The fall of Assad means opportunities for Israel – and some danger

The collapse of Assad’s brutal regime places Israel in a complex situation, presenting both new threats and significant opportunities. After more than 13 years of a ruthless civil war, during which Syria became an Iranian stronghold and a base for Russian power, Assad’s fall could significantly alter Israel’s strategic balance and that of the Middle East. For now, Israel is a passive observer with limited ability to influence events. However, it will soon need to adopt a strategy to mitigate the risks arising from the new reality along the Golan Heights border.

Let us start with the positive aspects of this surprising development in Syria. Assad has been a long-time enemy of Israel. While he did not initiate wars, he posed a constant potential threat. Worse, under his rule, Syria became a central link in the Shiite axis connecting Tehran to Beirut, serving as a corridor for transferring Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. It is no wonder that these players invested heavily in maintaining Assad’s rule. The collapse of his regime and the rise of forces hostile to Iran in his place could sever this axis. The result would be the isolation of Hezbollah, trapped between a hostile regime in Syria and Israel.

The organization, which has been severely weakened by the war and suffers from significant attrition, is now looking toward a period of respite and recovery. Assad’s fall may cut off its main supply route from Iran, making it much harder for Tehran to replenish its weapons stockpiles. This development would also likely weaken Hezbollah domestically, as other sects in Lebanon would welcome its decline.

Assad’s fall also deals a severe blow to Iran itself. Tehran has invested billions in preserving Assad’s regime and views Syria as one of its most important strategic assets in the region. The collapse of the Damascus regime undermines Iran’s influence in the Middle East and harms its plans to surround Israel with a “ring of fire.” Similarly, Russia, Syria’s ally, may lose its strategic bases — the airbase in Khmeimim and the naval base in Latakia — weakening its regional standing.

However, alongside these opportunities, there are clear dangers. Syria under Assad’s leadership may have been an enemy, but it was a state. It was possible to communicate with it — indirectly or directly — and to leverage diplomatic and other tools against it. Assad’s fall could turn Syria into a battleground dominated by jihadist forces, a collection of extremist organizations uninterested in dialogue or agreements. These actors could pose a direct and immediate threat along the Golan Heights border.

Moreover, the chaos likely to emerge in Syria could tempt Turkey to intervene more aggressively. President Erdogan, who has been promoting an Islamist agenda for some time, harbors expansionist ambitions in the Middle East and views Syria, particularly its Kurdish minority in the north, as a threat to his borders. His support for certain rebel factions and increased influence in Syria could lead to direct friction with Israel. While this is a less likely scenario, it remains a dangerous one.

What should Israel do in light of this emerging reality? At present, it has established a security buffer against the emerging forces on the border, but it has no control over events in Syria and remains primarily an observer. However, in the near future, it will need to make decisions. For example, should it take military action to deter extremist elements?

For now, Israel can sit on the sidelines, observe, prepare, and, for a brief moment, “enjoy” the fact that there is a war in the Middle East in which it is not involved.