The Iran Dilemma: Best Case, Worst Case, No Case

As Iran and the United States circle each other once again in nuclear negotiations, the stakes are rising — not just for the immediate players, but for the entire region. For Israel, the implications are existential. Some view the talks as a final chance for diplomacy. Others see them as a smokescreen ahead of inevitable confrontation. The outcome could define the Middle East’s strategic landscape for the next decade. This article explores three potential paths: One highly desirable but unlikely, one cynical yet potentially effective, and one deeply problematic. All roads lead to Tehran — but not all provide Israel the room it needs to maneuver.

The Strategic Landscape

Since the 2015 nuclear deal, the strategic terrain has shifted. After the October 7th attacks and their aftermath, Iran’s regional deterrence network took a hit. Hamas and Hezbollah have been severely weakened, Assad is gone, and Tehran’s proxies in Yemen and Iraq have been increasingly targeted and scrutinized. Iran’s ability to project power through non-state actors is diminished — at least temporarily.

But on the nuclear front, Iran is in a much stronger position. The IAEA reports Iran now holds a significantly larger stockpile of enriched uranium, including material enriched up to 60% — dangerously close to weapons-grade. Its nuclear breakout time has shrunk from years to months or even weeks.

This asymmetry — weakened regional deterrence paired with nuclear acceleration — presents a volatile backdrop. From a rational deterrence perspective, Tehran may view its nuclear advances as compensation for regional losses, seeking to restore strategic balance and regime security.

For Israel, time is running out. Traditional deterrence tools are eroding, and the narrowing window to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran is raising alarm. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are watching closely. Riyadh, in particular, has hinted it may pursue its own nuclear capability if Iran crosses the weapons threshold, risking a regional arms race. While Gulf states publicly endorse diplomacy to avoid economic disruption, they may quietly support decisive action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

The Libyan Model: A Dream Scenario

From Israel’s viewpoint, the ideal outcome would resemble the 2003 Libyan model. In that case, Muammar Gaddafi voluntarily dismantled his WMD program in exchange for normalization with the West and reintegration into the global system. Applied to Iran, this would mean the total and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure, intrusive international inspections, and permanent renunciation of weapons-grade enrichment.

Such a development would be a strategic game-changer. It would neutralize what Israel sees as its gravest existential threat without requiring military action. It could also rebalance power in the region and reduce the chances of a nuclear arms race.

But that vision remains largely utopian. Iran’s leaders internalized Gaddafi’s fate — overthrown by Western-backed forces less than a decade after disarming — as a cautionary tale. For Tehran, nuclear capability isn’t just leverage; it’s a regime survival tool and an ideological cornerstone of resistance. Even under a game-theoretic lens, Iran’s optimal strategy is to maintain nuclear latency: Close enough to weaponization to deter attack, but not so close as to trigger one. The Libyan model is useful as an ideal, but practically unachievable under current conditions.

Negotiations as Prelude to Confrontation: The Calculated Cynicism

A more plausible, if cynical, path is that the current negotiations are not expected to succeed — but are necessary optics. In this view, talks are a prelude to confrontation, designed to demonstrate good faith, exhaust peaceful avenues, and build international legitimacy for a tougher response if Iran escalates further.

This strategy offers key benefits. It allows military preparations to advance — including long-range strike planning and air defense upgrades — while shaping global perception. For Israel, it offers cover: If conflict erupts, it will appear reluctant, not reckless.

A historical parallel can be drawn from the lead-up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Throughout 2002, Washington pushed diplomacy through the UN, demanding Iraq disclose and dismantle WMDs. Weapons inspectors returned, site visits resumed, but trust eroded. Meanwhile, military preparations continued. For many, diplomacy served less as a conflict-resolution mechanism and more as a political prerequisite for war. The lesson for today: Public negotiations can function less as problem-solving and more as staging — a necessary box to check before kinetic action begins.

