Lithuania has spent years asking the public to trust the Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance Research Centre. I have now put the opposite proposition into the record: trust is not a methodology.

LGGRTC has exhausted the presumption of credibility. Across this record, unread judgments, inflated procedural claims, selective evidentiary burdens, partial corrections and continued repetition after notice demand adversarial scrutiny at every material turn. No contested LGGRTC proposition should now be accepted because the Centre published it. Each must be independently verified against the underlying record. Until that happens, the proper evidentiary posture is distrust, not deference.

The Centre admitted the central defect

On October 2, 2026, LGGRTC registered response No. 55R-951. The Centre acknowledged that it had not examined the 1970 Lübeck judgment before using that proceeding in its defense of Jonas Noreika. It also acknowledged that the formulation that Bub had been “completely acquitted” was probably not legally correct.

The concession should have ended the matter. Instead, the Centre insisted that its “essential statements” were still accurate and defended them by weakening the proposition. The earlier claim said the court had rejected charges concerning the Holocaust. The later defense said the accusations had not resulted in conviction for all of the alleged activity.

The same letter records that Hans Gewecke was sentenced to four and a half years. The 2019 memorandum dated the court’s ruling to 1969; the judgment is dated January 27, 1970.

The Centre’s own paper trail therefore supplies the source-control failure: the legal characterization was made without primary verification, and the later correction narrowed rather than withdrew the claim.

The 105-event audit removes the escape route

I have now published a 105-event documentary audit and a public reproducibility appendix so the record can be checked rather than trusted.

The audit contains 105 rows. Eighty-four active events bear on eight methodological tests and produce 118 overlapping test assignments. Eighty-three of those 84 counted events have a public source path; the remaining event is explicitly marked as under source verification rather than smuggled into the record as settled fact.

I deliberately did not convert the counts into a fake probability of dishonesty. The corpus is purposive and the assignments overlap. The evidence is stronger when the mathematics does not pretend to prove motive.

What the audit shows is recurrence across different files and different types of evidence: foreign procedural outcomes translated into more exculpatory language; limited inquiries expanded beyond their scope; categorical certification before primary verification; different attribution burdens; criminal-guilt standards imported into historical responsibility; corrections that do not propagate; and Centre conclusions moving into wider state use.

The conclusion is documentary: LGGRTC’s exculpatory historical conclusions repeatedly survive with a lighter burden of verification, attribution and correction than the adverse evidence used to challenge them.

I included the evidence that cuts against my own thesis

The audit rejects an easy accusation. LGGRTC does not simply accept Soviet-derived evidence when it helps an honored figure and reject it when it hurts. In the Krikštaponis record, Alfredas Rukšėnas used postwar criminal-case files adversely.

That counterexample disposes of the provenance argument. The live issue is what rule the Centre applies after a source enters the record.

Inside one 2016 Rukšėnas article, a favorable episode is used to support an inference about Jonas Noreika and his comrades. A few pages later, Aleksandras Pakalniškis’s adverse account faces a heavier attribution and corroboration burden.

The evidentiary question is whether favorable and adverse material face the same threshold for attribution, corroboration and inference.

Brazaitis proves that notice is no longer the missing fact

The Juozas Ambrazevičius-Brazaitis record is even harder for the state to explain away. On May 12, 2026, Vice-Minister Vidmantas Verbickas wrote to Representative Brad Sherman that LGGRTC had acknowledged that its earlier “complete exoneration” wording was legally imprecise.

The correction did not clean the record. The October 9 capture of the corrected page still showed a separate statement that Brazaitis had been rehabilitated by the U.S. Department of Justice, while another Centre page captured the same day continued to state the same rehabilitation claim.

A prosecutor later declined criminal investigation of both complaints, calling the Centre’s Škirpa report a historiographical rather than legal assessment and the opinion of specialist historians, while treating the Brazaitis correction as evidence that intent to spread knowingly false information had not been established. Criminal intent is not my test. Accuracy is.

