Why including your adversaries at the table might be the most rational play in a multipolar world—and what it means for Israel

Reports have emerged of a proposed ‘Core5’ (C5) grouping—the United States, China, Russia, India, and Japan—allegedly contained in an unpublished, longer draft of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy. The White House has not confirmed the existence of such a document, and the reports remain contested. Yet whether or not this specific proposal advances, the concept deserves serious analytical attention as a window into evolving American strategic thinking. For those of us who apply financial and game theory frameworks to geopolitical questions, the C5 represents a fascinating strategic pivot that carries profound implications for Israel and the Middle East.

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From Concert to Core: Historical Echoes

The proposed C5 bears striking resemblance to the Concert of Europe that emerged after the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. That arrangement—bringing together Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—maintained European peace for nearly four decades. The key insight from Vienna was counterintuitive: include your recent adversary at the table rather than isolate them. France, freshly defeated, became a stabilizing partner rather than a resentful revisionist.

The C5 would apply this logic globally. Rather than the G7’s democracy-and-wealth criteria, the C5 would reportedly be defined by hard power—population exceeding 100 million, significant military capability, and genuine global influence. Together, these five nations represent roughly half the world’s population, include the three largest nuclear arsenals, encompass four permanent UN Security Council members, and account for a substantial share of global GDP at purchasing power parity.

The Game Theory Logic

What follows is my analytical framework for understanding the C5’s strategic logic—not a description of stated US policy, but a lens for interpreting what such an arrangement might accomplish.

Consider the standard challenge of multipolar systems through the lens of iterated game theory. In a prisoner’s dilemma with multiple players, cooperation becomes exponentially harder as the number of significant actors increases. Each additional player creates new potential for defection, miscalculation, and the classic problems international relations scholars call ‘chain-ganging’ and ‘buck-passing.’

The C5 addresses this by reducing the effective number of players at the highest level. Rather than managing the cacophony of 200 UN member states or even the unwieldy G20, five great powers would form a steering committee for global order. This is not unlike how oligopolistic industries stabilize through implicit coordination—fewer players enable clearer signaling, more credible commitments, and reduced transaction costs.

But here’s the crucial game-theoretic insight: the C5 deliberately includes adversaries. Standard alliance theory would suggest clustering with ideologically aligned partners—hence NATO, the Quad, or AUKUS. The C5 inverts this logic. By bringing China and Russia inside the tent, the arrangement transforms a zero-sum competition into a repeated game with reputational stakes and ongoing interaction.

In game theory terms, we move from a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma (where defection dominates) to an iterated version where shadow-of-the-future considerations encourage cooperation. Players who expect repeated interactions are more likely to adopt ‘tit-for-tat’ or other conditionally cooperative strategies.

The Middle East as First Agenda Item

Notably, the reported first agenda item for C5 would allegedly be Middle East security, specifically normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. If accurate, this would be strategically astute. The Middle East serves as an ideal test case for great power concert logic—it’s a region where all five C5 members have interests but none possesses absolute control.

For Israel, this configuration presents a classic mixed-strategy game. On one hand, having all major powers engaged reduces the risk of any single patron being able to impose terms unilaterally. China’s growing Gulf presence, Russia’s regional entanglement, India’s energy dependencies, and Japan’s maritime concerns all create cross-cutting pressures that Israel can navigate.

On the other hand, a genuine great power concert might constrain Israel’s freedom of action. The Concert of Europe worked partly because the great powers agreed to contain revolutionary change—including the aspirations of smaller nations. A functioning C5 might similarly prefer regional stability over any single state’s strategic ambitions.

The Options Pricing Perspective

Applying financial economics to geopolitics requires explicit acknowledgment that we are reasoning by analogy. The following framework illuminates strategic trade-offs but should not be mistaken for a description of actual policy deliberations.

