The Future of U.S./Israel Relations: Two Elections, Two Scenarios – Part II

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.”

Part II: Two Scenarios for the Future

The future of U.S.–Israel relations hinges heavily on two variables: who leads Israel, and whether the new Congress translates unprecedented public dissatisfaction into concrete policy. The baseline is clear: the era of reflexive, bipartisan, unconditional support is over. What replaces it depends on the scenario.

  Scenario A: A Non-Netanyahu Israeli Government + New Congress

A government led by someone other than Netanyahu, most likely former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, whose “Straight Party” was tasked with forming a government after the October 2026 election, would face a Congress where the old bipartisan consensus has shattered.

 The Congressional Dynamic

The new Congress, convening in January 2027 with Democrats having retaken both chambers, represents a structural shift. The midterm elections delivered a clear message: candidates openly critical of Israel outperformed pro-Israel candidates in multiple races, and Michigan elected its first Muslim senator. Vermont Senator Peter Welch stated that within the Democratic Party, a “consensus of opposition and distrust” toward Netanyahu and his government now exists. The new Congress is expected to push measures previously unthinkable: arms embargoes and sanctions on extremist settlers and officials.

This does not mean Congress will immediately cut all aid. The underlying security relationship retains structural depth. But the political cost of supporting Israel has flipped. As one analysis noted, positions that once made candidates unelectable may now be electoral advantages.

 The Non-Netanyahu Advantage

A non-Netanyahu government would be uniquely positioned to exploit this shift. Eisenkot explicitly campaigned on “restarting and deepening” the partnership with the U.S. and “consolidating its bipartisan foundations.” The logic is straightforward: much of the Democratic anger is personal and policy-specific, directed at Netanyahu’s alignment with the Republican Party and his government’s conduct. A new Israeli leader could credibly argue that the “Netanyahu problem” is solved, potentially unlocking a more functional, if still more conditional, relationship.

The risk, however, is that the structural drivers of the shift, generational change in American attitudes, the memory of Gaza, and the “America First” faction’s hostility to foreign entanglements, transcend any individual Israeli leader. A non-Netanyahu government buys goodwill, but not a return to the pre-2023 status quo.

Summary of Scenario A:  A non-Netanyahu government offers a softer landing. It can rebuild bipartisan channels and credibly distance Israel from the person most responsible for the rupture, but it cannot reverse the deeper structural forces pushing the relationship toward conditionality.

  Scenario B: Netanyahu Remains Prime Minister + New Congress

This is the far more volatile scenario. Netanyahu’s continued tenure would collide directly with a Congress and an American public that have increasingly defined their opposition to Israel through their opposition to him.

 The “Toxic” Factor

Israeli opposition leaders did not mince words after the midterms. Yair Golan said the results showed how “toxic” Netanyahu is in the eyes of both American parties; Yair Lapid stated that “Israel cannot afford” another Netanyahu term. Pew data from mid-2026 showed that 62% of Americans held negative views of Netanyahu’s government, including a majority of Republicans under 39.

 Trump’s Unreliable Patronage

Netanyahu’s primary asset, his relationship with Trump, has depreciated. Trump publicly backed Netanyahu’s reelection in October 2026, but then announced in November that he and Netanyahu had agreed to end the roughly $4 billion in annual U.S. aid by year’s end, partly to avoid giving Democrats “ammunition.” Trump also acknowledged that American “disgust” with Israel was a major factor in Republican losses. Vice President Vance, positioning for 2028, pointedly refused to endorse Netanyahu and blamed the Iran war, which many Americans believe Netanyahu dragged the U.S. into, for the electoral defeat.

 The Likely Trajectory

With Netanyahu in power and a hostile Congress, the relationship would likely enter a phase of “managed divergence.” The new Congress would attempt to impose conditions on aid, restrict arms transfers, and sanction settler violence. A President Trump, motivated by his own grievances and electoral math, might not veto these efforts, or might preempt them with unilateral cuts. The structural security relationship would persist in degraded form: intelligence sharing and some defense cooperation would continue, but the public, financial, and political dimensions of the alliance would contract sharply.

Summary of Scenario B:  Netanyahu’s presence accelerates the rupture. The relationship becomes more transactional, more adversarial in Congress, and more dependent on an unpredictable president whose support is no longer reliable, while the aid framework that underpins Israel’s military planning erodes in real time.

  The Common Thread

In both scenarios, the direction is the same: from unconditional to conditional. The difference is pace and manageability. A non-Netanyahu government offers a chance for a softer landing, preserving bipartisan channels and rebuilding trust incrementally. Netanyahu’s presence accelerates the rupture, making the relationship more transactional, more adversarial in Congress, and more dependent on an unpredictable president whose support is no longer reliable.

The deeper forces, demographic change, generational shifts in American attitudes, and the post-Gaza reckoning with Israel’s conduct, will outlast any single Israeli government or U.S. Congress. As one former Israeli ambassador put it, what is ending is not the alliance itself, but the “half-century” framework of shared values and perceived shared virtue that sustained it.

Whether Israel is led by Netanyahu or a successor, the trajectory is the same, conditional, transactional, contested. The only question is how fast and how rough the landing will be. The forces reshaping the relationship are bigger than any one leader or election, and the era of unconditional support is not coming back.