If a state research body can be authoritative when its history is cited and merely “historians’ opinion” when the consequences of error are tested, the state has created authority without accountability.

That is why there are ten doors

On October 9, I filed ten signed submissions, each directed to a separate competence within the Lithuanian state accountability structure.

The public filings are AE-01, AR-01, O-SUPP, S-AUD, A-01, S-EDU, MFA-01, S-FAC, P-01, and S-01.

Archive provenance went to the archival authority. Research integrity went to the academic-ethics channel. Administrative accountability went to the Ombudsperson. Audit and control went to audit and parliamentary oversight. Research and education policy went to the Seimas Education and Science Committee. Foreign procedural claims went to the Foreign Ministry and foreign-affairs oversight. Structural ownership went to the Seimas. State honors and legislative initiative went to the President.

This is the institutional test. A ministry may say it does not decide history. A prosecutor may call the material historians’ opinion. An archive may say it only holds records. A committee may say another committee owns the issue.

Ten tailored filings remove the convenience of everybody being adjacent to the problem and nobody owning it.

PRISMA makes the contradiction European

On October 2, the same date 55R-951 was registered, LGGRTC announced its PRISMA participation, identifying project code 101296606 and the project “Memory from the EU Peripheries: Resisting Holocaust Distortion, Activating Exchange for Resilient European Remembrance.”

A PRISMA consortium page published by the Jewish Community of Osijek identifies the partner countries as Belgium, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia, and lists the Lithuanian Jewish Community and LGGRTC among the partners. The consortium describes a project aimed at countering Holocaust denial, distortion and instrumentalization through education, transnational exchange and critical engagement with victims, bystanders, collaborators and rescuers.

That puts the Centre inside a European project whose subject is the exact methodological field now under challenge.

PRISMA’s own mission therefore creates a due-diligence obligation. A project built to resist Holocaust distortion cannot treat source verification, correction controls and partner methodology as somebody else’s problem.

What verification rules did the consortium examine before treating LGGRTC as a partner in resistance to Holocaust distortion? What correction mechanism did it confirm? What conflict controls exist? What happens when a partner admits that it had not read a judgment before certifying its supposed meaning?

Those questions go to the core of the work PRISMA says it exists to perform.

October 2 is the entire case in one date

On October 2, LGGRTC told the public that it would help Europe resist Holocaust distortion.

On October 2, LGGRTC registered a letter acknowledging that it had not examined the Lübeck judgment behind one of its exculpatory historical claims.

The chronology is sufficient: the anti-distortion announcement and the source-control admission entered the public record on the same date.

The President now owns the honors question

P-01 asks the President to call for independent review and then use powers that belong to the Presidency if the review produces findings material to legislation or state honors.

It does not ask the President to decide historical guilt. It asks the Presidency not to treat state commemoration as immune from evidence.

The Seimas now owns the structural question

S-01 went to the Speaker and Board of the Seimas because the 2024 framework makes the Seimas the holder of the Centre’s owner rights.

The Seimas does not need to vote on 1941 history. It needs to answer a governance question: who independently verifies LGGRTC’s primary-source work, methodological consistency, conflict controls, corrections and withdrawals?

If the answer is that the Centre reviews the Centre, Lithuania has institutional self-certification rather than external historical accountability.

The burden has shifted

For years the Centre’s defense has been institutional status: state body, historians, archives, expertise.

The public record now asks for something more primitive: show the work.

The 105-event audit is public. The reproducibility appendix is public. The ten filings are public. The Lübeck admission is public. The Brazaitis correction chain is public. PRISMA’s anti-distortion mandate is public.

No one needs to accept my historical conclusions to answer the institutional question.

If ten Lithuanian state bodies cannot identify who independently checks the Genocide Centre, and a European anti-distortion project cannot explain the controls it applied before making the Centre a partner, the credibility problem no longer belongs to the critic.

It belongs to the institution demanding trust without submitting to verification.