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Another huge project, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), was proposed to run from India to Saudi Arabia and on to Europe through Haifa, with recent versions said to include Syria as well (or instead of Israel), linking the Arab Gulf States to Europe. If Israel can resolve its border conflicts, it would likely benefit from being part of this global network including by offering cyber security tech and other mechanisms to ensure the secure passage of goods.

There are obstacles to full regional interconnectivity, which is predicated on normalization. Public opinion in Arabic speaking countries, such as Saudi Arabia, has massively opposed normalization in the wake of the Gaza War. (Indeed, documents found in Gaza suggest that Yahya al-Sinwar aimed to scuttle Israel-Saudi rapprochement.)

In May 2025, US President Donald Trump warmly embraced al-Sharaa, and has since invited him to the White House and encouraged Congress to drop sanctions on Syria. Al-Sharaa did not hesitate to embrace Mr. Trump in return, even though he was first US president to legitimize Israel’s possession of the Golan Heights.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apparently asked US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, to help Israel and Syria work on a deal back in June 2025, but in July an attack against Druze militants by government-backed forces who killed hundreds of civilians led to Israeli intervention and a stalemate in Suwayda. Right wing elected officials in Netanyahu’s Cabinet, such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Amichai Chikli, openly called for the assassination of Ahmad al-Sharaa. The talks have moved at a snail’s pace since then.

The US, EU, and most regional players in the Middle East would likely welcome a peaceful political resolution of the border dispute in the Golan Heights. Israel would be a direct beneficiary, too, if claims were dropped against the territory, which it technically annexed in 1981. The Golan’s exports are easy targets for anti-settlement legislation since the EU and other countries maintain, like Syria, that this matter has not been resolved. A deal with Syria would end the uncertainty.

Israel should consider an interim deal with Syria that offers concrete mutual defense benefits (such as stopping cross-border militias) with creative economic ties that could help southern Syria and the Israeli Golan, in addition to setting up a long-term strategy for regional prosperity. The potential for interconnectivity with Syria could also help Israel create trade opportunities from India to Europe, Saudi Arabia to Eurasia.