Those familiar with my previous work know I often apply options pricing frameworks to geopolitical risk analysis. Think of the C5 as the United States purchasing a ‘put option’ on global order—paying a premium (sharing the table with adversaries) for downside protection (reduced great power conflict).

The ‘strike price’ of this option is the current rules-based international order. If multipolarity continues deteriorating toward what some scholars call ‘a-polarity’—a world without any ordering principles—the C5 option pays off handsomely. Having an established forum for great power dialogue prevents the kind of miscalculations that precipitated 1914.

However, options have costs. The premium here is ideological: the C5 would explicitly abandon the democracy-promotion agenda that characterized post-Cold War American foreign policy. European allies, excluded from the table, represent the largest implicit cost. Commentators interpreting the 2025 NSS suggest it treats Europe more as an arena for great power competition than as a primary actor—a significant departure from traditional trans-Atlantic frameworks.

Risks and Instabilities

Game theory also illuminates the C5’s vulnerabilities. First, there’s the ‘core vs. periphery’ problem. Great power concerts historically work by managing competition among the great while suppressing challenges from smaller states. The Concert of Europe’s major failures came when it tried to contain popular movements (1848) or nationalist aspirations (the Balkans). A C5 that tries to impose solutions on the Middle East without local buy-in may face similar resistance.

Second, domestic constraints matter. The Concert of Europe was negotiated by autocratic monarchs with relatively free hands in foreign policy. Today’s C5 members face vastly more complex domestic political environments. Can any American president credibly commit to concert-style compromises when Congress remains adversarial? Can Xi Jinping accept anything that looks like a win for Washington? The ‘two-level game’ of international negotiations becomes vastly more complex.

Third, the C5 notably excludes any Middle Eastern power. Neither Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, nor Turkey sits at the table. This ‘gangsters and molls’ structure—as one analyst colorfully described great power concerts—may breed resentment and instability among those relegated to observer status.

Strategic Implications for Israel

The following scenarios represent my policy analysis, not official Israeli doctrine—though they are consistent with Israel’s ongoing diversification toward India, Gulf partners, and other emerging relationships.

For Israeli strategists, the C5 concept demands careful hedging. Several scenarios warrant consideration:

If the C5 materializes and functions, Israel benefits from great power investment in regional stability while facing potential constraints on unilateral action. The optimal response involves deepening ties across all five powers—not just Washington—while building regional coalitions that give Israel voice even without a seat at the C5 table.

If the C5 proves stillborn (the more likely outcome given current great power tensions), its proposal still signals American willingness to trade traditional alliances for new configurations. Israel’s diversification toward India, the UAE, and other emerging partners looks increasingly prescient.

Perhaps most importantly, the C5 concept reflects what commentators describe as a fundamental American reassessment of the costs and benefits of global hegemony. Analysts reading the 2025 NSS suggest it conveys skepticism about past ‘global overreach’ and implies that sustained, worldwide hegemony may be neither achievable nor desirable. For Israel, this trajectory suggests a future where American commitment cannot be assumed and regional partnerships become existentially important.

Conclusion: The Paradox of Power Sharing

The Core5 proposal, whether it advances or fades, represents a serious intellectual engagement with the challenges of multipolarity. Its game-theoretic logic—reduce players, include adversaries, create repeated interactions—has historical precedent and theoretical grounding.

Yet concerts are fragile things. They require a delicate balance of shared interests and mutual restraint. The Concert of Europe lasted decades; the Versailles settlement barely managed one. The difference lay not in the structure but in the participants’ willingness to accept less than total victory.

For Israel and the broader Middle East, the message is clear: prepare for a world where great powers seek stability over transformation, where ideological alignment matters less than raw capability, and where smaller states must navigate among giants rather than depend upon patrons.

In game theory, we call this a ‘coordination game with distributive conflict.’ Everyone prefers coordination to chaos—but everyone also wants the coordination point that best serves their interests. The strategic skill lies in shaping which equilibrium emerges.

Israel has played this game before.