The Importance of Sharing Intelligence, including Intelligence from Arab States

On September 25, 1973, King Hussein of Jordan secretly travelled to Israel and met with the then-Prime Minister, Golda Meir. His message was brief and unequivocal: Egypt and Syria had decided to launch a war against Israel. He estimated that the attack would take place within a short period of time, approximately ten days.

Following the meeting, Golda Meir immediately summoned Défense Minister Moshe Dayan, IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar, and Military Intelligence chief Eli Zeira to her office. She had one request: assess the reliability and credibility of the information she had received. In intelligence terminology, she wanted to determine whether there was supporting or corroborating information that could validate the Jordanian king’s warning. Or, in the opposite direction, to refute the information.

The tragic ending is well known, especially to students of history. The information was examined, but Zeira led the assessment that the probability of war was low. The result was the devastating Yom Kippur War, which cost the lives of 2,656 IDF soldiers.

I begin with this historical episode because of information published this week alleging that the ruler of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed, warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu before October 7, 2023, of a planned large-scale Hamas attack. According to reports in the Israeli media, the chain of information was as follows: Yahya Sinwar shared the plan with a Fatah operative in the Gaza Strip. The information subsequently reached the Emiratis, and from there it was passed to Mohammed bin Zayed, who decided to convey it to Netanyahu. The Prime Minister’s Office denies that such a conversation took place. The Emiratis, in diplomatic language, have said that intelligence was passed on when necessary.

The United Arab Emirates is perhaps more closely connected to Israel than any other Arab state, including in the realm of intelligence and security cooperation. It is worth recalling in this context that Egypt also reportedly conveyed a similar warning to the Prime Minister’s Office three days before the October 7 massacre.

Now consider this carefully: Netanyahu did not come from the intelligence community. But his extensive political experience, and the thousands of meetings he has held with intelligence and security officials over the years, undoubtedly give him at least some understanding of how intelligence is collected, processed, and analysed.

To be clear: a prime minister in a democratic state is not required to accept the intelligence community’s assessment. Nor is he required to accept the recommendations of those who produce it. But as prime minister, he is obligated to listen to professional assessments. That is part of his responsibility.

In the case before us, however, the picture is reversed. The warnings came from Arab political leaders, at least two of them: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. When reports of the Egyptian warning emerged, Netanyahu denied that such a warning had been conveyed. A quick examination, however, indicated that the warning had indeed been delivered. Moreover, Netanyahu and the person who conveyed the warning, Abbas Kamel, Egypt’s intelligence chief, have been photographed together at a meeting.

What was true in the Egyptian case appears to be true now as well: Netanyahu denies receiving the Emirati warning. The Emirati ruler has limited himself to an ambiguous statement, presumably in order not to damage relations with Israel and with the Prime Minister’s Office.

But the problem here is not merely diplomatic. It is a matter of leadership and accountability. A leader has a responsibility to determine, as thoroughly as possible, whether information of such potentially enormous significance is credible. Apparently, this was not done. The matter is even more serious because similar warnings were reportedly circulating within Israel’s own intelligence system. Netanyahu was entitled to reject those assessments. It is also legitimate to argue that, at the time, the principal security effort was focused on Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank. If that was indeed the professional assessment, it is a legitimate position.

So what, then, is the problem?

The problem is that Netanyahu apparently did not make a sufficient effort to verify the information he received through intelligence and diplomatic channels. Egypt has insisted that the information was conveyed. A U.S. congressman has reportedly confirmed the Egyptian warning. And the Emiratis have, in diplomatic language, indicated that intelligence was passed on.

The prime minister’s decision rested on a conception, which ultimately proven wrong, that the situation in Gaza was under control. As prime minister, Netanyahu bears primary responsibility for this conceptual failure.

There are two principal lessons to be drawn from the story of intelligence sharing between Arab states and Israel’s prime minister.

The first concerns the Arab states themselves. It turns out that some Arab states that have signed peace or normalization agreements with Israel honour those agreements, at least in the fields of intelligence and security cooperation. The familiar distinctions between a “cold peace” and a “warm peace” are therefore not necessarily the most useful ones here. A more accurate term may be instrumental peace: relations between two sides that cooperate because doing so serves their respective interests.

From now on, when an Arab political leader conveys a warning, it should, and, in my view, must, be examined carefully, precisely as Golda Meir did in 1973. The warning may ultimately prove accurate, or it may prove wrong. But the process of verification is not optional.

The second lesson is political. Every Israeli reading this column should ask themselves what kind of person they want in the Prime Minister’s Office: a leader who assumes responsibility, examines intelligence with the senior security establishment, seriously considers competing assessments, and only then decides? Or a leader who disregards those around him, fails to thoroughly investigate critical information, and then makes the decision alone?

When the decision succeeds, the credit belongs to the leader. The same principle applies when it fails. Unfortunately, Netanyahu has not internalized this lesson. Israeli citizens would do well to remember it every day, not only on election day. Why? Because the prime minister is the person who has the greatest influence over the lives of all of us.

May the coming year be a good and peaceful one.

The author is Head of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science at Ariel University and a Visiting Scholar at Florida Atlantic University.