The Guard at Your Synagogue Door is Not Enough

I am the son of a German Jew who fled Germany in late 1941 for America. I grew up listening to my father, of blessed memory, describe surviving the terror of Kristallnacht as an eight-year-old boy. He spoke of the shattered glass, the fear, and the sudden realization that neighbors could turn hostile and institutions could fail. In our home, those stories were not abstractions; they were warnings wrapped in memory. They shaped how I understand Jewish vulnerability, Jewish resilience, and the profound responsibility that comes with communal life.

For much of my life, those stories felt like history: tragic, instructive, but ultimately distant.

The attacks of October 7th in Israel changed that. The surge of antisemitism that followed globally, and here in the United States, made something deeply uncomfortable feel real again. Jewish communities were once again facing open hostility, threats, and the normalization of Jew-hatred in public spaces. For me, this was not simply geopolitical news. It was a generational echo, and it compelled me to act.

Over two years ago, I volunteered to become the first Head of Community Safety at our synagogue in New Jersey. I had no formal training in security, nor a military or police background. I possessed only an unwavering need to do something to protect our Kehilla in the face of rising Jew hate. After all, “Kol Yisrael arevim zeh la-zeh” (all of Israel is responsible for one another).

I immersed myself in site security, joining the Community Security Service (CSS), taking free online courses from Homeland Security and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and talking to industry experts from our local police forces.

Through those conversations and resources, a consistent framework emerged: true synagogue security must be layered.

Synagogue security in the United States is often defined by a single, visible measure: a uniformed guard at the front entrance. While that presence offers reassurance and deterrence, a guard at the door is a tactic, not a security strategy. The threat is real; CISA has stated that acts of targeted violence against houses of worship are a “top priority,” noting 37 attacks resulting in 64 fatalities between 2009 and 2019 alone. However, as Michael Masters, National Director of the Secure Community Network, has warned: “If religious institutions begin to resemble militarized zones, we will have fundamentally lost a huge part of what it means to be a functioning democracy.”

To navigate that tension (to be serious without stripping a synagogue of its soul) we must build a comprehensive program resting on three core pillars:

1. Leadership and Governance

Security Governance and Concealed Carry Policy

Security must begin with governance. Before cameras are installed, vendors are hired, guards are assigned, or volunteer teams are formed, synagogue leadership must determine who owns security decisions and how those decisions will be made.

Rabbis, board members, executive staff, facilities personnel, security coordinators, and lay leaders should align around shared priorities, risk tolerance, and clear escalation authority. When governance is unclear, security becomes reactive and personality-driven. When governance is documented and approved, authority lines are clear, decisions are defensible, and emergency response is more coordinated.

Strong governance also supports relationships with law enforcement, insurers, and agencies such as FEMA, where leadership-owned planning can strengthen security grant applications.

Given the increase in threats against Jewish institutions, every synagogue should also have a formal governance-level discussion about lawful concealed carry inside its building. That discussion should include applicable state and local laws, insurance and liability concerns, law enforcement coordination, communal sensitivities, and the synagogue’s overall risk tolerance.

Whether lawful concealed carry is allowed, restricted, or prohibited, the policy should be deliberate, lawful, and approved by leadership.

2. Layered Physical Design

No single measure can address the full spectrum of risk. Effective protection relies on concentric rings of deterrence, detection, delay, and response. As one security consultant recently explained in The Washington Post, “It’s the same kind of system we use in government to protect an embassy. There are layers that someone has to get through before they actually get into the congregation.”

• The Outer Layer: Lighting, landscaping, and vehicular considerations that shape how individuals approach the building.
• The Middle Layer: Controlled entry points (the most critical element), visitor management procedures, and trained greeters who balance hospitality with situational awareness.
• The Inner Layer: Access control technology, compartmentalized spaces, internal communication systems, and clearly defined safe areas.

When congregations undertake new construction or major renovations, protective measures such as entry sequencing, sightlines, and emergency egress need to be integrated early. Layered security, when done properly, does not create a fortress; it creates largely invisible, structural resilience. If one layer fails, another remains in place. 

3. Comprehensive Planning and Training

Leadership intent and layered design must translate into operational reality through a written Emergency Management Plan (EMP). This defines how the synagogue responds to all credible threats: active assailants, medical emergencies, fires, and natural disasters. Crucially, it establishes an incident command structure. In a crisis, confusion is dangerous. Who has decision authority? Who communicates with congregants? Who accounts for children in classrooms? These questions must be answered before an incident occurs.

However, security plans that remain in binders or on computers do not protect congregations. Training must be role-based, sustainable, and aligned with the governance framework. The Rabbi(s), administrative staff, educators, congregational volunteers and yes the guard at the door, each carry different responsibilities within the security architecture. Tabletop exercises, drills, and periodic refreshers reinforce communication and decision-making across all layers of protection.

A Unifying Principle

Across governance, physical design, and emergency planning, one unifying principle remains: leadership ownership. Security cannot be entirely outsourced to a guard service or delegated informally to a small group of concerned congregants. It must be embedded in how the institution thinks, decides, budgets, builds, and trains.

Our security guard at the door is important. But he/she is simply not enough.

If we take seriously both the documented threat environment and the democratic values that define us, we must move beyond symbolic measures and build comprehensive, governance-driven security programs. Serious without being militarized, visible without being theatrical, and disciplined without being fearful.

Not out of panic. Not out of politics. But out of responsibility.