The “Greater Israel” Idea: History and Modern Implications

The idea of “Greater Israel” has never been a central concept in the history of the Zionist movement, not even after the establishment of the State of Israel.

This idea is based on the historical–religious conception of the Jewish people as a nation returning to its biblical homeland stretching “from the sea to the river,” and sometimes even beyond the river.

The roots of this vision can be found in the Bible, in rabbinic religious thought, and in the early national literature of the Zionist movement.

With Israel’s takeover of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights in the June 1967 War, the idea shifted from an abstract vision into a political program for certain right-wing Jewish currents.

During the early decades of Zionism, the political debate was mainly between pragmatic currents, which constituted the majority and sought to establish a Jewish state within any possible borders, and ideological currents that regarded relinquishing any part of the land as undermining the essence of national redemption.

But only after 1967, with the return of Jewish control over East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, did the idea of “Greater Israel” regain momentum within the Israeli right. Movements such as Gush Emunim pushed for intensive settlement in these territories, viewing it as a historical and moral duty.

By contrast, the realist current within Zionism, represented by leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, and later Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, believed that controlling the whole of Greater Israel was politically and demographically unfeasible. Ruling over millions of Palestinians without granting them full civil rights would place Israel before a dilemma: either undermine its democratic character or forfeit its Jewish majority.

Moreover, retaining these territories has provoked, and continues to provoke, strong international opposition, keeping Israel in constant confrontation with the global community.

The clash between the vision of “Greater Israel” and pragmatic thinking has been a main dividing line in Israeli politics since the 1970s. Menachem Begin, who had once believed in the indivisibility of the land, signed the peace treaty with Egypt that included withdrawal from Sinai, a move considered by some of his supporters as a betrayal. Later came the Oslo Accords and attempts at a final settlement with the Palestinians, which deepened the rift between the ideological and pragmatic camps.

In recent decades, it has become increasingly clear that the idea of “Greater Israel” is not viable in our time.

First, demographically, the millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza make the vision of a clear Jewish majority between the sea and the river highly doubtful.

Second, politically, maintaining control over all the territories threatens Israel’s standing in the world and isolates it internationally.

Third, from a security perspective, imposing full sovereignty over all areas could ignite unending violence, undermine stability, and drain Israel’s economic resources.

Instead of this comprehensive vision, realism has gained strength, advocating gradual solutions, regional arrangements, and preserving the Jewish–democratic identity of the state while ensuring its security.

The idea of Greater Israel remains a source of inspiration for certain ideological circles, but as a foundation for the policy of a modern sovereign state, it is no longer achievable.

In conclusion, the idea of Greater Israel still exists as a dream among a certain Jewish ideological current, and perhaps this is why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared his solidarity with it.

Yet demographic, political, and security realities impose the recognition that it is not feasible today and contradicts the democratic character of the State of Israel.

As an idea, it may survive in public discourse, but pragmatic Zionism continues to set the agenda.