History also suggests that limited military action can sometimes pave the way for renewed diplomacy — but from a stronger negotiating position. Targeted strikes on key nuclear facilities or proxy assets could reset the strategic calculus, demonstrating resolve while preserving room for negotiation. For Israel or the US, such action might serve as a calibrated warning: The cost of further nuclear advancement is real, but the door to diplomacy remains open. This approach mirrors past precedents — from US strikes on Syria in 2017, which were followed by diplomatic overtures, to Israel’s own history of using military pressure to shape adversaries’ behavior. The risk is high, but so too is the potential reward: Compelling Tehran to return to the table under duress, potentially agreeing to stricter terms than it would under the status quo.

This approach, however, carries real risks. A collapsed negotiation could prompt asymmetric retaliation through Iran’s proxies — from Hezbollah to Iraqi militias or naval disruptions in the Red Sea. Escalation could spin out of control. Moreover, early military engagement might fracture international coalitions, especially in Europe, where appetite for another Middle East war remains low.

Strategic Dissonance in Washington

Layered atop these calculations is a growing strategic divide within Washington. There is broad consensus that China remains the primary geopolitical challenge — particularly over Taiwan and Indo-Pacific stability. But disagreement persists over how the Iranian file fits into that bigger picture.

One camp urges restraint. From this perspective, the US must conserve military and political resources for a potential confrontation with China. A war with Iran — even a limited one — would drain ammunition, readiness, and global focus at the worst possible time.

The opposing camp sees credibility as indivisible. If the US draws red lines (like preventing a nuclear-armed Iran) but fails to enforce them, it risks undermining deterrence everywhere — including in Asia. For this group, a firm response to Iranian escalation would send a powerful signal to adversaries like Beijing: American warnings are not rhetorical.

The Cold War offers a relevant example. In 1986, Reagan ordered airstrikes against Libya in response to terrorism — not only to punish Tripoli, but to signal American resolve globally, including to Moscow. Today’s Iran dilemma is shaped by similar logic: Act decisively in one theater to deter in another.

JCPOA 2.0: Diplomacy on Borrowed Time

Ironically, the most diplomatically appealing scenario — a revived nuclear agreement, or “JCPOA 2.0” — may pose the greatest long-term risk to Israel. On paper, such a deal would reinstate caps on enrichment levels, boost inspections, and reduce immediate tensions.

But many of the original JCPOA’s flaws would persist. Sunset clauses would still allow Iran to resume advanced enrichment within years. Ballistic missile development and regional proxy funding would likely remain untouched. Strategically, the deal would buy time — but offer no permanent fix.

Sanctions relief would inject billions into Iran’s economy. History suggests some of that would flow to groups like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, potentially increasing regional threats. Worse, the optics of renewed diplomacy could tie Israel’s hands. Any unilateral Israeli action might be viewed internationally not as preemptive, but as destabilizing, weakening its alliances.

While Western capitals might celebrate a revived JCPOA as a diplomatic win, regional actors are less convinced. Gulf states remember the post-2015 wave of Iranian cash and aggression. Their concerns go beyond enrichment levels — they fear a more empowered Iran legitimized by international agreement.

The danger here is not confrontation — but the illusion of resolution. A flawed deal may delay conflict, only to ensure a tougher fight down the line.

Conclusion: Choose Your Illusions

In the months ahead, negotiations may dominate headlines and raise hopes. But Israel and its allies must remain clear-eyed. The Libyan model, while ideal, is unrealistic. A managed collapse of talks, though dangerous, could yield greater strategic clarity. And a revived JCPOA, though outwardly stabilizing, may actually heighten long-term risks.

Strategic decision-making requires more than hope. It demands consistency: Assessing each scenario by its deterrence durability, risk of escalation, likelihood of compliance, and impact on Israel’s strategic autonomy. Not all deals are peace. And not all failures are disasters. The future of regional security may depend less on which illusions are embraced — and more on which are wisely discarded.