T.I.N.A. and the Ideologies Driving Anti Israel Hostility

How media framing obscure the realities driving Israel’s foreign policy.

According to recent reporting, the American government and the Islamic Republic of Iran appear to be moving toward a memorandum of understanding. The full and accurate details of what is happening behind closed doors remain unknown to the public. Officially, though, along with other clauses, the emerging framework calls for the Islamic Republic of Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and commit not to pursue nuclear weapons, and for the United States to lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports.  Both sides would also pledge not to initiate future military action against one another, Lebanon included. As part of these negotiations, Teheran has demanded that Washington restrain Israel, making the conflict in Lebanon where Israel is fighting the Teheran‑backed Hezbollah, a central condition of its diplomacy. Iranian officials argue that the United States is responsible for ensuring Israel respects ceasefires and halts military activity.

Viewed through the lens of Western media coverage, Teheran’s demand can easily appear reasonable. Much of the reporting, such as New York Times headlines noting that “Israel directs its military to limit its actions in Lebanon” or that “fighting between Israel and Iran‑backed Hezbollah appeared to ease” highlights Israel’s visible military activity while ignoring the Hezbollah attacks that provoked it. This style of coverage naturally tilts the narrative toward plausibly portraying Israel as the driving force in the conflict, or at least equally responsible for the violence.

A recent development has sparked speculation that President Trump may be willing to throw Israel, long a reliably aligned partner, under the bus abandoning it, if that is what it takes to secure a working agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Those who oppose Israel, Netanyahu, or who oppose Trump and his Middle East policy, would likely welcome any sign that he is distancing himself from Israel and may well exaggerate the rift for partisan effect.

Until now, President Trump has been the only American president and Western leader to both recognize and act on the long‑term danger posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran beyond imposing sanctions which have not worked. In doing so, he has remained a consistent supporter of Israel, even if the two countries occasionally disagree.

What, nevertheless, lies ahead for Israel if the U.S. signs this memorandum as is?

A skewed understanding of the present situation can easily lead to incorrect conclusions. I will try to make the record straight as I see it: Regrettably, as is often the case with coverage of the Israel–Arab conflict, even if the mainstream media lens is factually accurate, by ignoring other crucial facts, the result is contextual distortion.  Mainstream outlets often omit that Hezbollah, supplied and armed to the teeth by Teheran, has been continuously firing rockets and drones into northern Israel devastating cities like Kiryat Shmona. These attacks force Israel to respond to prevent further attacks. This omission obscures the basic cause‑and‑effect dynamic: if Hezbollah stopped firing, Israel would have no reason to respond or remain in Lebanon. Under the U.S.-backed August 2025 agreement, Hezbollah was meant to disarm, yet along with Teheran’s support it refuses to do so.

The present conflict is not a tit‑for‑tat match between Hezbollah and Israel as implied by the New York Times and other mainstream style of writing. Neither are Israel’s operations in Lebanon driven by arbitrary, imperial, or expansionist ambitions. Teheran’s calls for the United States to “rein in” Israel without coupled with a declaration to equally compel Hezbollah to stop attacking Israel reinforce the point that the dynamics of violence in Lebanon which originate with Hezbollah along with Teheran’s support, not Israel and are not about to change.

Even if the analysts are correct and the U.S. proceeds with signing the memorandum of agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran while the Hezbollah–Israeli conflict remains unresolved likely reflects only a tactical rather than a strategic difference between Washington and Jerusalem. The U.S. may simply want to at least secure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and a commitment from Teheran not to pursue nuclear weapons which are objectives also important to Israel. Taking this step first does not contradict the deeper strategic alignment between the two countries: neither wants Teheran to continue backing its proxies, expanding its ballistic‑missile arsenal, or exporting Islamic fundamentalism.

Ultimately, the primary driver of Israel’s foreign policy is reality. And just as the United States would never tolerate Canada launching hundreds of missiles at Detroit or Rochester, Israel cannot tolerate Hezbollah’s ongoing assaults without doing what it can to prevent this onslaught or to borrow Margaret Thatcher’s famous formulation, T.I.N.A.: there is no alternative. This strategic posture has remained consistent across Israeli governments and leaders. Decades ago, Prime Minister Golda Meir, representing a different party, a different ideology, and a different era than Netanyahu, captured this enduring logic attributed to her with the saying: “If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.” Golda Meir’s predicament, voiced decades before the rise of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism, underscores that regrettably the roots of the Israeli Arab conflict extend far beyond today’s Iran style fundamentalist movement. What we see is that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ideology of rejecting coexistence and pursuing Israel’s destruction even at the expense of the wellbeing of their own citizens did not sprout spontaneously out of nothing.

Discriminatory attitudes in parts of the modern Muslim and Arab world began before the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, and extend beyond Jews and Israel, impacting other minority communities as well. Christian populations in Arab countries, for example, have fallen from an estimated 12–14 million in the 1950s to roughly 5–7 million today, half the number, illustrating the unwelcome environment they must contend with. Weaker minorities such as the Yazidis have simply been brutally persecuted. This is the lens through which the present Iranian and Hezbollah conflict with the U.S. and Israel can be best understood.

If Teheran genuinely wants a more stable Middle East, refusing to curb Hezbollah would be inconsistent. Its true intentions toward the United States can be read in how it and Hezbollah act on the ground along with Teheran’s stance. The Hezbollah–Israel conflict and the Teheran–U.S. dynamic are parallel, interconnected processes.

Ultimately, Israel’s choices are dictated not by diplomatic maneuvering but by existential necessity. No memorandum, no shifting media narrative, and no political calculation in Washington can change the fact that Hezbollah continues to fire on Israeli cities with Iran’s backing. If Iran uses negotiations as a smokescreen to advance its ideological and military ambitions, and if the U.S. backs off from its support for Israel, even if Israel ultimately must act alone, it will do so, and likely with overwhelming public support. For Israelis, the conflict is not an intellectual game but an existential threat. What choice will it have?  Would any other country respond differently?  On the other hand, if Iran truly seeks a different future for the region, the first test is simple: restrain Hezbollah. Without that step, talk of peace is little more than rhetoric, and Israel will continue to live by the principle that has defined its survival – T.I.N.A. there is no alternative.