The Middle East’s ‘Babushka Doll’ Syndrome: States within States

A “Babushka Doll” comprises several layers of ever smaller dolls nestled within each other. It turns out that some Middle East countries have a similar configuration – but as opposed to the Babushka, in a national context it’s a real problem.

In the Middle East, a nation’s map will often show you only half the picture. Officially, a country has one national flag, one capital city, and one constitutional government; but in fact, inside that structure there’s another power center: an organization or political party that commands loyalty, controls resources, and sets its own rules with a high degree of autonomy that usually is an exclusive function of the state. They act like political mini-states – embedded in the system but largely insulated. These organizations distribute benefits to their supporters/adherents, enforce their own particularistic norms, and wield coercive power through legislation and other even more coercive means that the official state can’t easily overcome.

Three countries are contemporary examples of this phenomenon, albeit each taking a somewhat different form. Before getting into the details, here’s the quick survey. The most extreme are Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, constituting a political, economic, and ideological power center inside the presently weakened theocratic regime. Somewhat less comprehensively, Lebanon’s Hezbollah combines military power and parliamentary influence, while also providing social services to its Shiite followers – much more than a traditional political party but somewhat less than a formal state. And then there’s Israel where the ultra-Orthodox political sector doesn’t command an army (“God forbid”!), but it has created a separate sphere of authority in such fields as education, welfare, and religious affairs – all through smart but self-serving coalition bargaining.

Nevertheless, despite their numerous differences, all three share a common feature: layered sovereignty, forcing official state bodies to negotiate – and concede authority to powerful actors within the country’s own borders.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was created after the 1979 toppling of the Shah, not merely to defend Iran, but to protect the ongoing social revolution itself. Unlike a conventional army, the RGC was created to be the regime’s ideological guardians. But like a “Golem,” over time they accrued major political weight, turning into a military force with strong, domestic intelligence gathering, economic muscle, and widespread media influence. Answering directly to the Supreme Leader, they act outside the state’s normal chains of command – and by now, actually above them.

The result is a dual system: on paper there’s only one state; however, another power structure controls the means of coercion, patronage, and ideological indoctrination. The result is that reform becomes difficult because the same organization that protects the system also profits from it.

If Iran displays a parallel sub-state inside a relatively strong regime, Lebanon’s second-level Babushka is contained within a weak state. Hezbollah emerged from a polity that often failed to deliver security, social services, and any sort of coherent national authority. This mini-state built an armed force that in some respects is more effective than what the state can offer – creating clinics, welfare networks, schools, and post-war reconstruction programs.

In short, Hezbollah has major influence without full accountability. True, it sits in the Lebanese parliament and even the government, but it keeps independent military power with a loyal constituency working and being serviced within its own institutions. The price that Lebanon pays is steep, as important decisions – even about war and peace! – aren’t fully controlled by the state. Thus, Hezbollah is not only a symptom of Lebanese weakness; it is a major force maintaining that weakness.

Israel’s case is different in tone and structure, but it harbors many of the same “Babushka” ailments. Unlike the RGC and Hezbollah, the Haredi sector in Israel isn’t a militia and doesn’t compete with the state through armed force. Nevertheless, socio-politically it has created a highly autonomous sphere of influence. Through strong religious parties, voter discipline, independent school systems, rabbinic authority, and smart (legislatively) tailored welfare policies and structures, the Haredim have secured exceptional arrangements that enable them to live as a separate socio-political enclave. Not completely territorially separate (there are Haredim who live in socially “mixed” cities) but nevertheless living as a semi-detached society with its own rules and leadership – and in certain general, national spheres of Israeli life – e.g., marriage, divorce, kashrut – running the lives of the rest of Israeli society.

Such authority differentiation in Israel’s democracy fuels tension over fairness (for most, no military duties), taxation, and labor participation. Making matters worse, with its high birthrate what started out as a manageable exception for a small minority has become a structural (even existential) challenge to the state’s economy and shared civic ethos.

Where is this Middle East “Babushka” trend moving? In opposite directions. For Iran, the latest war has enabled the RGC to finally take power with only a “nod” to the ostensibly ruling Mullahs. Lebanon seems to be moving in the other direction, with the Lebanese government determined (at least verbally) to bring Hezbollah to heel, at least regarding military disarmament.

At present, Israel seems to be somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, there is extremely strong civic and political pressure to have most Haredim drafted into the IDF, as well as inserting the critically important secular subjects into their curriculum. On the other hand, few see a diminution in their authority regarding kosher certification, the religious courts, Wailing Wall discriminatory policies, etc. In the middle are some important areas that would potentially weaken their monopolistic authority e.g., officially sanctioned civil marriage.

For Israel, all this is ironic given PM Ben-Gurion’s successful post-independence policy of mamlakhtiut (“statism”), whereby he disbanded all the ideological militias (e.g., Haganah, Palmakh) and centralized the numerous Socialist educational systems under one educational authority. Unfortunately, the centrifugal force of religious differentiation turned out to be too strong over the ensuing years. Whether that can and will be reversed – in Israel as well as in Iran and Lebanon – only time will tell.