Syria: The Battlefield Between Intentions and Interests

Syria: The Battlefield Between Intentions and Interests — Who Has Won, and Who Will Rule After the Collapse of the Shiite Axis?

The campaign in Syria is no longer merely a struggle over regime change; it is a test of survival for an entire region. In recent years, Israel and the West have struck deep at Iran and Hezbollah’s spheres of influence in Syria. These blows significantly weakened the “Axis of Resistance,” constraining its freedom of action across the country. Monitoring by Western research institutes indicates that the structural and organic damage to the Shiite axis since October 7 is substantial—but not fatal. Its operational capacity has diminished, yet the remnants of its power remain dangerous.

Those who have truly benefited from this partial collapse are local Sunni factions—Syrian and Iraqi alike—who have gained a certain political and security breathing room to accelerate their own status, whether through political networking or by reinforcing local power mechanisms. Israel fully recognizes this interesting consequence: more and more Sunni centers are consolidating their internal independence, not necessarily in a pro-Israeli manner, but rather as a form of insulation from Iranian Shiism.

And where does Turkey stand? Ankara’s interests are crystal clear and enduring: preventing the rise of a strong Kurdish entity along its border, fortifying Turkish zones of influence in northern Syria, and maintaining leverage toward Damascus. The Turkish parliament recently extended authorization for military operations in Syria—an unmistakable signal of Turkey’s long-term commitment to sustained military and political involvement. This is not a direct or immediate threat to Israel, but an attempt to maximize Ankara’s national interests in the region. The side effects may alarm Jerusalem. Worse, in the Middle East one can never predict where escalation ends once it begins. A small human error may serve as an excuse for political, diplomatic, or security maneuvering in pursuit of interests—thus the danger is real, and so is the anxiety.

And what of Trump and America? As part of the US effort to steer the region toward stability, President Trump is pushing for regional dialogues—including initiatives encouraging talks between Jerusalem and Damascus on a security and trade basis. A mutual non-aggression arrangement built upon interests could build trust and potentially open the door to integration into the Abraham Accords. Let’s not forget: Israel delivered an enormous favor to Sunnis by dismantling Shiite capacity in Syria, Lebanon, and by damaging Iran.

Yet the current White House does not hide its tensions with Israel regarding IDF strikes in Syria. Even if some of this is mere lip service, Washington voices complaints about destabilization and bypassing coordination. In other words: the US supports the idea of dialogue, but seeks to distinguish between strategic engagement and military actions that could destroy any future agreement.

Ultimately, the American—Trumpian—interest is to create more stability, meaning additional peace and normalization agreements, cementing Trump’s place in history as the president who brokered the most peace deals—an “American president of peace.” That is how the Nobel Prize is attained; that is how legacy is written. Thus, Israel does have maneuvering space—but possibly limited, and quite likely narrowing over time. Israel’s window of opportunity is not infinite; it must be utilized wisely and cautiously, without provoking Uncle Sam.

Will Syria join the Abraham Accords or pursue a non-aggression pact with Israel? The realist view says: highly doubtful. The new government in Damascus has issued statements that leave the major questions unresolved—particularly the question of the Golan Heights. Political research suggests Damascus might agree to gradual security arrangements (de-escalation, separation zones), but full entry into the Abraham Accords currently appears impractical. The Golan issue, as well as continued Iranian-Hezbollah presence (even weakened), make full normalization difficult.

Still, cautiously, one cannot rule out that interests may override realism. Syria may surprise everyone: in exchange for American funds, security guarantees, and the international elevation of its new president—who seeks to brand himself as a “retired terrorist turned statesman”—a US-Israeli-Syrian initiative might emerge that shocks the region and the world. Personally, I believe there is more than a reasonable chance for such a development.

What can Israel do? Israel faces a dual dilemma: on one hand, continue delivering targeted blows against capabilities that may pose threats (Hezbollah, Iranian transfers); on the other hand, intensify diplomatic coordination with the US and Arab states seeking stability, in order to prevent escalation that would jeopardize strategic opportunities. The winning formula would be to push gradual security options while maintaining proven military strength, but also keeping an open diplomatic channel for circumstances in which stable regional solutions can be pursued.

Once again, Israel finds itself between safeguarding its security and preserving the possibility of a historic diplomatic breakthrough—one that, if successful in the long run, would dramatically improve the security of the State of Israel and the entire region. The opportunity exists; the will and capabilities exist. The million-dollar question is whether the sides can implement and commit to this monumental event.

The bottom line: Syria has transformed into a complex junction of interests—a sharp decline in Iranian influence, though not yet fully neutralized. Turkey seeks space and levers in the north, and the US is attempting to encourage dialogue which, under the right timing and precise conditions, might reduce risks—though far from guaranteeing normalization. Everything remains open, including a sudden strategic shift.

Jerusalem must act with force and in diplomatic concert simultaneously; otherwise, the chance to turn the ruins of conflict into political and security opportunity will slip through its fingers. Here stands a triangle of responsibility—each actor capable of triggering escalation or normalization. First Syria, then Israel, under American leadership—and without Turkish interference. Perhaps it is worth considering giving Turkey the role of the ceremonial broker: imagine Erdoğan standing beside Trump at a signing ceremony for a Syrian-Israeli agreement on the White House lawn. Erdoğan would relish it, and it could accelerate the process.

We are living in a historic moment—critical days. It is essential to be smart and right, not arrogant and not complacent. This opportunity is within reach.