Mohamed Osman

The Crisis Within

Why Somalia’s political turmoil cannot be blamed on its neighbors.

It is tempting to blame Ethiopia, Kenya, or the UAE for Somalia’s political turmoil. But the forces paralyzing the state today are homegrown: domestic institutional failures, elite power struggles, and federal bargains that were never settled. Outside actors may exploit these divisions, but they did not create the constitutional, judicial, or federal breakdowns at the heart of the crisis.

A Federation Built on Unfinished Business

Somalia’s federal system was assembled piecemeal after Siad Barre’s dictatorship collapsed in 1991. The 2012 Provisional Constitution was meant to prevent a return to authoritarian rule, but it left revenue sharing, security command, and electoral administration deliberately vague. That ambiguity has put Mogadishu on a recurring collision course with its most autonomous states.

Puntland, founded in 1998—more than a decade before the modern federal government—sees itself as a founding partner, not a subordinate province. Jubaland, formed in 2013 after Ahmed Madobe’s forces ousted Al-Shabaab from Kismayo with Kenyan backing, has long clashed with Mogadishu over port revenue, Madobe’s legitimacy, and control of the Gedo region.

Who Writes the Rules?

The current crisis centers on who controls the rules of political transition. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s overhaul of the provisional constitution—extending presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years and centralizing authority in Mogadishu—lacked broad consensus among the opposition and Federal Member States. Moving from the indirect “4.5” clan formula to “one person, one vote” elections is widely supported in principle, but pushing it through without agreed constituencies, an independent electoral body, or security parity threatens the balance of clan and regional power.

The judiciary has become a casualty. After the Supreme Court ruled that the term extensions could not apply retrospectively—meaning the president’s mandate expired in May 2026 and elections must be held within 90 days—the federal government rejected the court’s authority. The removal of Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed in November 2026 drew condemnation from UN human rights experts as a direct threat to judicial independence.

No foreign government can fix a domestic lack of trust over how votes are counted and seats are allocated.

From Friction to Open Rupture

Relations with the regions have escalated sharply since 2024:

  • Puntland walks away: In March 2024, Puntland withdrew recognition of the federal government over the unilateral amendments, vowing to operate independently until a consensus constitution is approved by referendum. The creation of the Mogadishu-aligned Northeast State in 2025 deepened the rift.
  • Jubaland takes up arms: After Madobe extended his own term, Mogadishu declared his re-election illegal, triggering rival arrest warrants in November 2024. Federal and Jubaland forces clashed in Ras Kamboni and Gedo, and Mogadishu imposed flight bans and backed a rival administration in Gedo.
  • Dialogue stalls: By 2026, Puntland, Jubaland, and opposition figures had united in the Somali Future Council. Their boycott kept a November 14–18, 2026 dialogue conference in Mogadishu from opening.

Al-Shabaab’s Biggest Advantage

This infighting is one of Al-Shabaab’s greatest strategic assets. A promising 2022 government offensive has given way to a deteriorating security picture as troops and political attention are diverted into internal standoffs. Plans to extend the campaign into southern Somalia have stalled over disputes with Jubaland and Puntland, while Puntland fights ISIS-Somalia on its own.

The timing could hardly be worse. With the transition to the AUSSOM mission in January 2025, Somali forces were expected to take over twenty-one forward operating bases from departing African Union troops. Stretched thin and divided, they have struggled to fill the gaps, and Al-Shabaab has recaptured areas such as the strategic district of Moqokori. Persistent infighting is also deepening donor fatigue, complicating efforts to fund AUSSOM at the UN Security Council.

Why Blaming the Neighbors Fails

  • Outsiders exploit vacuums; they do not create them. Regional and Gulf powers—Turkey backing federal institutions, the UAE close to Puntland and Jubaland—gain leverage because Somali leaders are already fractured and seeking outside patrons.
  • Scapegoating erodes accountability. Framing domestic failures as foreign plots lets elites dodge the compromises needed to build inclusive institutions and respect term limits.
  • Security costs compound at home. Every soldier sent to settle political scores in Baidoa, Gedo, or Beledweyne is one not fighting Al-Shabaab.

The Way Forward

Until Somali leaders rebuild consensus around the constitution, restore judicial independence, and agree on a federal power-sharing arrangement, these crises will persist—no matter what neighboring governments do.

For more on the judicial standoff, watch Somalia Supreme Court Declares President’s Term Expired.

About the Author
Osman is a retired physician and public health specialist, originally from Somaliland and now a Canadian citizen. His career spans clinical practice, public health leadership, consulting, and health analytics. In addition to his healthcare work, he advocates for Somaliland’s international recognition and publishes commentary on related issues.
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